Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson Study Guide

Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson by Robert Caro

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Plot Summary

Master of the Senate is the third volume in Robert Caro's biography of Lyndon Baines Johnson, (1908 -1973), who peferred to be known as LBJ, because only great presidents were known by their initials. This volume covers the twelve years (1949-1960) that LBJ spent in the U.S. Senate, representing his native Texas, after having served several terms in the House of Representatives. It inevitably looks back to those earlier years and less often, ahead to his vice presidency under John F. Kennedy and his own presidency, marked by passage of the epochal Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965.

Master of the Senate is also a study of how legislative power works in America and how Johnson mastered the Senate as no political leader had before him. Caro describes the ups and downs of Senate history, particularly in relation to the power of the Executive Branch, showing that in 1949 it was a tradition-rich, decentralized, inefficient body. He examines how LBJ carefully studied the institution in order to make himself useful to his colleagues and then turn this usefulness into a means of attaining his short-term goal of wielding *real* power somewhere (the House had not afforded this). Solidarity with the powerful "Southern Bloc" of senators was invaluable in this process, but because LBJ's ultimate goal was the presidency, he could not afford to be seen as merely a regional candidate, particularly a region whose primary goal was to resist granting civil rights to its black population. Much of the book deals with LBJ building national fame and maneuvering to balance all the conflicting forces that made it doubtful that he would ever sit in the Oval Office.

Introduction

Introduction Summary

The Introduction sketches the techniques used by white officials in 1957 in Eufaula, AL, to prevent black citizens from voting. No matter how determined they were to exercise the basic right given to them in 1870 by the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, blacks had no legal remedy; hundreds of bills had been introduced in Congress to give teeth to the amendment, but only one had passed, only to be declared unconstitutional. The "Southern Bloc" of senators from the eleven states of the former Confederacy had crushed every attempt to pass legislation that would allow the federal government to intervene. The most recent attempt had been in 1956. In the summer of 1957, liberals were poised to try again, knowing they would almost certainly lose, but Senator Lyndon Baines Johnson, the Senate Majority Leader, was recommending practicality: they had to give the blacks *something*. He was no abstract idealist, but rather a ruthless pragmatist who did whatever was necessary always to be on the winning side. During twenty years of service in Washington, LBJ had voted against civil rights bills and had helped formulate the strategy of the Southern Bloc as a protégé of Richard Brevard Russell of Georgia and his anointed successor.

Caro declares that LBJ will be the primary subject of this book, specifically his years of service in the Senate, which began in 1949. It will show an enormous man of raw power, cockier, tougher and more confident than the man who from 1963 to 1969 would consciously appear "presidential" and "statesmanlike" in the White House. As a senator LBJ was an actor, a storyteller, larger than life, a restless prowler of the corridors of power, a masterful manipulator of the rules of order and a conductor of the symphony of legislative power.

The book is also an examination of the particular type of power that LBJ exercised in the Senate, an institution hamstrung by archaic rules and customs. He surpassed all previous leaders in finding ways to make it work. Ingenuity, ruthlessness, charm, threats and bribery were his tools. His life's quest was for great power and there were early hints that he would use it to help the downtrodden. He had an instinctive gift for legislative power and rose to leadership with unprecedented speed. He was the leader that dragged the stuffy body from the eighteenth century into the twentieth. He became its master.

In 1957, LBJ would reverse his position on civil rights and ram a bill through the Senate, modest in scope but pioneering as the first crack in the wall that the Southern Bloc had defiantly maintained. Men of principle and eloquence had fought for generations to admit blacks to the voting booth, but failed; the pragmatic LBJ made it happen.

Introduction Analysis

Master of the Senate will begin with the story of the U.S. Senate and culminate in LBJ's remarkable victory in 1957. The Introduction is entitled, "The Presence of Fire," from a quotation by Woodrow Wilson. Fire, said the president, is the mark of a true leader of men and the danger that exists in crossing him.

In the introduction Caro makes clear that he is focusing on a man who did not yet feel restrained by the trappings of the presidency. He has achieved his long quest for real power as leader of the Senate. Caro begins painting a vivid word picture of the Leader's use of his physical size, vast energy, cunning mind and amorality in the exercise of power. This picture will be developed throughout the book, but after thirteen pages the reader has a feel for the man and the obstacles he faced in transforming the Senate from an object of cartoonists and comedians' ridicule ("the senility system") into an instrument of social change. We understand that the Southern Bloc, whose cause LBJ championed until 1957, is the roadblock he will have to overcome and that Caro intends to offer us a biography not only of the leader, but also of the institution in which he came to power.

Part 1 Chapter 1

Part 1 Chapter 1 Summary

Four semicircles of identical mahogany desks tell the story of an institution. Viewed from above and behind from the public galleries, the desks look like schoolhouse furniture, spindly, unsubstantial and set in a gloomy, colorless, cavernous chamber. Viewed from the perspective of a senator addressing the body, however, they gleamed in a setting that evoked the majesty of the Roman Senate and rang with the rhetoric of great senators, debating the preservation of the union in the decades leading up to the American Civil War.

The framers of the U.S. Constitution entrusted to the Senate responsibility for restraining the Executive Branch by approving (or rejecting) appointments to office, judging those impeached by the House, advising and consenting presidents on treaties they had negotiated and broadly restraining the tyranny of the people. The Senate was designed to serve as the new nation's "anchor against popular fluctuations," a receptacle of wisdom and virtue. Its function was to "cool" the processes of government. Originally, the framers of the Constitution had senators elected by state legislatures. They served terms longer than representatives and presidents and with only one-third of their number up for election every two years, the Senate could never be completely refashioned. It was designed to be stable, firm and independent.

Caro examines the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the attempt in 1805 that President Thomas Jefferson and the House made to impeach Justice Samuel Chase. The Senate saved the judiciary from presidential caprice. Senators would take pride in this achievement two centuries later.

Caro next details the Golden Age of the Senate from 1819 to 1859, as it grappled with rapid westward expansion to Oregon and Texas, an era marked by the magnificent oratory of the Great Triumvirate from the Missouri Compromise of 1820 through the Compromise of 1850, which warded off civil war for a decade. The departure of the southern legislators in 1861 to form the Confederacy freed the Senate from the shackles that prevented its providing for the needs of an expanding nation.

The only southern senator to remain loyal, Andrew Johnson, was elected vice president in 1860 and succeeded Abraham Lincoln in the presidency in 1865. Johnson sought reconciliation rather than revenge after the bloody war, but this angered the Radical Republican majority and the House voted articles of impeachment. It fell to the Senate to save the presidency as it had the judiciary. Seven Republican senators braved calumny, voted their consciences and proved the wisdom of the Founding Fathers' decision to establish an institution not subject to the "excitement of the hour."

During Reconstruction, the Senate grew in power while that of the House and presidency declined. A streamlined method of choosing committees, allowing the party

caucuses to name members for rubber-stamping by the Senate gave the party leadership a power unanticipated by the Constitution. The Senate's power to block cabinet nominations forced President Ulysses S. Grant (and his four Republican successors) to seek harmony with the upper house. At this time, the great industrialists (the "robber barons") arose, needing government support to maximize their profits and power; this led them to enter politics and to expand the federal bureaucracy. Rich bosses now sat at the plain, tiny desks as the Senate Supreme evolved during the Gilded Age, wielding bribery and graft and causing scandal. As Americans at large cried out for protection against big business, members of the Philosophy Club of rich senators held firm behind closed doors to block all efforts at reform. The seniority system came into its own, in which mind and heart mattered nothing in an individual senator's rise to power, just the ability to be re-elected consistently. Once assigned to a committee, it was only a matter of time before a senator would control the presiding gavel, which gave him complete power. This happened most often in the "safe states" of the South, where incumbents most often died of old age in office. As America became a world power, the Senate went beyond accepting or rejecting treaties and began amending them, helping to forge foreign policy.

It took the appearance of President Theodore Roosevelt (TR), at the beginning of the twentieth century, to restore balance. TR needed a navy and could not wait for long deliberations. He refused to be cowed. His strategy was to replace treaties by executive agreements, which were not subject to advice and consent. The Senate momentarily weakened itself by not opposing TR and it only reasserted itself, at the end of World War I, to reject President Woodrow Wilson's overwhelmingly popular plans for a League of Nations. Philosophical debates reminiscent of the Golden Age marked the day.

In domestic matters, the Senate chose to resist widespread demands for the regulation of trusts and reduction in the protective tariff. Even TR could not prevail against the "mighty dam" of the Senate when it set its mind to stem the tides of social justice. TR again had to exercise executive authority to win victories on behalf of progressivism and left office with neither a federal child labor law nor workers' compensation in place. Senator Nelson Aldrich, one of the Big Four that controlled the flow of business in the Senate, was openly contemptuous of the public outcry and President Taft had no choice but to surrender to the Senate's power.

Part 1 Chapter 1 Analysis

Part 1 is entitled "The Dam" because the Senate served to hold back the great rush of social activism that characterized the twentieth century. Caro explains this image at the end of Chapter 1, as President Taft is forced to accept the Senate's will on tariffs. He uses Chapter 1 to outline the constitutional powers of the Senate and chronicle its high and low points through the turn of the twentieth century. In Chapter 2 he will continue to examine its ups and downs in the years between the two world wars, an era marked by senatorial indifference to the Great Depression and the blind acceptance of presidential fiat during Franklin D. Roosevelt's first hundred days. Chapter 3 will focus on how the Southern Bloc came to control the Senate completely and crippled its ability to deal with

the needs of a changing world. Thus, by the end of Part 1 the reader will understand and appreciate the institution that LBJ would transform during his years as Master of the Senate.

Caro has great mercy on the non-historian. His rich quotations, careful characterization and patient analysis allow times and events to come alive, without requiring the reader to dredge up remnants of high school coursework as he creates a portrait of the institutions of American government. When he later focuses on LBJ's senatorial career, Caro will use shorthand references to this history, confident that the careful reader will recall the contexts he has established. Chapter 1's references will be to the Senate as a bulwark against popular pressure through the Constitution's provision that senators enjoy.

Part 1 Chapter 2

Part 1 Chapter 2 Summary

Chapter 2 takes up the story in 1913, with the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson as president. Wilson broke tradition by appearing in person before the Congress to announce his intention to reduce tariffs. His party, the Democrats, controlled both houses and lowered tariffs more than Wilson asked and passed the first progressive income tax, banking and labor reforms. In 1913 the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified, changing the way in which senators were elected, by popular vote rather than appointment by state legislatures; reformers had hoped this would make the Senate more responsive to the will of the people.

World War I helped the gates of the dam to swing shut again. The Senate reasserted itself by rejecting the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations and in the election of 1920, Senate Democrats saw to it that one of their members, Warren G. Harding, was elevated to the White House. He was charged to sign obediently whatever bills the Senate sent to him and to not interfere with their business by proposing bills of his own. This "normalcy" continued under his successors, Coolidge and Hoover. Republicans took control of Congress and the 1920s were marked by ineffectually "bouncing bills back and forth," with none of the public debate that had marked the Senate's glory days. Everything now was done behind closed doors.

Normalcy ended with Black Friday in 1929 and the beginning of the Great Depression. Conservatives in both houses maintained that the best cure for the business crisis was business as usual. Tariffs were restored to prohibitive levels. The public cried out for relief as the Depression deepened, but Hoover saw no need for action. Members of "the Monkey House" and the leaderless Senate did nothing either, adjourning for nine months at the height of the crisis; by the time they reconvened in January 1932, there were 15-17 million unemployed Americans, barely surviving and beginning to mobilize. In the November election they turned out of office 158 congressmen and the president. The lame duck Congress did nothing as "hunger marchers" were sent to detention camps and armed guards were posted outside the Capitol. Senators were held in particular contempt.

On the day of his inauguration in March of 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) announced that the nation would receive the action for which it was clamoring. He called Congress into special session for the Hundred Days that would transform the nation. Congressmen "scampered in panic" to approve his proposals, giving FDR broad executive power to wage war against the emergency. Fifteen major legislative laws, in the progressive spirit of TR and Wilson, were passed with minimal debate by the time Congress adjourned on June 15, granting a helping hand to the powerless. Back home, congressmen began resenting being treated as lackeys and senators, particularly those from the South, began repenting, having abdicated their historic role as a bulwark against executive authority. FDR, however, pushed on with the New Deal and in the

election of 1934 won Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. In 1936, the once invincible GOP majority was broken further and FDR announced at his second inaugural that he would be the true master of the Congress.

Caro likens FDR's popularity and power in 1936 to Jefferson's following his 1804 landslide victory and compares FDR's plans to enlarge the Supreme Court by six new justices to Jefferson's attempt to remove Justice Chase. FDR was frustrated that the high court had dared overturn part of his New Deal and sought to prevent any repetition by stuffing the court with men who shared his philosophy. Congressional leaders were stunned. FDR used his popular radio "fireside chats" to rally support with the laborers who had returned him to the White House and used patronage appointments to entice their representatives to respond positively. Some senators, however, saw the possibility of tyranny and refused to relinquish their right to unlimited debate on the proposal. The debate was turgid, often irrelevant and self-serving, but it gave the country time to think the issue over. Newspapers reported on the oratory and on the "stump-speaking tours" that senators undertook, much as they had in 1919 during the League of Nations fight. FDR lobbied hard in the backrooms of the Capitol, but previously pliant senators grew backbones. Liberal leaders saw a dangerous shift in the balance of governmental power and refused to fight for the cause. The Judiciary Committee reported the bill out, recommending that the full Senate should not approve it.

When the full Senate took up the matter, the Majority Leader defended the President, but was met by a spirited defense of the Constitution, which grew more bitter and hate-filled than at any time in a quarter century. After two weeks of debate, the unbeatable president was defeated; his miscalculation and arrogance had united opposition senators and a bipartisan coalition of conservatives formed in both houses of Congress. His attempts in the election of 1938 to purge three Southern senators backfired and thereafter, no additional New Deal legislation passed. The Senate was once again the stronghold of the status quo, a dam against social reform.

Caro next examines how the Senate went about not taking action when it chose. Its basic committee and staff structure had been set in 1890 and while the Executive branch had modernized to develop trained staffs, the Senate had not. Senators had small, underpaid and largely ineffective staffs, many filled with relatives. They could not keep up with the demands of analyzing the proposals submitted for their approval, particularly in the area of foreign affairs.

In addition, Congress did not have the expertise to draft legislation in this new, complex era. Proponents of complex bills often resorted to reading speeches written by White House aides rather than speaking extemporaneously as had earlier generations of orators. Beside the financial cost that expanding the amount of staff would incur, there were fears that administrative assistants would threaten committee chairmen's power. Congress had a deep, vested interest in remaining inefficient, nowhere more clearly than in the strict adherence to the seniority rule in committee membership and rank: time in service was all that mattered and competence was superfluous.

Caro next focuses on the Senate's utter inability to respond to the modern world in the early twentieth century in the area of foreign affairs. Isolationists came to the fore after World War I and Republican Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is briefly profiled as an example. During the Coolidge Administration, Borah never tired of using his eloquence to attract press coverage. A liberal domestically, he was implacable about keeping America out of international involvements (the World Court in 1923 and League of Nations opposition to Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931). He led the opposition to FDR's warnings about aggressor countries in 1933, enacting an embargo against all countries involved in a war.

Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota convinced the public that the U.S. had been lured into World War I by greedy arms makers and in 1935 led the fight to pass the Neutrality Act, drawing the support of twenty Democrats. In 1937, Congress broadened the prohibition to include civil wars, when FDR tried to help Spain resist a Nazi-backed fascist rebellion. Borah and Nye denied any threat to America in the deepening aggression being witnessed in Asia and Europe. FDR was reduced to begging the Senate to wake up to Hitler's threat, but was rebuffed until the *Wehrmacht* rolled into Poland in September of 1939 and the Nazi bombing of London in 1940 to convince Congress that the oceans kept America safe. Congress rapidly authorized funds to rebuild the armed forces, but the Senate continued to oppose military aid to England. Like TR, FDR resorted to executive agreement to initiate Lend-Lease; Democratic Senator Walter George, new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee spearheaded passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in 1940, confirming the program that saved the beleaguered island nation.

Twenty years of Senate rhetoric about American safety from attack was proved false when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941; and even FDR's defeated Republican in 1940 vowed to spend the rest of his life to "saving America from the Senate." The upper House itself confessed to institutional inferiority, if not institutional guilt. Accordingly, Congress granted FDR enormous discretionary authority through two War Powers Acts. As FDR used them vigorously, Congress became an irrelevancy, voting through everything he demanded, even while some congressmen rankled about the "would-be dictator" and his unconstitutional actions.

Caro focuses on the work of the Congress in late 1943 as described by a United Press reporter, Allen Drury: short sessions, desultory debate, routine, do-nothing committee hearings and frequent vacations. Calls for reform of Senate procedures were laughed off. Drury focused on the urgent need for planning for postwar demobilization and reconversion to a peacetime economy; he found it inexcusable that the Senate seemed unconcerned. The Senate's inertia resulted from its fear of the future and its responsibility for shaping it. Americans were growing fed-up with their elected representatives.

Part 1 Chapter 2 Analysis

The title of Chapter 2, "Great Things are Underway!" is taken from a telegram sent by Senator La Follette to Donald Richberg, an old TR progressive, summoning him back to no-longer-moribund Washington, DC, in 1913. Woodrow Wilson was making the institution move again. The title is ironic, however, as the bulk of the chapter deals with the Senate's utter ineffectiveness during most of the first half of the twentieth century. At best, it reacted to FDR's bullying by creating the agencies he needed to pull America out of the Depression and to prepare it for a second world war. At worst, it did nothing in the face of economic and foreign threats. Only in turning back FDR's attempt at packing the Supreme Court did the Senate actively assert itself on constitutional principles.

Caro is still building the background to enable the reader to evaluate LBJ's transformation of a dead institution after World War II. He mentions that LBJ was present in Washington as a congressional assistant at the beginning of the New Deal, but pays him no attention, even during his tenure as a congressman, which began in 1941. This was the subject of Volume 2 and will be briefly summarized in Chapter 4, to equip those who have not read the previous volumes to understand LBJ's Senate career.

The attention given to two chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committee begins to suggest how this position can shape Senate action or inaction. Caro will concentrate on the centrality of committee membership and control in Chapter 3, focusing on the Southern Bloc, which utterly dominated the Senate in the postwar era.

Part 1 Chapter 3

Part 1 Chapter 3 Summary

Institutional inertia intensified after the end of World War II and the root cause was the phenomenon of seniority, instituted only 1845. How long a senator had served in the Senate automatically determined his right to join the committees that did all the important work, including writing, debating, amending bills and determining which bills would ultimately come to a vote by the full Senate. Whether qualified or not, a senator could claim membership on any committee and be given it if no one with more years of service wanted it. The senator of the majority party with the most seniority in a committee was its chairman and controlled every aspect of its activities. The committee became his lifelong fiefdom. The Senate's effectiveness and prestige declined as this pattern solidified.

By the time LBJ reached the Senate, seniority determined where a senator sat in the Senate, where and how big his office would be and even where he would park his car. Elders let senators know when to speak; independent or premature speakers were peremptorily put in their place. By 1949, ten senators had served more than a quarter century in the body and the average age of a senator was steadily increasing, creating a senility system that threatened its work. This was because chairmen, the vaunted Old Bulls, were more conservative and hostile to change than the Senate as a whole and controlled committee work; the bills they delivered to the floor came in a virtually unchallengeable, "take-it or leave-it" form. Postwar journalists attacked the crippling effects of a gerontocracy that prided itself on flaunting the will of the electorate and the platforms of their parties, but savvy voters realized that longtime incumbents were able to deliver a larger slice of the pie and kept returning old men to Washington. The system seemed unchangeable.

Proper deportment was formed in freshmen senators by the grand Senate Office Building (SOB) that housed the 96 senators and about 1,100 staff and maintenance employees. The SOB was restrained, dignified and austere. There was little movement in the hallways; visiting and socializing between senators was discouraged. Most business was conducted behind closed doors in committees. Senators were jealous of the prerogatives; by tradition, elevator operators went directly to the floor where the buzzer was pressed three times, the mark that a *senator* required a ride. Everyone else waited. Elaborate formality ruled on the Senate floor.

The South held a grip on this system even before the Civil War. The more powerful a committee, the more deeply it was "stacked" with southerners. First among these was Appropriations, which controlled the money to run programs passed into law by other committees. For southerners, the Senate was the summit of political life, since they realized they could not be elected president. It therefore attracted very high-caliber men, who "came to stay." Many of them mastered the Senate's forty standing rules and the hundreds of pages of precedents used to interpret them. This gave them an advantage

over less diligent colleagues who turned to the official parliamentarian for rulings; southerners knew how to get around roadblocks and easily outmaneuver opponents.

The standing rules did not include any provision for forcing senators to quit talking about a bill and begin voting on it. The British concept of "moving the previous question," or forcing a vote without further debate or amendment, was adopted by the House of Representatives and the legislatures of forty-five states, but omitted from the Senate's 1806 rules. "Unanimous consent" was required to override a senator's right to extended discussion and was rarely achieved. From the early 1800s and particularly after the Civil War, southern senators made lavish use of the filibuster to hijack the legislative agenda.

In 1917, President Wilson grew so incensed over the practice that he convinced the Senate to pass a bipartisan Rule 22, to allow, "cloture" on debate at the insistence of sixteen senators. The rule, however, conflicted with other standing rules and proved easy to circumvent. The only hope for liberals frustrated by filibusters was to modify Rule 22 to close the loophole and the motion needed to change it was itself subject to filibuster. By the mid-twentieth century, southerners had grown judicious about using the filibuster, since it had gotten a very bad name in the press, reserving it for cases where the their very way of life seemed threatened. Seniority and filibuster allowed the Senate to serve as the "only place in the country where the South did not lose the war."

Courtesy and courtliness, southern virtues, were embodied in the Senate rules. These regulated debate, forcing it to remain civil. Of particular importance was Rule 19, which forbade senators to cast asperities on colleagues and their states; if it was invoked in the course of a heated debate, the speaker had to fall silent, take his seat and allow the offended member to respond. Many of the framers of the Constitution were great southern orators and their sensibilities established the aristocratic flavor of the Senate. In the early twentieth century, the southern orator might be mimicked on radio, but the power wielded by the twenty-two-member Southern Caucus was no laughing matter. Always firmly united in purpose, they attracted many conservative Republicans to their side during FDR's 1937 court-packing campaign.

The South's overriding concern was to fight off any attempt to change its racial policies. Even a rash of lynchings in 1938 could not rally sufficient votes to invoke cloture and move civil rights bills to the floor for voting. They refused to be shamed into passing modest civil rights proposals to reward black veterans for their sacrifices during World War I. Bills to outlaw the poll tax and to make permanent the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) were filibustered to death in 1942 and 1944. In both cases, the House was moved to act, but the Senate closed the dam. Most southern senators couched their opposition in constitutional terms, meaning that it is up to the states, not the federal government, to attend to such matters, rather than in the purely racist manner of their rhetoric behind closed doors, which reflected the rage felt by their constituents.

Conservative senators of both parties were sure that the New Deal foolishness was dead when Harry S. Truman succeeded FDR in 1945; Truman had been a senator and understood their ways. They were sadly mistaken. The new president sought to expand

programs to provide decent, fair housing, Social Security, universal health insurance, veterans' benefits, education and unemployment assistance. Unlike FDR, Truman wanted to end racial discrimination. Filibusters blocked his efforts. When Republicans wrested away control of both houses of Congress in the 1946 elections, they were determined to roll back the New Deal and were sometimes successful, but they could not budge the Senate to move on racial matters; Truman was derided as staging a "lynching of the Constitution," and his efforts were talked to death. Public disgust deepened and Truman ran successfully in 1948 against the "Do-Nothing Eightieth Congress," but the eighty-first refused to accept his public mandate, got rid of the "communistic" FEPC and talked down every attempt at social change.

Part 1 Chapter 3 Analysis

It is vital to pay attention to Caro's discussion of Rule 22, as it will be crucial tools in the hands of LBJ at the end of Part 5 "The Great Cause" (chapters 30-40). We will meet it often as liberals rankle over Southern filibusters and will see its ultimate use during LBJ's masterful handling of the 1957 Civil Rights Bill, the climax of his senatorial career.

Part 2 Chapter 4

Part 2 Chapter 4 Summary

Caro opens Part 2 entitled "Learning," by portraying LBJ's swearing in as a senator on January 3, 1949. He then offers a brief biographical sketch. LBJ was born in 1908 in the barren Texas Hill Country, where his father had been an economic failure. He attended a "poor boys' school," gained a reputation as a political wonder kid, running two campaigns and at age twenty-three went to Washington as a congressman's aide. There he became Boss of the Little Congress, a club of congressional aides. At age twenty-six, he was appointed director of the National Youth Administration (NYA) for Texas, the youngest New Deal administrator of a statewide program. Two years later, he beat seven better-known opponents to win a congressional seat and used this office to benefit influential constituents and earn a name for himself in the House of Representatives. From his early years as a manual laborer, LBJ had been convinced he would some day be president and mapped out a sophisticated, pragmatic plan, which focused on Washington rather than state politics. The House was step one, but the Senate was his primary goal. Before World War II, LBJ had no money and greatly feared ending up penniless like his father, so he courted Texas tycoons to bankroll his career. Nevertheless, when he was offered a lucrative partnership in an oil company in 1940, he turned it down, fearing the political backlash of being identified as an oilman, not in Texas, but on a national scale. Colleagues were certain that LBJ would advance to the Senate in a 1941 special election, but LBJ made a fatal mistake on election day, letting on too early how many corrupt votes he expected to garner and his opponent used this information to outmaneuver him.

It would be seven years before LBJ got another chance to run and they were bleak years as a junior representative. He hated being just part of a crowd of 435. He had little interest in general legislative work, particularly after he misstepped in 1943, trying to introduce a bill in the jurisdiction of a committee of which he was not a member. He introduced very few bills (all were limited to his immediate constituents' interests), delivered few formal speeches and seldom took part in debate. He grew adept, however, at working behind the scenes in cloakrooms, gradually domineering his colleagues, until they began to avoid him. He succeeded in convincing liberals that he was a liberal and conservatives that he was a conservative. At social events he seized center stage. He despaired, however, at having to wait years before he could gain enough seniority to attain real power, obsessing that he would die at an early age, like his father (whom he resembled physically and behaviorally) and other male relatives.

He avoided active combat during World War II, while arranging a single bombing mission to enhance his wartime reputation and campaigned for a post as Secretary of the Navy. When this failed to pan out, he lost interest in the war effort. He appeared to have no more interest in helping the dispossessed people of his district, but developed an efficient staff and ingratiated himself to the important constituents who could guarantee that his seat was safe in all future elections.

Seeing that it would be a long time before he could accrue real power, LBJ turned his attention to building a personal fortune, using his political influence; by 1948, he was a millionaire. That year, LBJ decided to run for the Senate against "the Cowboy Governor," whom pundits believed to be unbeatable. Since one could not run for the House and Senate simultaneously, this was an all or nothing gamble. LBJ had a history of stealing elections in college politics and in the Little Congress; in 1948 he stole tens of thousands to achieve victory, with an immorality shocking even in Texas. All that mattered to LBJ was being sworn in as a U.S. Senator.

Part 2 Chapter 4 Analysis

Part 2 "Learning," will in eleven chapters show how LBJ grew into the role of senator that he won in 1948. It begins by showing how the Senate was his short-term goal as a base for seeking the presidency. Despite the frustrations that the seniority system imposed on a young, ambitious man, the Senate was a smaller venue than the House of Representatives, where it was all but impossible to be anything but a small fish in a large pond. Chapter 4, "A Hard Path," begins this exploration, showing how uncomfortable this pond was for LBJ. Caro very briefly summarizes LBJ's preparation for the Senate job (this is the content of the first two massive volumes of *The Years of Lyndon Johnson*), giving just enough information to appreciate his mindset at this point in his career. It is always a challenge for authors of multivolume biographies to make each self-contained. At times Caro resorts to explicit references to the earlier volumes, enabling readers to find relevant detail if desired, but *Master of the Senate* can be read independently without difficulty.

Part 2 is organized topically, so details build up gradually. For instance, that LBJ lost his 1941 bid for a Senate seat by a strategic error is mentioned here in Chapter 4, but will be detailed later, when more of the context has been developed. A certain amount of patience is required in reading, but rest assured that the full picture comes into focus as LBJ's Senate world is populated with characters and events.

Part 2 Chapter 5

Part 2 Chapter 5 Summary

LBJ did not fit the austere, restrained, dignified and refined image of the institution he was entering. He was an earthy man, urinating in public, boasting about his manhood, scratching and adjusting himself, picking his nose or slurping loudly at his nasal inhaler to relieve congestion. He was bigger than life, dramatic. LBJ fully trusted no one. He had the "Bunton eye," dark, penetrating, intimidating and unforgettable, which was inherited from ancestors who ruled the Hill Country before Texas statehood. As a congressman, his clothing had been gaudy and oversized to conceal his paunch; he hurried everywhere, lunging awkwardly, elbowing people aside and swaggering. He was charming and witty, the life of every party, telling wonderful Texas stories and accurately mimicking the great figures of Washington. When it got down to business, however, LBJ *always* had to win and he would not allow opponents to escape before they gave in. He had always used the great emotion that dwelled within him to "rev up" or "work up" to tasks, because "What convinces is conviction." Once he had filled himself up with arguments and believed them completely, he could "let it fly" and rally people to his cause, making them see, feel and taste what he was talking about. This had not been particularly endearing in the House and was likely to be less palatable in the Senate.

The seniority system meant that the path to power required waiting. To reach his ultimate goal, the White House, LBJ would have to win the support of the mighty Southern Bloc to establish a power base, but distance himself from segregation in order not to alienate the North, where the bulk of electoral votes was concentrated. It would be a narrow, rocky path.

LBJ's office could be filled with drama and fun, true theater, with LBJ cast in shifting starring roles. It could be a place of inspiration. But it could also be a pressure cooker, ruled by a foul-mouthed tyrant who would glare, rage, abuse, micromanage, demand, exhaust and virtually enslave subordinates. He demanded complete loyalty. LBJ's reputation as a boss was so bad that he had difficulty recruiting talented individuals.

Part 2 Chapter 5 Analysis

The very brief Chapter 5, "The Path Ahead," focuses on the coarse, demanding personality of the new Senator from Texas, contrasting his demeanor and style with the staid institution he was entering. The stories are vivid and we can better appreciate many of the statements Caro makes earlier about LBJ. It is easy to identify with those who declined to be put on his payroll. Caro introduces characters we will meet repeatedly in the pages ahead: John Connally, Horace (Buzz) Busby, Walter Jenkins and Jim Rowe, all of which are already detailed in previous volumes of *The Years of Lyndon Johnson*.

BOOKRAGS

Part 2 Chapter 6

Part 2 Chapter 6 Summary

LBJ was raring to go, even before his swearing in. He wanted a choice committee assignment and tried to induce Texas's senior senator into helping him, but was offered only Agriculture for starters, with Foreign Relations as a later possibility. Carl Hayden, Chairman of the Rules Committee that allocated space, informed LBJ that seniority governed office assignments in the SOB. LBJ was convinced that meeting face-to-face with Hayden, with Vice President-elect Alben Barkley (the departing Majority Leader of the Senate), Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn and former Attorney General Tom Clark (a fellow Texan) would do more good than phone calls, so he flew to Washington in December, determined to make his mark. He parked his car in the space nearest to the door, only to be challenged by a policeman and his successful cowing of the cop was the only victory of that trip.

Inside the SOB, LBJ's "howdy partner" drop-ins on senators were endured with civility and pro forma promises to help him any way they could. Walter George tried to counsel him on the behavior appropriate to senators with "the seniority of a jackrabbit." LBJ could get no better than Suite 231, small and distant from the Capitol subway. The trip was not a total loss, because LBJ entered the Senate Chamber and, standing in awe, took its measure: "the right size."

LBJ was not a reader of books, but a natural "reader of men," and he sought to teach the method to his staff: watch people's hands and eyes and exploit whatever weaknesses they detected. Keep them talking until they revealed some vulnerability. Do this whenever possible in private. LBJ was the greatest salesman Jenkins and Busby ever met, able to prey on other's hopes and fears and to persuade tirelessly. One of LBJ's greatest frustrations in the House was that he could not work one-on-one, rarely even in small groups. Everything there was necessarily done en masse. The smaller Senate fit him precisely because it worked his way: face-to-face, behind the scenes.

We return to LBJ's swearing in and occupation of SOB 231, a little but high ceilinged, spacious and well-appointed space, with a magnificent view of the Mall and the Washington Monument. LBJ had always demonstrated an ability to transform his outward personality, demeanor and mannerisms as needed, while preserving his concealed true nature. During the successful 1948 campaign, he had reined in his violent, obscene tantrums when he saw that he could not afford to alienate a single voter. Once elected, he reverted to this in the office and at home.

Caro next shifts, rather abruptly, to the tales of LBJ's two most notable love affairs, one carefully clandestine with Alice Glass and another carefully publicized, with Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas.

Next, we follow LBJ bounding into the SOB and up the stairs, with the same haste he had shown as a congressional assistant in his youth. The doors to Office 231 blow open and LBJ begins making his rounds. He finds a reason to beat up on everyone and then vanishes into his private office, bellowing, "C'mon, let's function!" We are treated to samples of LBJ's "barnyard" office talk and sexual innuendo.

Inside 231 he expected underlings to jump like marionettes, but outside he put on a proper senatorial mask: slow, calm and dignified; elaborately courteous and proper with regard to protocol. On the floor and in the Democratic cloakroom, he was unbelievably deferential to senior senators. LBJ latched tightly onto Senator Walter George of Georgia, who frequently pontificated in the cloakroom, telling tales of old Senate battles, sat daily beside him, attentively, appreciatively and ingratiatingly.

After their swearing in, the twelve freshman Democratic senators met to draw lots for permanent desk assignments. LBJ drew Desk 18 in the far left of the lowest arc of desks; opening the drawer, he saw that it had once belonged to Harry S. Truman. As a senator LBJ learned to slow down and show deference. No longer did he aggressively buttonhole colleagues. He was charming and self-deprecating. He no longer hogged attention in photographs. Even insults could not shatter his new façade. He ordered his staff to avoid any clash with the senior senator from Texas, over who received credit for successful legislation.

The newly patient LBJ took to spending long hours in the afternoon, sitting in the nearly empty Senate chamber, listening to speeches, observing the routines, absorbing how a senator ought to sound and comport himself, mastering parliamentary techniques and beginning to "read" his colleagues, as individuals and groups. Often he summoned his assistant to sit beside him on a folding chair in order not to be alone. LBJ came to be perceived as a gentleman of the old school. When the Senate adjourned for the day, he would return to 231, often throw a tantrum at the staff as he passed through the outer offices, then begin phoning colleagues and just listen to them talk.

LBJ had already used these tools on older men, such as college professors and House members, who could be of value to him; he knew how to draw out their paternal feelings and figure out where their thinking processes were heading, then asking the advice he knew they would offer. His contemporaries mocked him for this behavior, but it repeatedly yielded results and results were all that mattered to LBJ.

In the House, LBJ had become unusually close to the Speaker, Sam Rayburn, breaking through his gruff exterior to fill the loneliness that "Mr. Sam" dreaded. Rayburn had been useful to the young congressman and eventually forgave LBJ's betrayal when he came between the Speaker and FDR, seeking to become chief broker of patronage in Texas. LBJ was taken inside the inner sanctum by the man who was "just like a Daddy to me." He also cultivated another irascible power in Carl Vinson, the Admiral, whom most congressmen avoided; LBJ visited the old man at home, bringing him the latest gossip and ribald stories.

In the Senate, LBJ set a path to winning over the "Big Bulls," powerful men who were aware their faculties were diminishing with age and who craved attention. LBJ delivered total support and made them dependent on him. He tailored his attentions to each Bull's temperament. He made them realize he valued their wisdom and in return tactfully offered the services of his staff to help them keep up with the volume of paperwork that faced them. LBJ once again gladly accepted derision for his "fawning" and "bootlicking." Wanting the Big Bulls to consider him their son, he was careful to cultivate this one-on-one, in order that none would realize they were not unique in LBJ's affections. In private he would snarl about constantly having to kiss asses, but within weeks of his swearing in, LBJ felt confident that he truly belonged in the Senate.

LBJ ingratiated himself to a young page, Bobby Baker, to learn the best ways of succeeding in the Senate and Baker readily volunteered that Dick Russell was *the* Big Bull needed to advance his Senate career, as FDR had watched over his years in the House.

Part 2 Chapter 6 Analysis

Chapter 6, "The Right Size," examines how the newly elected senator made himself fit in to the new institution for which he seemed temperamentally so ill fit. He got off on the wrong foot when he tried to apply his brash old ways to gain preference in committees and office space, but then took the time to learn the rhythms of the institution. He slowed down and dressed the part. He resurrected proven talents for ingratiating himself to powerful older men who were the absolute key to success. We will encounter Clinton Anderson during the crucial 1957 debate; here we meet him as one of the freshmen with whom LBJ wagered over who would draw the last desk assignment. LBJ won (or lost, depending on the perspective) drawing the last desk, which had belonged to Harry S. Truman. Note that Caro does not record the emotion with which LBJ reacted; his relations with the president will be checkered.

Caro twice states that LBJ was called the "Uriah Heep of Texas." Note that this refers to a character in Charles Dickens's novel *David Copperfield.* Heep pretends to be humble while gradually taking over control of his employer's law firm by devious means; Dickens likens him to an oily snake. Less literary critics called LBJ a bootlicker. The earthy LBJ admitted to being a life-long ass kisser, but was not about to change, since it almost all the time got the results he wanted.

At the end of the chapter, Caro recalls how school children in mid-twentieth century learned the

"Three Rs." He sketched in Chapter 4 how LBJ had studied, cultivated and profited from two Rs: Roosevelt and Rayburn, alone with many other invaluable Big Bulls whose names start with other letters. The third R, Richard Brevard Russell, Jr., proved to be of such importance to LBJ's career that several chapters are given to introduce him.

Part 2 Chapter 7

Part 2 Chapter 7 Summary

Caro introduces Richard Brevard Russell, Jr., as a barefoot boy, playing soldier in rural Georgia. He is participating not in the contemporary Russo-Japanese war, but in one that was fought forty years earlier: the Battle of Gettysburg, which sealed the fate of the South's "Lost Cause." The Russells and Brevards had owned plantations in Georgia since colonial times, living an aristocratic life that war and cruel Reconstruction abruptly ended. Richard Russell, Sr., had done his best to restore his family's name and fortune, but succeeded only with the former. After gaining a reputation as a lawyer, he entered politics and won a seat in the state House of Representatives, where he championed higher education. He left the legislature to serve as Solicitor General and won a series of elections to court assignments, finally the state Supreme Court, over which he presided for sixteen years as Chief Justice. His sights, however, were set on higher office: at least the governorship, but ultimately a seat in the U.S. Senate. Judge Russell, however, was too blunt, too fearless and too socially progressive to survive in Georgia politics and lost all five races he entered. He and school teacher Ina Dillard raised thirteen children in near poverty, but with extraordinary love and devotion to the political process.

Richard Brevard Russell, Jr., was born in 1897, following three sisters. The judge was "crazy with happiness" at the birth of a son and began inculcating in him the lore of the Lost Cause, encouraging a lifelong love of reading and an awareness of his obligation to follow in and go beyond his footsteps. "Young Dick" graduated from the University of Georgia, where his talents were highly appreciated and surprised everyone by turning down offers from large legal firms to partner with his father in Winder, GA: "Russell & Russell."

In 1921, Young Dick won a seat in the state house at age twenty-three. He showed that he had learned lessons from his father's political failures and he took care not to "jump out in front" of issues too quickly and never to volunteer an opinion. He exercised his impressive oratory with greater restraint, preferring to chat behind the scenes with colleagues. He gained a reputation for dignity and reserve. In 1926, realizing that the run would fail, he tried to rally support for his father's final bid for the U.S. Senate; he lost humiliatingly, to Walter George. In 1927 at age twenty-seven, Dick was unopposed in the election for Speaker of the Georgia House. His career as Speaker was marked by integrity and independence from the lobbyists who were accustomed to dictating to legislators; he had an ability to unite people behind his aims and to share credit with others and he succeeded in improving the public school and highway systems.

In 1930 Dick became the "Boy Scout candidate" for governor against three well-financed and organized opponents. Dick traveled the state, treating farmers without condescension, refusing to make unrealistic promises. The people just liked him and he

won by an unprecedented margin. He was sworn in 1931, the youngest governor in the history of Georgia, by his proud father, the Chief Justice.

Russell governed a state financially broken by the Depression and almost immediately secured passage of an act, which drastically reduced the size of the bloated government, reduced total debt and invested in schools, highways and agricultural research. He succeeded because he was able to cajole, encourage and support others, making them feel important.

Eighteen months into his tenure, the popular governor won a special election to the Senate and was sworn in as the youngest Senator. The traits that elevated him swiftly in state politics served him well in Washington. In 1932, the electorate nationwide was so fed up with President Hoover's do-nothing approach to the Depression that they turned out of office the greatest number of legislators ever and the Democrats recovered control of Congress. There were an unprecedented number of committee openings for freshmen legislators. Russell wanted only one: Appropriations. The Majority Leader was scornful of such a request, but granted it in order to avoid having another southern orator tormenting him. Appropriations chairman Carter Glass took a liking to the new senator and bucked the seniority system to grant him chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Agricultural Appropriations as a snub to a cantankerous colleague, who received enough coveted appointments to agree to the arrangement.

Russell was instantly powerful and he worked hard to make the most of it, memorizing verbatim the Senate's twenty-two formal rules and 1,326 pages of the precedents that governed their use and circumvention. No one else showed such diligence and it was soon realized that Russell could find better ways to accomplish goals. He read voraciously about political and economic conditions in all the states, making him an even greater resource. He cultivated his gift for understanding the hearts of others and gained only respectful friends, never enemies. He gained a reputation for intellectual integrity and the ability to strike compromises. Preferring to work anonymously, he was a threat to no one's ego, so when he spoke, colleagues listened.

Russell's passions in politics were military strength, the plight of the farmer and the preservation of segregation as the only viable solution to race relations. He studied to become an expert in all three areas and strongly advocated programs to facilitate them. In the third, most controversial area, he refused to lower himself to the rabid "nigger-baiting" of his fellow members of the Southern Bloc. When he joined in filibusters against anti-lynching laws in 1935 and 1938, opponents respected his erudition and acknowledged his moderation and even his claims never to have been a racist. He had been brought up to love blacks (however patronizingly), but could not yield to a federal usurpation of sovereign, constitutionally guaranteed states' rights, or to any tampering with the sacred doctrine of unlimited debate in the Senate. Russell also insisted that there was no necessity to tamper with social patterns that had gradually evolved in the South, satisfied the desires of both races and generally resulted in peaceful coexistence. Northern outrage over lynchings was overblown and its meddling in local affairs could only increase violence.

Journalists bent over backwards to convince themselves that the morally upright, non-demagogic Russell could not really mean the things he said against civil rights legislation, but the racial record of Winder, GA and Russell's own, as legislator and governor in Georgia, show he was guilty of harshness against blacks.

World War II altered the situation. Defense plants were constructed in the South and the executive order establishing the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC) forbade discrimination in their operation. Northern blacks, unaccustomed to segregation, came to fill the jobs and thereby resulted a lot of de facto integration, which Russell saw as a threat to the South he loved. Blacks serving in the military also troubled him; he maintained that as a rule, non-whites were simply not as brave as whites and had higher incidents of venereal disease; it was patently unfair to allow their commingling under battle conditions.

Russell repeatedly rallied conservative Republicans to slash funding for the FEPC, but could not get it voted out of existence and began sharpening his rhetoric to paint the agency as a communist plot against the southern way of life. Blacks, he began contending, had been elevated from semi-civilization in the South and intermarriage between the races, which was inevitable in an integrated society, would result in a mongrolization that would destroy America.

President Truman's response was to create a blue-ribbon panel on civil rights, which recommended that the FEPC be made permanent and that federal laws be passed not only against lynching, but also in favor of broad equal rights. The Southern Bloc united against the "South haters" in their own party who began catering to black voters in their districts. Hot heads denounced it as a Gestapo approach, but Russell sought to find methods of response that others could support. Filibusters would be used to support the Cause, but the arguments were to be kept germane and speeches non-inflammatory. Constitutional issues were to be emphasized and civil rights agitation was to be cast as communist-inspired. This, he felt, would play outside the South and it did for a dozen years.

Russell was fifty-one when LBJ came to the Senate in 1949, a dominant member of two key committees (Armed Services and Appropriations) and the acknowledged leader of the Southern Caucus. He had constructed a very strong web. He was the only senator to sit on both the Democratic Policy Committee and the Democratic Steering Committee and he enjoyed a "winking" relationship with Senator Robert Taft, who led the conservative Republicans. "Everybody's favorite uncle," Russell knew how to maneuver the Senate. The *New York Times* compared him to Robert E. Lee as a "master of tactics and strategy" and a "respected, even beloved adversary."

Part 2 Chapter 7 Analysis

"A Russell of the Russells of Georgia" provides a detailed picture of the man who would most influence LBJ's path to the White House. It is clear how an ambitious young Texan with a hankering for power would attach himself to a man like Dick Russell. The

brilliancy of Russell's rise to power would have been inspiring; the back-room strategy for organizing success would resonate; the poise, dignity and eloquence precisely fit the mold LBJ wanted to fit in 1949. In the coming chapters, we will see how this third R in LBJ's learning period would adopt him, position him for power and after his own bid for the presidency fails, determine to do whatever it takes to put him in the Presidency.

Chapter 7 provides a lot of background information on southern life in the twentieth century, the idyllic view of southern patricians about segregation, their ultimate fear that any breakdown in the system would inevitably lead to intermarriage and the violence with which whites were willing to meet the incipient threat. We will see in detail how southern whites dealt with growing black "uppitiness" over the next decade and how blacks disagreed with the thesis that separation was best solution. We will see how northerners, black and white, came into the equation and finally, how LBJ became a man of conscience with Russell's backing.

Part 2 Chapter 8

Part 2 Chapter 8 Summary

Russell was too busy ever to marry. When his father died in 1938, Young Dick became "Uncle Dick," assuming the family patriarchy. He enjoyed spending time at the Winder homestead, but had no intimate friends in Georgia; he felt he had to remain aloof. He felt awkward in Washington society. He rarely accepted dinner invitations from staff members and even stopped going to baseball games. Senate routine kept his days and evenings amply filled. At night, he read the *Congressional Record,* classified reports and books delivered from the Library of Congress. The Senate was his life.

Alerted by Bobby Baker, LBJ turned his attention to gaining membership on the Armed Service Committee in order to work alongside "the Old Master," and to prove his value by his own tireless work. He began visiting Russell's office to discuss business and to absorb wisdom from the great legislator. LBJ helped with paperwork and planning and began suggesting casually that they finish their tasks after dinner at his house. To accommodate the gentile visitor, LBJ feigned table manners and Lady Bird worked graciously to relieve his aloofness. Russell never became a member of the family like Mr. Sam, but did feel comfortable enough eventually to become a regular Sunday visitor.

LBJ transformed himself into a baseball fan in order to spend time at the park with Russell; he changed his breakfast-in-bed routine in order to eat with Russell before Senate sessions; he went in to the office on Saturdays so Russell would not be alone and so that he would see that someone worked as hard as he; and he enticed Russell to spent at least part of every Sunday at his home. The unbookish LBJ even drummed up enthusiasm for Civil War history because of Russell's dedication to it. Inevitably, there was some snickering among those who saw LBJ's courtship of Russell, but the two authentically hit it off together and in a very short time, LBJ had for his mentor the Senate's most powerful member.

Russell gained what he most wanted: a true and faithful soldier for the southern cause. LBJ proved himself in his inaugural speech before the Senate, the centerpiece of a filibuster against President Truman's civil rights legislation. For just short of an hour and a half, LBJ defended the use of filibuster, addressed the nature of prejudice and assailed executive authority and its ultimate anti-democratic weapon, cloture. He turned next to the substance of the legislation: the prejudice that would kindle flames if the federal government stepped in to change Southern custom. LBJ claimed personally to oppose the poll tax and lynching and not to oppose the Negro race. He attacked the FEPC more vehemently than fellow speakers and Truman's hypocrisy in calling for cloture, while he himself spoke without limitations on the subject at hand. LBJ remained calm, reasonable and moderate, adhering to Russell's familiar arguments.

The 1949 fight over civil rights legislation was fierce; Truman had pledged firm commitment during the 1948 campaign and enjoyed strong support from black voters in key northern cities. Congressional liberals were confident that the hold of the Southern Bloc could finally be broken. Russell admitted the odds were against the South's prevailing, but issued the war cry. Aides began drawing up lists of federal laws that the president could not afford to see log jammed by a civil rights filibuster. Russell suggested to isolationist Republican Robert Taft that the South would support his proposals if he rallied support against the civil rights program.

In 1948, before his party lost control of the Senate, Arthur Vandenberg had taken a firm stand against cloture; if he continued his insistence now, the South would again have its way; his only demand was that filibuster remain on the topic rather than wandering into irrelevancies. The validity of Vandenberg's 1948 ruling that Rule 22 applied as early in the parliamentary process as the motion to consider a bill began to be debated. The vice president ruled against him, but Russell skillfully proved precedent was on his side. Southerners now had three opportunities to filibuster and three opportunities to fight off cloture before the whole body could vote civil rights on and if it ever came to that, they had allies lined up to vote with them. Victorious, Russell proposed a compromise on the future use of cloture that strengthened the South's hand; henceforth, two-thirds of the full Senate membership would be required to invoke it rather than two-thirds of those present and voting.

Knowing his Civil War history, Russell was wary over new attacks that would snatch away his victory and drew up a schedule for senators to watch the floor every day and alert the Caucus to any legislative trickery. LBJ was one of those sentries and Russell appears fully convinced of his loyalty to the Cause and to him personally; LBJ was, after all, busily courting him. He understood LBJ's tactics and appreciated them.

Part 2 Chapter 8 Analysis

Chapter 8, "We of the South," continues the portrayal of Richard Russell, begun in Chapter 7, concentrating on the beginnings of his relationship with LBJ and his inclusion of LBJ in the full-court press in 1949 against the Truman civil rights program. The young Texan was allowed very early in his career to make a major speech at a critical point in the fight over filibuster. The day after the speech Russell defeated the Vice President's attempts to set aside the Vandenberg ruling on how early in the parliamentary process cloture could be invoked and succeeded in strengthening the South's hand. LBJ was an integral part of part of the "we" in "We of the South." His loyalty was expected, trusted and delivered. His talents and potential were appreciated by the man who led the caucus as a second Robert E. Lee.

"Jim Crow" is a shorthand reference to the body of laws that southern states erected to enforce segregation after northern troops were withdrawn at the conclusion of the Reconstruction. They prevented blacks from using the same public accommodations as whites: schools, housing, transportation, restaurants, rest rooms, water fountains, etc. They also made it virtually impossible for them to register to vote. By the mid-twentieth

century, Jim Crow laws were under attack by northern liberals and the Southern Bloc had been successful in filibustering all bills to death. Jim Crow refers directly to the minstrel shows in which white and black actors wearing heavy blackface makeup, sang songs like "Dixie" and "Camptown Races" in the stereotypical image of lazy, shiftless, submissive Southern blacks. Once prevalent in popular culture, considered innocent and entertaining, they came to be identified as racist and faded from use.

"The enemy comes: to our tents, O Israel!" was Russell's rallying call to the South in the civil rights battle of 1949. It is taken from 1 Kings 12.16, where the Israelite King Rehoboam rallies his followers to separate from his grandfather, King David of Judah. The extended context of this passage shows God using the seer Shemaiah to forbid active civil war between the two factions and Rehoboam obeys. If Russell intended only to call for continued separatism, the use of this verse is fitting. If, however, he intended it as a war cry, which Caro suggests by his own extended context, it is misleading, since the Israelites retreated rather than advancing on the enemy.

Caro's reference to the Civil War battle of Antietam in 1862 is similarly confusing. It marked the Confederacy's first attack in northern territory and which ended in a bloody draw. Caro uses Antietam to show Russell organizing vigilance against renewed attack after a splendid victory, which Antietam certainly was not. More apt would have been a reference to Second Bull Run, a clear Confederate victory, but it was not followed by a northern counter-offensive; Robert E. Lee launched the Antietam offensive. The best understanding of the reference is probably that the standoff was followed by President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, which solidified southern resolve to hold out to the end.

Part 2 Chapter 9

Part 2 Chapter 9 Summary

When LBJ called at the last moment to tell Lady Bird he was bringing Russell home for dinner, this was no usual occasion. Even before 1943, when they first employed a cook, Lady Bird was accustomed to having dinner on the table when her husband arrived, frequently accompanied by colleagues, staff members and anyone he happened to be working on for support. LBJ would countenance no delay in getting it on the table and his temper would flair if he was disappointed.

Lady Bird was the nickname that stuck to Claudia Alta Taylor after a nurse declared the two-year-old was "purty as a lady bird." She was still as painfully shy and lonely, dowdy, panicky in public situations and constantly humiliated by her crass husband. Throughout her life Lady Bird had, beneath the subservience, shown hints of ambition, determination and dignity, but in 1949, she laid out his clothes and took dictation as he prepared for a day at the Senate. She continued to endure his shocking abuse. Visitors admired her charm and felt sorry for a truly beaten down woman. Nevertheless, she was utterly devoted to him and loved him deeply. Their house was too small for the furniture it held, which was bought at auction by LBJ when Lady Bird took too long making up her mind. Texas friends would regularly descend on them for weeks at a time and Lady Bird took it in stride.

LBJ impulsively called aides and colleagues throughout the night and was usually awake when his alarm clock went off at 7:30 AM. He ate breakfast in bed and began imbibing coffee and cigarettes, making sure at 8:00 AM sharp that SOB 231 was ready for his arrival. He read newspapers and the *Congressional Record,* delivered to his door every weekday. He wouldn't return home until after the Board of Education session with Mr. Sam and a few hours of paper work. If he invited home last-minute visitors, he would complete his paperwork while they enjoyed cocktails in the living room. LBJ left the house too early and returned home too late to see his daughters. Saturdays he attended to the lonely Richard Russell and entertained him and Mr. Sam on Sundays. The girls felt neglected by their father and Lady Bird focused all of her attention on her husband. The girls were "raised by committee."

Part 2 Chapter 9 Analysis

Chapter 9, "Thirtieth Place," takes its name from LBJ's home address in Washington, DC and examines his home life with Lady Bird and their daughters. Caro shows LBJ at his worst: harassing his wife for her dowdy appearance and dismissing her opinions as less important than even his "nigger maid." Caro tempts the reader to take up the earlier volumes of his biography, but selects enough incidents to illustrate Lady Birds value to LBJ politically and practically, stocking his pockets with change, pens and cigarettes as he rushed to shave, dress and rush out; and to being ready for whatever the end of the

work day might bring to the little household. She chose to fulfill his every demand, to the detriment of their children. Her victimization and choice to accept victimization, is hard to read. Fortunately, we will see LBJ soften towards her later in the book, when she remains at his side after his heart attack and as she breaks out of her shell in order to please the husband she so loved.

Part 2 Chapter 10

Part 2 Chapter 10 Summary

LBJ was utterly ruthless in destroying all obstacles in the path to power. In 1949, that obstacle was Leland Olds, Chairman of the Federal Power Commission (FPC), a five-member body that licensed and regulated facilities generating power from natural resources and selling it to the public.

Olds was born in 1890, son of an Amherst professor of mathematics and his prominent Bostonian wife. At summer church camps he saw first hand the evils of industrialization and dedicated himself to a career in social work. In the slums of South Boston, he saw the horrors of the sweatshops and how ill prepared social agencies were to deal with the problems of poverty. He was attracted to the Social Gospel movement, which sought to remind business owners of their Christian duties towards workers. He attended Union Theological Seminary in New York City, was ordained a Congregationalist minister and began serving a small working-class parish in Brooklyn, NY. He grew frustrated when he could not convince parishioners to support his social agenda and left the ministry to pursue a graduate degree in European history at Columbia University. Olds began teaching at Amherst.

During World War I, Olds was hired as a statistician by the federal Industrial Relations Commission and discovered his gift for analyzing huge masses of raw economic data; he came to believe that if labor unions were given the right to bargain collectively, the workers' plight could be improved. He became head of the research bureau of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and toured Pennsylvania steel towns where strikes were being brutally suppressed. A Catholic priest who supported the strikers impressed him.

Olds turned from research to writing in order to further the cause, contributing articles to the Federated Press, a wire service, dedicated to supplying the kind of labor-oriented copy that the Associated Press and United Press ignored. He became its industrial editor in 1922, a time when all branches of government were supporting Big Business against the workers, who had lost the will to organize. Liberals and radicals looked to the social experiment in the Soviet Union for ways in which to correct the failings at home and preserve everything that was good in the American tradition. Olds contributed articles on the danger of big money in universities, the churches and the federal government. Democracy was being perverted.

He, his activist wife Maud Spear and their four children, made do on his meager salary from the Federated Press, but in 1929 this ended and Olds accepted a lucrative position with a consulting firm. To prepare himself, he decided to spend a month studying in Chicago; there, he discovered how tightly controlled hydroelectric power was by a few interstate companies and beyond effective regulation. Low-income urban and small town workers were priced out of the market and rural families were forced to live in the

Middle Ages because the companies refused to risk capital on bringing power lines to them.

Data crunching convinced Olds that rates could be drastically lowered and profits increased, helping both sides. He phoned the chairman of the New York State Power Authority and was introduced to FDR. The governor offered Olds a job and by 1931, he saw his ideas codified in state legislation. Olds became executive secretary of the agency and for ten years conducted surveys and drafted legislation that indeed lowered rates substantially. In 1932, FDR was elected President and Olds became a passionate New Dealer, seeing that radicalism of the kind embodied in Fascism and Communism were unnecessary and, anti-democratic. Olds wanted a return to the great eighteenth-century ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness for all. Democracy had either to evolve or die, he maintained. FDR policies were effective.

Seeing for the first time a real difference between the two political parties, Olds defended FDR against New York Republicans who condemned his "dictatorship," proclaiming that the corporate interests were the true threat. He joined the American Labor Party in 1938, believing it best-embodied FDR's principles. He swiftly resigned when it became clear that communists had infiltrated the ALP.

In 1939, FDR brought Olds to Washington to head the FPC, one of the few New Deal agencies at which morale was low. Olds's facility with numbers and optimistic attitude inspired his staff and the FPC without taking any draconian measures, managed to lower electrical rates and bring the benefits to neglected rural areas. The FPC, he told power executives in 1944, was intent on preserving responsible private enterprise.

In 1938, Congress passed the Natural Gas Act, giving the FPC broad powers to regulate the price of gas pumped from southwestern states to the northeast. Olds insisted on enforcing the act faithfully and disallowed accounting tricks used to hide illegal profits.

In 1944, FDR nominated Olds for a second five-year term and during Senate confirmation hearings, the rabidly right-wing Oklahoman Edward Moore, tried to use Olds's writings from the 1920s to prove he was a communist. The Chairman of the Commerce Committee rejected the claim and the validity of judging Olds on anything other than his exemplary six-year record. Olds was overwhelmingly confirmed. After the war, demand for natural gas increased dramatically and Texas investors, supported by and supporters of LBJ, began lobbying furiously for deregulation in order to multiply their windfall profits. Truman respected Olds as much as FDR had and he vetoed bills introduced in 1948 and 1949.

LBJ's benefactors raged about Olds's dedication to replacing the profit motive by social responsibility and LBJ understood that when Olds's term ended in 1949, he would have to take responsibility for defeating his renomination and receive proper credit for the defeat. Oilmen, though suspicious of the New Dealer LBJ, had supported him in 1948 and would be needed in 1954 and beyond; LBJ had to demonstrate concretely his value to the oilmen.

LBJ realized that the Red Scare atmosphere of 1949 would be more conducive to tarring Olds as a communist. He talked the chairman of the Interstate Commerce Committee into appointing him to the chair the subcommittee that would look into the renomination and secured permission to hold public hearings. He set his staff to digging up material that could be successfully spun against Olds. Texas Congressman John Lyle examined files from the communist-hunting House Un-American Activities Committee and several brilliant young lawyers were retained to look into a variety of matters. All of the work was done under LBJ's tight control. After studying Olds's FPC paper trail, they decided to avoid his exemplary record and instead made copies of every one of the 1,800 articles Olds wrote in the 1920s and selected a few which, cunningly removed from proper context, would damn him. Alvin Wirtz, the Austin-based oil and natural gas lobbyist, headed this task. Lyle, a dedicated Red-baiter, would be the primary witness. LBJ would appear neutral in the chair.

The final element in LBJ's strategy was to keep both the victim and his Senate colleagues ignorant until the trap could be sprung. Olds was popular among liberals on Capitol Hill and too intelligent to be beaten if given a chance to prepare a defense. Surprise was essential. LBJ made everyone believe that he was on their side.

LBJ held off hearings for three months after Truman submitted the nomination. Rumors rose of a whispering campaign against Olds. Finally, the nominee was informed that his three-day hearing would begin on September 27; by then LBJ had let his mask drop and was showing "open hostility." In the months since the nomination, membership of the subcommittee was stacked with the Midwest's most rabid anti-communists. Most entered the hearing determined to reject the nominee, but LBJ was determined that the vote had to be unanimous. Talking with liberals, LBJ feigned impartiality, so no one felt any urgency in lining up to testify on Olds's behalf.

Part 2 Chapter 10 Analysis

The "Liberal" in Chapter 10's "Lyndon Johnson and the Liberal," is Leland Olds, eighteen years LBJ's elder, a dedicated civil servant and a man who believed LBJ was his friend. Olds, however, was costing money to important people whose backing LBJ knew he would need in order to fulfill his dream of occupying the White House. By 1949, the first of the Three R's was long dead and no longer of value to him, so LBJ needed to shed his New Deal skin. He needed to prove he was worth the investment made by oil and gas interests in his 1948 election. He needed a notch on his belt and he knew how to get it: destroy Olds. After reading about LBJ's treatment of Lady Bird, it was hard to imagine he could appear more despicable. He manages to in Chapter 10, even if one is forced to admire the way in which he pulled together all the pieces of his strategy and kept the whole operation secret until the end. Prepare, in reading Chapter 11, which continues the story of Olds's passion, to see LBJ as utterly vile.

Part 2 Chapter 11

Part 2 Chapter 11 Summary

Leland Olds and his wife Maud entered SOB 312, high ceilinged and gold draped, to find few spectators or reporters; no one expected the hearing to generate news. Congressman John Lyle sat, holding a large briefcase on his lap. LBJ opened the proceedings, calling Lyle as the first witness. Lyle took out a thick stack of papers and declared it would be "utterly unthinkable" to reappoint Olds, who was a proponent of Leninism, an opponent of the U.S. government and free enterprise, author of a body of alien economic and philosophical writings in the communist organ, the *Daily Worker* and a chameleon who would say anything in order to remain in power.

Lyle proceeded to examine each of his fifty-four select articles, calling the senators' attention to particularly damning phrases. Early on, Senator Charles Tobey, a member who had opted to give LBJ his proxy for sessions he planned not to attend, objected to the portrayal of Olds as a chameleon. Tobey asserted that everyone had a right to change his mind. LBJ cut him off, asking that Lyle be allowed to read his prepared statement without interruption. A routine developed: Lyle identified an article from the *Daily Worker,* indignantly read the portion that summed up its contents and rose and handed the photostat to the clerk with a flourish. LBJ would then intone a "without objection" motion that the incriminating item be entered into the record. Occasionally, Lyle would add a snide editorial comment. The routine, sustained for an hour and a half, lent an air of authenticity to the testimony. When Lyle finished, committee members registered only shock and dismay; none had any questions for Lyle. Tobey, who had tried to defend Olds at the start of the session, had by this point quietly left the room and never returned.

LBJ next called Olds to testify. Unaware of what awaited him, Olds had provided LBJ a copy of his closely argued 12,000-word statement the day before. LBJ therefore knew better than to let him read it uninterrupted, because by sheer coincidence, it addressed all of Lyle's attacks on his philosophy. Olds acknowledged having been radical early in his career, but his radicalism mellowed under the influence of FDR. He had always rejected Karl Marx as "unwholesome." He had never written for the *Daily Worker*; that paper had been one of eighty publications, almost all non-communist, that had subscribed to his news service. He had faithfully implemented New Deal policies as modified by Congress and his ten years leading the FPC had at all times been "an open book" to Congress.

LBJ allowed Senator Capehart to interrupt Olds almost immediately and, after acknowledging that Olds ought to be given an opportunity to proceed with minimal interruption, personally interrupted in order to keep the focus on Communism. LBJ wanted to produce guilt by association, concentrating on an isolated occasion when Olds had shared a stage with Earl Brower, head of the American Communist Party. He badgered the witness about the organization they had addressed and swept aside

Olds's contention that he made a point of speaking to any group that requested his insight. The dam broke. Senators Capehart and McFarland demanded yes-or-no answers to complex questions. Every time Olds was allowed to resume reading, establishing the context for his early statements, he was interrupted.

LBJ affected a grave, judicious and highly controlled demeanor, in striking contrast to his aggressive colleagues on the dais. His line of questioning was precise, designed for him by Texas attorney Ralph Yarborough, with whom he was in daily communication. LBJ insisted on yes-or-no answers and Olds's inability to give them added to the impression that he was evasive. Committee members charged this when Olds asked time to examine the articles that had been placed on the record, in order to recall the contexts. LBJ had been careful to provide each senator with a copy of the photostats, but not Olds. As they read excerpts, they offered Olds no opportunity to respond. Whenever their attack faltered, LBJ urged them on: why could Olds not state his position on important matters? After letting the witness squirm long enough to create the impression he wanted, LBJ demanded he clarify his *current* thinking. The seed was planted; Senator Reed told a reporter that Olds was "a full-fledged, first-class Communist." Capehart, Reed and LBJ alternated interruptions, visibly shaking the nominee.

During the lunch break, LBJ read initial press coverage voicing concern over an "obviously packed" committee trying a "proved and outstanding champion of the public interest." Senators were hitting below the belt, implicating Olds was a communist, or close to being one. LBJ's colleagues did not return for the afternoon session, allowing LBJ to moderate his tone. His voice was warm and sympathetic and he allowed Olds to read his statement for a while, even appearing to understand and accept the nominee's "reforming" of his 1920s thinking. LBJ chided the press for suggesting Olds was being opposed by the utilities, acknowledging his own past interest in electrical projects.

When the other committee members returned, LBJ reverted to the morning tone, knowing that Olds's text was too convincing to be heard in full. LBJ bored in on Olds's membership in the ALP. Surprised by the question, Olds could not remember the precise date of his resignation, creating suspicion that he still harbored communist sympathies. LBJ turned sarcastic when discussing Olds's FPC colleagues, aiming to make him portray himself either as a conceited, grasping "indispensable man," or as an easily replaced cog in the federal establishment. Capehart would not let go of the communist menace. Only when the senators left the hearing again was Olds allowed to resume reading and when they wandered back in, LBJ had no need to interrupt him, because Olds had reached the innocuous portion dealing with his FPC tenure. The committee members were no longer listening anyway. LBJ called two of the slumping Olds's colleagues to offer mild support before adjourning for the day.

Since few reporters had attended the hearing, most newspapers relied on feeds from the United Press and these gave LBJ precisely the coverage he wanted: Olds was Red. Protestations of "smear" from eyewitness journalists could not compete. Liberals now realized what was going on, but it was too late to rally to Olds's support. LBJ began

phoning fellow senators to bring them up to date on the hearings, leaving the impression that Olds was lying.

At the next day's hearing, LBJ impatiently hurried pro-Olds witnesses along, measuring their allotted time ostentatiously with a stopwatch, politely cutting them short and seeing that few questions were asked. Their eloquence and objectivity were easily downplayed. Anti-Olds witnesses, by comparison, were given unlimited time to provide carefully coached responses to loaded questions. Olds emerged as a "termite" gnawing into the very foundations of the government and the morning's *Washington Post* editorial, decrying Lyle's "despicable," libelous testimony, was called a pack of lies. LBJ tried for a while to appear impartial, decrying in public sentiments he was approving in private. William N. Bonner, a Houston-based lawyer, was allowed to read into the record a summary of House Un-American Activities Committee data on Olds; LBJ demurred that it had been shown that Olds was not a member of the Communist Party, but the strong impression was left that he was a fraud, a crackpot, a jackass and a traitor. Evening newspapers got the point and broadcast it.

Swiftness was LBJ's second tactical tool for dealing with Olds. This was nearly derailed by Olds's request for time to study the deconstructed documents submitted against him and to prepare a reply. LBJ would give him only until Saturday morning. Olds repeatedly begged LBJ for more adequate time and he gave him until Monday, but only after threatening that Lyle would be allowed to rebut him.

On Monday, Olds began by stating that he had never been and was not currently, a communist. He admitted to writing radically during a period when the American people needed to be shocked out of lethargy. Before he could begin clarifying the fifty-four articles, LBJ cut him off and demanded he treat them as a group. He demanded a simplistic answer: did Olds repudiate his writings or reassert them? LBJ would not let Olds escape the trap: either answer would damn him. Only an extended discussion of the context of the 1920s and a one-by-one analysis could exonerate him. McFarland tried to convince the chairman to allow Olds to have his say, but Olds remained frustrated for two more hours. Conservative newspapers concentrated either on Olds's refusal to recant or his ability to play the chameleon. Committee members held the same view. Truman interceded on Olds's behalf, calling upon the committee to concentrate on Olds's spotless record and the public need for protection against the powerful utilities. The subcommittee ignored him and unanimously rejected Olds's renomination; only two members of the full Commerce Committee dissented and Leland Olds was out of a job.

Eight hundred oil and natural gas producers meeting in Fort Worth broke into cheers at the news. In Washington, liberals were amazed to see LBJ desert the New Deal. Their publications charged that the subcommittee had been packed; that Olds had been smeared, his record distorted; that a vendetta had removed a valuable safeguard against powerful interests; that no one in public service could feel safe confronting them. LBJ's betrayal of the liberal agenda was assailed and his brutal tactics denounced; the best that longtime friends offered was understanding that a Texas senator had to establish his credentials with the oil barons.

The luster was off LBJ's "shining knight" armor; he was now a politician, with all the negative connotations. Truman rallied the old New Deal "names," and Eleanor Roosevelt paid tribute in her newspaper column to Olds's service; she singled out "our old friend Lyndon Johnson" as the culprit who brought him down. Many more voices were raised in outrage, but it was too late. No senator would dare support the Red-tainted bureaucrat and they resented Truman's incursion into their cherished independence. LBJ didn't feel he had come off to badly; people remembered more vividly his loud colleagues' rhetoric and he had already planned a speech on the floor of the Senate that would repair his reputation.

Part 2 Chapter 11 Analysis

Chapter 11, "The Hearing," could as easily have been entitled "The Crucifixion," an image suggested by longtime LBJ friend and supporter Tommy Corcoran, or "The Inquisition." It certainly did not deal with listening, since LBJ made sure that Leland Olds would be unable to offer a meaningful defense. LBJ was rightfully pilloried by the liberal media for his brutality, but had carefully modulated his behavior to avoid monopolizing criticism. This chapter reveals the backstage machinations that only the most naïve could believe are not in play every day in government. It shows LBJ at his least appealing, building upon the heinous way he treated staff members and his own wife.

Caro is clearly on the side of the journalists who caught on too late and could only rail helplessly at the *fait accompli*. Caro notes that the Olds hearing preceded the full-scale persecution of suspected communist sympathizers launched by Senator Joseph McCarthy, a shameless period that he will examine at great length later in this volume. In that section he shows how LBJ evaded involvement until the outcome, the Senate's condemnation of McCarthyism, was beyond doubt. LBJ will not smell like a rose in that context either, but he will not stink as he does here. The next chapter will provide Leland Olds's sad postscript.

In one of the only his lapses in explaining events covered in previous volumes, Caro mentions repulsion over the Olds affair in the circle of lawyers who helped LBJ circumvent the law to keep the Senate seat he won under questionable circumstances in 1948 (pg. 287). He adds a little more detail on the next page, stating the Joe Rauh, who with Rowe and Corcoran produced the legal briefs for Justice Hugo Black's consideration, knew Johnson's capacity for disinformation. Unfortunately, this is all the information we are provided about the advent of "Landslide Lyndon."

Part 2 Chapter 12

Part 2 Chapter 12 Summary

Five liberal Democrats found the courage to defend Leland Olds, knowing they would lose the vote on his confirmation. They were outraged at the injustice being done to him and warned that repercussions would sound for years to come. Olds's record had been all but ignored. Hubert Humphrey was particularly eloquent, addressing the gumption needed to stand up against and condemn powerful exploiters. Those who failed to rally to Olds's side were the ones who should be on trial, not the good civil servant. "If there is any divine justice," Humphrey said, "those men will fry and Mr. Olds will have a crown."

LBJ rose to present his subcommittee's report. He dropped the senatorial persona and attacked Olds in a hoarse, shouting voice for fifty minutes. He repeated all the charges, painting Olds as an egotist who thought only he could defend the public interest. LBJ broadened the opposition to Olds from the natural gas lobby to power interests and utilities, intimating that electrical utilities and not just Texas-based powers sought to escape Olds's aims of confiscating their assets. Olds's supporters were trying to "blackmail Congress." LBJ denied charging that Olds was a communist, but kept alive the possibility in his listener's minds, as he concentrated on Olds's alleged determination to write laws of his own, in opposition to the will of Congress. His Marxist rhetoric of the 1920s was dropped after 1929, when Olds found he could work for the cause more effectively from within government. LBJ ended with a memorable phrase: "Shall we have a commissioner or a commissar?"

Liberal senators had left the floor before the vote was taken; Olds was rejected by a vote of 53 to 15. The *Washington Star* focused on the "political licking" Truman had taken. Capitol Hill took up this theme, but hailed the fact that it was a freshman senator who almost single-handedly delivered the blow. Senators began to fear the big Texan. Georgia's two Big Dogs, George and Russell, congratulated LBJ heartily and southerners identified with his staunch anti-Communism. In two speeches, LBJ had identified himself with southern interests and helped bolster their strength in the Senate.

Texas newspapers hailed LBJ's "victory" and the political courage it required. LBJ humbly confessed his pain at having to put what he knew was right over loyalty to his president and the party leadership. LBJ flew home for a triumphal, two-month tour of the state. His speeches continued distancing himself from the New Deal and identifying with the state's conservative interests. "Stay out of the Red!" he recommended. In Houston, LBJ met with the men who mattered most in Texas politics: Herman and George Brown, Jim Abercrombie and Gus Wortham. He spent a week partying with the 8-F crowd (so named for the Brown & Root suite in the Lamar Hotel), into whose pockets he had finally delivered something tangible. LBJ knew he would have all the money he would need to reach his dream and was happier than his aides could remember ever having seen him.

Truman created a job for Olds that ended when the president left office. Olds established a consulting firm and spoke at rural electrification conventions, but remained poor for the rest of his life. His high-strung wife Maud grew bitter and died hating LBJ. Olds never said a bad word about his inquisitor, but lost his natural bounciness and optimism. He watched in horror as the FPC reversed his policies. He died in 1960, long after most senators would remember him. Two offered him posthumous tributes; LBJ was not one of them.

Part 2 Chapter 12 Analysis

"The Debate" concludes the three-chapter examination of the Leland Olds affair and shows LBJ emerging not only unscathed, but also enthusiastically embraced by the most powerful forces in Texas politics. It is hard to turn the last page and continue on, having read that LBJ would not in 1960, as a candidate for the vice presidency, say a word or two about the onetime friend he had cold-bloodedly assassinated in order to advance his own reputation. It still was, as he told Olds, clapping him on the shoulder in 1949, "only politics, you know." Rest assured, the Leland Olds affair will not be completely forgotten and will come back to haunt LBJ, but not to derail him from his path. Failure to crush Olds decisively would have derailed LBJ in 1949, so Olds had to be sacrificed.

Try as he might in the years ahead, LBJ will never again sink to this level of amorality. In the rest of the machinations Caro describes, there is always some redeeming factor, leading up to his ultimate Senate victory, passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act. In that instance, we will see LBJ needing to conciliate national liberals as in 1949 he had to conciliate Texas conservatives. Once again, it will be "only politics, you know." Expediency will team with an awakening of conscience in 1957, anticipating his monumental contribution to civil rights while president. Caro often hints at the need to forebear and accept that the ends will justify LBJ's often-devious means.

Part 2 Chapter 13

Part 2 Chapter 13 Summary

The greatest benefit LBJ reaped from the Olds affair was the recognition of his potential by Russell. In previous Senate skirmishes, LBJ had been a loyal foot soldier, but here he had been the battlefield commander and won a splendid victory over liberalism. The reclusive Georgian felt so warmly towards LBJ that he accepted an invitation to go hunting in November. They spent a week at "St. Joe," St. Joseph Island in the Gulf of Mexico, an exclusive and luxurious private resort. There, LBJ introduced Russell to powerful Texan friends who shared Russell's views on Communism, labor unions and civil rights. They got on famously. LBJ positioned himself to ask for Russell's help when he needed it.

The first half of 1950 was slow in the Senate. LBJ found himself ostracized by old friends at dinner parties and Truman grew frostier than ever. LBJ became depressed and listless. Then, on a quiet Sunday morning, news came that North Korea had invaded the south and LBJ was re-energized. He was, after all, a "creature of war," formed by the build-up to World War II. Truman did not invite him for a briefing with congressional leaders, nor did LBJ participate in the initial debate over the "police action," but he took pains to see that his syrupy letter of support to the commander-in-chief would be the first one Truman would see on his desk in the morning. Truman appreciated the letter and cordiality restored their relationship, although Truman would never fully trust LBJ.

Everyone in Washington remembered that Truman's rise to power was based in his chairing of a special Senate committee to investigate charges of waste and mismanagement in American defense mobilization program at the start of World War II. Only LBJ took quick action to reproduce the effect of the Truman Committee in the new crisis. He got his friend, Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force, to intimate that if the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments received jurisdiction over the investigation, Joe McCarthy would be a factor. and perhaps the chairman, should the 1950 elections go against the Democrats. Better, LBJ suggested, to have the Armed Services Committee handle it. Chairman Millard Tydings was facing a tough re-election fight, so he was easily convinced not to take time away from campaigning in order personally to head the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee and when Russell, the other logical choice, was won over by his hard-working protégé, the coveted job fell to LBJ. Journalists were quick to note the boost this gave to his opportunity to achieve fame and political advancement even earlier in his career than Truman had.

Having won the post, against overwhelming odds, LBJ made the most of it. He organized a crack staff, including his own Horace Bubsy and John Connally. LBJ bent Senate rules by "borrowing" personnel from the Executive Branch and the Vice Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Donald Cook's salary continued to be paid by the SEC, freeing subcommittee dollars for other purposes and Cook

brought along Gerald W. Siegel, a rising attorney in the SEC hierarchy, along with support staff. The staff was given free space in the SEC Building (after Russell headed off objections in the Appropriations Committee). Refusing to take no for an answer, LBJ carefully created an "empire of talent" from the cream of the FBI and ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence).

They moved quickly to preempt anticipated rivals. Within three weeks of its organizational meeting, the subcommittee released its first report to the press, largely recycled from reports nearly completed for the Armed Services subcommittee just before the outbreak of war. It dealt with reactivating the synthetic rubber plants mothballed after World War II; although most of its recommendations were already being implemented, the report caused a public outcry and LBJ reaped the publicity. Busby did the groundwork, but LBJ added dramatic, urgent, aggressive phrases, warning in particular about the danger of a "siesta psychology." The press hailed the report as "a model of its kind" and "Congress at its best." Forty-three more reports, briefer and no more substantial, followed.

In April of 1951, the conservative UP reporter George Reedy succeeded liberal Busby as speechwriter, but the catchy phrases, not "federal gobbledygook," continued to flow. LBJ refused to allow his subcommittee to bear his name; it was "the new Truman Committee" instead. LBJ courted the president by paraphrasing his own words from a decade before and reassuring him that he would never hunt headlines or point to past mistakes. Truman declared LBJ's reports "the finest ever made by a Senate committee" and gave the go-ahead. The press enthused about the father-and-son relationship of the two wartime preparedness committees.

The original Truman Commission stemmed from the concerns of the senator from Missouri that defense contractors in his state might not be receiving their fair share as the U.S. military was gearing up for war in 1940. He took it upon himself to drive around the country, inspecting military installations, looking for profiteering and waste. His report to the Senate resulted in the naming of a commission in April 1941. Truman shared the travel and the limelight, with his six colleagues.

By contrast, Johnson discouraged participation by his otherwise preoccupied or pliant colleagues; all business was channeled through the chairman. Truman chaired 329 hearings, the majority of which were public, in Washington and around the country; LBJ worked in strict secrecy, largely alone and in Washington. LBJ could not afford to take the kind of chances Truman had, such as surprise revelations, controversy and confrontation. It was far safer to reap publicity through formal written reports. Government agencies and the Library of Congress were culled for data to which LBJ's speechwriters added summaries and introductions. LBJ personally added pithy phrases and then submitted the galleys to the senators on the subcommittee for review, because it was essential he obtain all of their signatures. Staff members were under strict orders to avoid reporters; LBJ would handle the press. The secrecy imparted an aura of urgency to the work and LBJ leaked the final reports to favored journalists to gain positive treatment of the often-sparse contents. There was always that implied *quid pro quo*.

LBJ was gathering national headlines as the elections of 1950 approached; he was the envy of many senior senators. He retained his chairmanship of the Armed Services' Preparedness Subcommittee when Senator Joe McCarthy campaigned to prevent the re-election of LBJ's rival for the post, Millard Tydings. People began saying LBJ lived a charmed life. Busby said, rather, he was a genius.

Part 2 Chapter 13 Analysis

Chapter 13, "No Time for a Siesta," draws its title from the clever slogan LBJ came up with for promoting his work with the Preparedness Subcommittee. It captured his southwestern tang: you can't afford to loll away a sleepy afternoon when there's work to be done. Caro makes it clear that LBJ's motivation and methodology were far different from Harry S. Truman's a decade earlier. Both rose to prominence through their watchdog activities over wartime preparedness, Truman out of sincere concern for security, LBJ hiding behind security to reap personal publicity. He mimicked the Truman Commission as accurately as he did Washington personalities, without doing the hard work of his predecessors. It is as cynical as the Olds hearings, but not openly cruel.

The last paragraph deals with the elimination of LBJ's rival for the chairmanship in 1950. Millard Tydings intended to take over the job after the election; he yielded it to LBJ temporarily only after receiving promises that he would release all reports (and receive the resulting publicity) and after being pressured by Richard Russell to do so. Tydings needed the time to campaign for re-election. He faced an unknown candidate in Maryland, but that person would be backed by a powerful force: Senator Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin. McCarthy had sworn to get revenge for Tydings's revelations of his lies. FDR had failed to purge Tydings in 1938, but he knew how much additional work it would take to overcome this new outside force in 1950. McCarthy swept into Maryland, ferociously and effectively, backed by big money (part donated by LBJ supporters); a key factor in the campaign was a composite picture, a pure fake, of Tydings listening to a speech by communist Earl Browder. This was a repeat tactic used by LBJ to crush Leland Olds. LBJ's career rolled ahead as Tydings's ended.

Part 2 Chapter 14

Part 2 Chapter 14 Summary

Sensationalism rather than substance was LBJ's focus in his subcommittee and sometimes he followed false leads. At Christmastime in 1950, Senators were hearing from constituents about conditions at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. The Armed Services Committee met with Air Force officials in closed session and learned that rumors were exaggerated about hunger and cold, disease and even suicides. There was, indeed, overcrowding as a result of a surge of enlistments, but the Air Force was constructing new barracks and reassigning enlistees to other bases for training. The Secretary of the Air Force appealed to LBJ to downplay the issue in the public interest.

Instead, LBJ dispatched four investigators "to make a personal check tonight." He was determined to tell America's mothers something about their sons. His investigators drew standard issue clothing and bedding and spent the stormy night in tents. They found conditions were normal. They uncovered no deaths. Morale was good. Veterans recognized that the whole crisis had arisen from nothing more than standard GI griping. It took LBJ three weeks to come up with the proper spin for his report, that the Air Force had been "irresponsible" in accepting so many enlistees, resulting in "the total breakdown of training." LBJ leaked word that the report would be a "sizzling" revelation of Air Force greed and newspaper headlines featured those precise words. LBJ promised more revelations later in the spring, but when investigations of other induction centers showed all was in order, he released the results without fanfare, leaks, or excess adjectives.

LBJ demanded unanimity in the subcommittee. He had pledged bipartisanship and objectivity and would not see that broken. Any negativity was personally unbearable. It was easy to get everyone to sign reports dealing with controversial topics like waste and gouging; it took politicking on less universal topics, where liberals and conservatives could disagree. Republican Senator Bridges presented the only true challenge. He was too powerful and shrewd to be manipulated; his acquiescence required tangible benefits to his constituents in New Hampshire. LBJ leapt at every opportunity to be of help, rapport between the two senators grew and Bridges's signature was assured.

When disagreements arose, LBJ worked to delete objectionable material and fashion compromises that everyone could sign. He charmed and complimented everyone, told wonderful stories to bring out the points he wanted to emphasize, cajoled, pleaded and dickered to obtain unanimity. For anyone who dared hold out, LBJ would retreat to his office and develop the precise mental script he would need to get his way; he would rehearse it to perfection, then apply it wherever he encountered his adversary, absolutely untiringly until victory was his. LBJ was more willing to devote time to his quest than anyone was to resist him and many times, they signed simply to get rid of him.

After Congress adjourned in September 1951, LBJ flew to Texas to spend three months on his ranch. He kept Preparedness busy, grinding out detective stories in his absence, but not beyond his reach and control and collecting great reviews. During 1951 he was hailed in *Colliers*, the *New York Times Magazine* and the *Saturday Evening Post* ("which never says anything kind about a Democrat if it can avoid it"). He set his goal at the year's end to getting a cover spread in *Newsweek*. To obtain it, he promised, in time for its November 29 issue, the exclusive release of a guns-and-butter solution to the problem of defense production. LBJ's staff knew it would have little substance, but *Newsweek* was interested. LBJ withheld a letter that might have changed *Newsweek's* mind and a photographer was dispatched to take a dramatic photograph. LBJ spent a nervous few days in Texas hoping no big news story would upstage him. None did and LBJ was portrayed as "Watchdog in Chief," "quiet and gentle," always deliberate and careful and "two-fisted and tough" when needed.

The press fell on the report and tore it apart. The Department of Defense demanded proof that troops in Korea were under-equipped or that it maintained a double set of books. Earlier subcommittee reports were re-examined and found not to deserve the headlines they had received. The *Post* published a seven-part series, showing that the Administration had resisted full mobilization not because it was soft on Communism, but because technology was evolving so rapidly that it did not want to over-purchase soon-to-be-obsolete weapon systems. There was no evidence for LBJ's contention that a state of crisis existed.

Public enthusiasm for the subcommittee's activities diminished and so did LBJ's. He retained most of the positive image that he had received nationally: impressive speed, sureness of touch, high-caliber staffing and management and a knack for public relations. LBJ was not yet being called the "wonder kid of the Senate," but his time was drawing near. In less than three years, LBJ was surely no longer "one of a crowd."

Part 2 Chapter 14 Analysis

Chapter 14, "Out of the Crowd," concludes Part 2 "Learning." Caro shows how LBJ took advantage of the Truman-like position he carved out and used to achieve nationwide fame and a reputation within the Senate. In under three years he had learned well: he had acquired a powerful mentor in Russell, whose word alone obtained LBJ's chairmanship and who will prove an invaluable ally in the pages to come. LBJ learned to change his stripes in public without ceasing to be a tiger within. He proved his competency in organization and in backroom maneuvering. The colorful details in this chapter help complete Caro's portrait of LBJ as the rookie senator poised to move forward towards true power and succeeds in taking the edge off the portrait of LBJ the inquisitor. It is easy to pull for him to get his *Newsweek* cover.

Part 3 Chapter 15

Part 3 Chapter 15 Summary

Unlike the House of Representatives, where the constitutionally prescribed leader, the speaker, by precedent wields great power, the Senate is presided over by a figurehead: the vice president, who votes only to break ties. In his absence, frequent during the mid-twentieth century, a president *pro tempore* was to take the chair. Clearly, the Founding Fathers did not want anyone to control the upper chamber; every senator spoke for himself and on behalf of his sovereign state.

The "Senate Supreme" in the nineteenth century grew increasingly divorced from the meaningful issues of the day, becoming a bulwark against the popular will and sunk in public esteem for doing nothing. It asserted itself, however, in foreign affairs; it is noteworthy that most nineteenth-century secretaries of state had served in the Senate. The American Century required faster reaction than the Senate could muster and executive agreement grew common until Henry Cabot Lodge stood up to Woodrow Wilson in a power duel, which involved two PhDs arguing and politicking until the senator won and steered America into tragic isolationism.

In 1905, the old guard was dying out. In 1913, the GOP began to impose party discipline on members, allowing caucus chairman to serve as *de facto* leaders. The Democrats followed suit, hoping greater unity would help them pass Wilson's progressive program. Both lacked formal powers, but gained by tradition a priority of recognition on the floor: first the Majority Leader, then the Minority. During FDR's Hundred Days, the office of Majority Leader came to be understood as an agent of the White House.

By 1949, additional prerogatives had accreted to the Majority Leader. He alone made motions to call bills off the Calendar for debate on the full Senate floor, as an agent of his party; in theory, this gave him the power to prioritize bills. He could not yet put bills *on* the Calendar; this was reserved for the fifteen Standing Committees, so *real* power remained with them. Nor could he control who sat on the committees; he was a member of the committee that determined this, but no more. Nor could he intervene in any way in the workings of the committees; their agenda was set by their chairmen, who were determined strictly by seniority. In reality, the Leader had little power to lead.

The public, not understanding the complexities of the situation, expected leaders not only to fight for, but pass, the legislation it desired; Democratic leaders felt the pressure most strongly, because they were considered the more liberal party. Southern Democrats and conservative allies held seniority in most of the committees and so controlled the greatest power. Republicans were less acutely divided ideologically and, in 1949, out of control of the Senate, so they were not expected to get many bills passed. The Majority Leader's greatest limitation was undoubtedly his inability to control unlimited debate on bills brought to the floor. It was the sacred right of each senator to

say anything he wanted at whatever length and as a body they guarded the right zealously. When they exercised the right to hold up action on bills that the public wanted passed, blame fell on the Majority Leader and they were heaped with scorn.

As a congressman, LBJ watched two Democrats and one Republican learn the lesson that the title Leader meant little. FDR's man, Alben Barkley, soon became "Bumbling Barkley," as technicalities hamstrung all his efforts. Frequently he could not muster a quorum. He resigned the post, but was re-elected and struggled on, ineffectually, under Truman. The Republican Leader, Wallace White, faired little better in 1947-1948. Conservatives held the real power and he was mocked as "Rearview White," because he was constantly looking back to Vandenberg, Bridges, Milikin and Taft for directions, none of whom wanted the job.

The Majority Leader in 1949 was Scott Lucas, who had accepted the job eagerly, craving attention. He quickly lost enthusiasm, as none of the proposals outlined at the White House Monday mornings went anywhere during the week. Civil rights and universal health insurance were at the heart of Truman's Fair Deal agenda and conservatives were determined to stall both in committee. Lucas got only a bleeding ulcer for his troubles. In 1950, Truman's desire to revitalize the FEPC brought chaos to the Senate chamber. He completely lost control and Everett Dirksen took advantage of Lucas's preoccupation with Senate business to defeat him in the general election. The Assistant Democratic Leader also lost his seat.

The dangers and limitations of leadership ought to have dissuaded LBJ from seeking it, since his greatest dreads in life were failure and humiliation, but the prospects of waiting decades to gain enough seniority to exercise real power overruled reason. LBJ was restless, Russell could not be bothered with details, so he did not want the post, but he did want a friend of the South to hold it. When Russell did not oppose his running, LBJ surprised everyone by volunteering for the even less important job of Assistant Leader (or "whip"). Russell gave LBJ the nod and it was his, at the age of forty-two, with less than two years of service in the Senate.

Part 3 Chapter 15 Analysis

Chapter 15, "No Choice," forms a preface to Part 3 "Looking For It," in which seven chapters chronicle the two years LBJ spent as Democratic Whip, assistant to the Majority Leader. LBJ received the nod because as Chapter 15's title suggests, there was no other choice. No one else, when Congress convened in 1951, wanted "The Nothing Job" (the title and primary focus of Chapter 17). The largely honorary but nevertheless demanding and exposed job of Majority Leader was a rock against which many a career had been tragically wrecked (as Caro details). It had little real power, presented diverse, thorny obstacles and threatened the two things that LBJ feared most: failure and humiliation. In Part 3 we will watch how the young whip discovered how the situation could be turned around, how he worked behind the scenes to consolidate support and how he waited for his time to strike for real power as Leader.

This chapter repeats topics already covered in Part 1 about how the Senate is organized and operates, but it reinforces and deepens our understanding of them by offering carefully chosen (new) exemplars from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Careful reading is required in order to be prepared for entering into the events of 1951 through January of 1953. It would have been most natural to move straight into a description of the "Nothing Job" that LBJ accepted, but an event of world importance occurred soon after Congress came into session and Caro first gets it out of the way, recognizing that LBJ's involvement was minimal.

Part 3 Chapter 16

Part 3 Chapter 16 Summary

In April of 1951, President Truman summarily relieved General Douglas MacArthur from his command in Korea and after a triumphant overnight stop in San Francisco, the war hero reached Washington to even greater accolades. On April 20, MacArthur addressed a joint session of Congress that was televised nationally. Congressmen and radio listeners alike cheered his dramatic rhetoric as he stated that, "there can be no substitute for victory." He claimed the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the position that had cost him his job and excoriated the appeasement practiced by civilians in the Truman Administration. The thirty-four minute speech ended with MacArthur applying to himself a popular barrack ballad of his youth, "Old soldiers never die. They just fade away." He whispered his final words: "Good-bye."

The General stepped down "into pandemonium," as congressmen swarmed to touch his sleeve. He was likened to St. Paul and to the voice of God himself. MacArthur was conveyed in triumph to his next speaking engagement, at the Washington Monument and his biographer likens it to a South American junta leader being carried in parade. George Reddy, in his last reporting assignment before joining LBJ's staff, said that it was the only time in his life that he felt the government was in danger; the mood was so explosive that the mob could have marched on the White House to remove the General's nemesis. The general's reception the next day in New York City outdid parades for such previous heroes as Lindberg, Pershing and Eisenhower.

Republican senators demanded a thorough hearing and saw an opening to force the U.S. out of the U.N.; Southern Democrats agreed. Even liberals realized a hearing was not only inevitable, but also necessary, since serious constitutional issues were involved and while Truman had avoided lynching, calls for his impeachment remained on many lips. Popular emotions were at a fever pitch, one hundred percent behind MacArthur. The Truman Administration was at best incompetent and perhaps traitorous. Many expected MacArthur to be the Republican nominee for president in 1952. Clearly, it was critical for both sides to expedite the matter.

Hearings would allow Republicans to attack their two favorite targets, General George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson and an opportunity to savage Democratic foreign policy from Yalta to Korea. Only the strongest of senators would be able to control raging passions and ensure orderly, impartial hearings. Colleagues turned naturally to Russell, who admired MacArthur's battlefield brilliance but was troubled by his global strategy and his challenge to presidential authority. Russell had no false modesty; he knew that his knowledge of military history was unsurpassed and in a spirit of *noblesse oblige,* stepped into the limelight.

Knowing that if hearings were televised, MacArthur's mastery of rhetoric would only fire popular passions and easily compromise America's military and strategic secrets,

Russell quoted Madison's fears about governing by "quick expression of uninformed desire." He gained bipartisan acceptance for closed hearings, of which its transcripts would be rapidly typed, censored by personnel from the State Department and Defense and mimeographed for distribution to reporters. This would preserve everyone's interests.

Russell displayed no pique when MacArthur strolled in twenty minutes late for the first hearing and rendered him due credit for his service to the nation. For three days, MacArthur eloquently laid out his case against his commander-in-chief. When he finished, Russell raised pointed questions, forcing the general to admit that some of his positions were overstated. Other senators were emboldened to ask difficult questions and MacArthur retreated further. He admitted he was no expert on strategic matters. Consensus in the committee was that MacArthur's popular proposals were unrealistic.

Marshall took center stage next and Russell lead him through five days of testimony that proved the Truman Administration had a definite policy of containing communist aggression without resorting to global war. The Joint Chiefs, he contended, agreed that the risk of following MacArthur far outweighed that of following the Administration. Public indignation slackened as the transcripts were published and eventually interest in the hearings declined. Leaks were few and when some of Marshall's censored testimony found its way into print, Russell menaced his colleagues not only with the old "loose lips sink ships" admonition, but with the very wrath of God; neither he nor the American people would forgive it and senators would deserve no forgiveness.

The Joint Chiefs testified next. Russell slowly and carefully guided through an examination of the flaws in MacArthur's proposals. By the sixth day, it was suggested the remaining Chiefs' testimony be skipped, since conclusions were abundantly clear. Russell wanted no one to be able to charge they had hurried or covered anything up and the impression that the war hero had misunderstood or oversimplified the situation grew. Russell kept the hearings thoughtful, judicious and properly senatorial in mid-June when Dean Acheson testified. Russell did not allow Republicans to bluster behind closed doors as they had in public. Mail no longer flooded into Congress and senators dropped off watching the closed proceedings. In New York, MacArthur was jeered at a baseball game and in Texas, so few people showed up for the kickoff of his presidential campaign that it died on the vine.

Russell fought to avoid issuing a formal committee report on the hearings, hoping to avoid affecting truce negotiations just as he had sought to avoid partisan infighting during the sessions. The evidence was transmitted to the Senate without comment and the MacArthur affair was ended, truthfully and capably.

LBJ played only a minor role in the episode and it bore no relation to his new role as Majority Whip. Two of his capable staff members helped prepare questions for Russell to ask next day. He came to appreciate LBJ's mastery of this tool and his capacity for leadership in steering the Senate into a new age. Their personal relationship became even closer.

Part 3 Chapter 16 Analysis

Chapter 16, "The General and the Senator," is an interlude, as far as LBJ's Senate career is concerned, but valuable to the reader in appreciating the importance of LBJ's mentor, Richard Russell, whom we have seen heretofore preferring to stay out of the limelight, to work behind the scenes. When called to serve in a situation that required precisely his knowledge of history and military affairs, he accepted. He fashioned a methodology that would maximize public information while minimizing passions and threats to security. He conducted the hearings with dignity and respect for those who testified, stood up to his colleagues on both sides of the aisle in defending what was right, thus forcing them to support him overwhelmingly.

Having read about LBJ's behavior in the Olds hearing of secretly preparing a crooked ambush and executing it with cold brutality and of the way he ran the Preparedness subcommittee by chasing personal headlines and producing little of value, one appreciates that a higher path is possible. LBJ's competent staff, lent to Russell to help him prepare for each day's questioning, convinced him that modernization was necessary and valuable and that a man like LBJ might be able to make a difference. The chapter ends with a report by a *Time* magazine reporter that Russell was thinking about LBJ ascending to the presidency and succeeding there. Throughout the rest of the book, we will see this surety develop in the great Georgian senator and after his own run for the White House fails, anointing LBJ as the South's best chance for finally ending the Civil War by putting him into the nation's highest office.

Part 3 Chapter 17

Part 3 Chapter 17 Summary

In 1951 LBJ was already making no secret of his ambition for the White House and held no false hope that the job of Whip was anything but a "nothing job." His challenge was to make something out of nothing. When Congress came into session, Truman flaunted his intention to reinforce U.S. forces in Europe by four divisions, without consulting the Senate. Republican Leader Taft claimed that this was unconstitutional usurpation; Tom Connally, backed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, contended that it was Truman's prerogative as commander-in-chief and vitally necessary for the defense of Western Europe. The "sense of Congress" was merely that Truman ought to consult them next time the U.S. moved abroad.

The eighty-first Congress, busily investigating the Administration and hunting communists, had little time to consider Fair Deal legislation and the American people were losing faith in a failed institution. The Senate received the lion's share of criticism and was, indeed, in nearly total disarray. Suggestions were made that the Senate might be eliminated as anachronistic and superfluous; many post-war democracies had adopted unicameral legislatures. Absenteeism and filibuster raised more ire among voters.

McFarland immediately proved that he was not up to the task of being the Senate Majority Leader. Still, someone had to call bills to the floor, which meant getting chairmen to put them on the Calendar. Someone had to rally senators to the floor for quorum calls, which were wasting vast amounts of time to no purpose. Colleagues and the press alike ridiculed McFarland. Since his job was understood to be honorary, no one but the columnist Drew Pearson blamed LBJ; Pearson resurrected an old nickname, "Lying Down Johnson," to describe his public lying back as Whip, but this was drowned out in the headlines over the Preparedness Subcommittee.

Behind the scenes, however, LBJ was maneuvering to become a conduit of information vital to his colleagues. Everyone needed to know when roll calls would occur, when bills would be argued, what amendments were being considered and whether it was safe for them to take a long weekend mending fences back home. McFarland did not know these things, was overwhelmed by details and he was also worrying about re-election. LBJ began polling chairmen about the status of their bills and made the information available to senators. He was an *ex officio* member of the Democratic Policy Committee and silently learned the who, what, when and how of what was to be brought before the Senate. People began to realize that there was someone who could keep them informed.

LBJ turned next to perfecting the art of vote counting, a concern vital to the White House, but one that few could master because of over-optimism. LBJ's father had cured him of that fault. For LBJ, this was not a game popular at cocktail parties, but a matter of

hard political reality. He did not *guess* about votes, but asked questions, not lobbying, but collecting data. Until he knew how a senator would vote, he didn't write it down. He grew adept at identifying swing votes. He became so proficient that he de facto usurped the job from Skeeter Johnson, Secretary for the Majority.

LBJ recruited a former chief Senate page, Bobby Baker, a "true child of the Senate," to serve as a second pair of sharp ears. He got him named "Assistant, Democratic Cloakroom," in order to gain for him access to that sacred hideaway, where senators came to speak candidly about their lives and activities. Through Baker, LBJ knew everything that was going on and where all the "bodies were buried." Baker proved himself a good, impartial counter, because he held no strong convictions himself. The LBJ-Baker team had a commodity that no one else did: accurate information, sought by the leadership and the White House. LBJ had only to add to this package the ability to produce votes in order to have power in his hands; Baker made it a point of knowing the phone number where every senator could be reached, day or night. The tool was perfected.

When McFarland was in Washington, his mundane chores piled up; while he was campaigning in Arizona, LBJ helped by drafting morning-hour schedules and Democratic senators came to depend on this service. LBJ next suggested a plan for expediting the backlog of bills. With McFarland out of town, he met the new GOP Leader, Styles Bridges and persuaded him to agree that on May 1, after the Calendar was brought up, only "unobjected to" bills would be considered and that *pro forma* remarks would be limited to five minutes per senator. LBJ dealt diplomatically but firmly and effectively with a Republican senator, unadvised of the agreement, who rose to speak on an unrelated matter. A substantial number of bills were enacted that day.

As Democratic senators began asking him whether the Policy Committee could expedite or hinder bills of particular interest to them, LBJ was happy to oblige; he would delicately ask McFarland or Russell for help, scrupulously avoiding controversial and major bills. They usually agreed and the word got out that LBJ was the guy to see to get action. LBJ began building up a reservoir of small debts, which he would later be able to call in.

Senate Procedure provided a device to allow senators to save face with constituents when forced to miss a vote or when reticent to be seen voting contrary to popular opinion. The Leader (or Whip in his absence) would announce before the voting how they would have voted if present; conveniently the "pairings" cancelled each other out. The *Congressional Record* would document their activity. "Live pairings" involved a missing senator getting an oppositely minded colleague who was on the floor to agree as a personal favor to abstain from voting. It was a political trick important to senators but time-consuming, so by brokering these arrangements LBJ, the diligent vote counter, gained another opportunity to be of service. His nothing job gained substance and no one could remember a Whip that had worked so diligently.

LBJ was proving his capacity for leadership. At the end of the 1952 session, isolationist senators tried to gut Truman's request for aid to NATO members. High absenteeism

among northern senators threatened to let them have their way. Even Russell saw that they were going too far. McFarland sat in frustration. *Newsweek* reported a "minor miracle" would be needed to head off this threat to U.S. foreign policy. LBJ accepted the challenge of working one within a narrow eighteen-hour window of opportunity. Overnight, he arranged a prodigious number of "live pairs" to whittle down the margin and the Long Amendment was defeated. New amendments were introduced and defeated by the same technique. LBJ had found a way to manage absenteeism to his party's advantage. It was like a "bolt of legislative lightening."

LBJ understood how power works and he was the only senator holding a key to Rayburn's hideaway, the "Board of Education." LBJ hurried there daily when the Senate recessed, audaciously kissed Mr. Sam's bald head and interceded with him to expedite legislation important to certain senators from whom LBJ needed favors. Loving and admiring LBJ's "vaunting ambition," the Speaker cooperated. Past Leaders had failed because they lacked anything tangible to offer or threaten senators; LBJ had Mr. Sam.

LBJ also had money. Texans were unsurpassed at raising it and LBJ pressed his donors to provide funds he could funnel to Senate colleagues less liquid but useful to keep being re-elected. His aides regularly collected envelopes and sometimes, brown paper sacks stuffed with $100 bills, from oilmen and contractors and dolled them out with an implied *quid pro quo*. LBJ did not leave the arrangements to his aides; he personally and very frankly, brokered wealth for considerations; no matter how much money he raised, it was never enough.

Being Whip gave LBJ an official reason for meeting with fellow senators and selling himself to them. They began coming over to his desk to talk with him on the floor. Republicans found him the easiest Democrat to work with; he even won over standoffish Taft. Most of LBJ's selling was done in the cloakroom. Here he still listened attentively to Walter George and the other Big Bulls, asking their advice, but also helping them with accurate vote counting, sending Bobby Baker darting about and working the phones. Less powerful senators were gravitating towards LBJ and he would drape his long arms on their shoulders in warm camaraderie; he was still careful not to grab lapels.

Colleagues realized LBJ was worth listening to and began dropping by his office. He always knew the inside story and had a chess master's ability to look several moves ahead in developing strategy. Senators were amazed. He charmed them with evocative words and images, often woven into homey and pointedly memorable, stories of life in the Hill Country of Texas, embellished to fit his immediate needs. Few novelists were more perceptive of human nature or possessed a surer ear for the natural rhythms of speech. LBJ dropped names and skillfully mimicked those he spoke about. He made points with all his jokes; he never simply entertained. But he managed to make senators laugh and laughing, they naturally liked LBJ.

Part 3 Chapter 17 Analysis

Chapter 17, "The 'Nothing' Job," returns directly to the saga of LBJ's rise to power in the Senate and redeems him from his villainy. We see LBJ deeply immersed in at best quasi-legal acts of graft in page after page of first-hand accounts by LBJ aides collected by the author over the years and plenty of devious manipulating, but gone is the evil LBJ of previous chapters. He is launching his quest for power and finds that by performing mundane tasks that no one else wants to do, he can carve out a niche for himself. He makes himself indispensable to fellow senators who lack the time or temperament to ferret out useful information, to broker deals, to raise funds, to rally support. Failure to do these things was bogging down the Senate and bringing popular scorn on the institution. LBJ packaged a variety of natural skills and marketed them in the spirit of American free enterprise. Senators realized that LBJ's free gifts had strings attached, but he was so amiable, charming, entertaining and easy-going in this period that no defenses went up. It is very hard not to like and pull for — the LBJ depicted in this chapter.

Caro frequently refers readers to passages in the first two volumes of *The Years of Lyndon Johnson* as he summarizes LBJ's fund-raising and fund-dispensing activities. He provides such a richness of examples that it is not necessary to follow his formal footnotes. LBJ, his staff members and associates emerge as lively, fascinating characters and not at all as villains.

In earlier chapters, Caro frequently quotes the humorist Will Rogers's biting commentaries on political ineptitude. In Chapter 17, we see that LBJ is Rogers's folksy equal, as the author unsparing digs into LBJ's treasure trove of homey stories about the Hill Country and analyses of how LBJ applied them to his purposes. Of the many useful tools the young Democratic Whip fashioned to further his ends, the most important one, this chapter convinces the reader, was his ability to get people to like him.

Part 3 Chapter 18

Part 3 Chapter 18 Summary

In 1951-1952, LBJ also labored to transform the Pedernales Valley into "Johnson Country" again. His grandfather Sam and great uncle Tom settled there in the 1860s, filled with dreams of riches but possessed of little business sense. Tom died in 1877 flat broke. Sam married the canny, hardworking Eliza Bunton, who was firmly dedicated to the family motto, "Charity begins at home." They scraped together enough money to return to the Pedernales and grew cotton on a tract they purchased near the lost Johnson Ranch. Their eldest son, Sam, Jr., married Rebekah Baines in 1907 and their first son, Lyndon, was born in a little "dog-run" cabin. The family moved to Johnson City in 1913 and when Sam's parents died, he opposed his siblings' desire to sell the broken-down homestead. Wanting to keep the dream alive, LBJ's father bought the property and moved back there in 1919. By 1922, Sam was broke and lost the land. The family returned to Johnson City, where he survived only because his brothers paid interest on his mortgage out of charity.

In 1951, LBJ learned that his Aunt Frank Martin, who had bought Sam's land, was anxious to sell it. The house held bad memories for LBJ. The extended family had gathered there for holidays and the Johnsons always felt like poor relations. LBJ's mother resented Judge Martin's condescension. Aunt Frank had neglected the house since her husband died in 1936 and Lady Bird was aghast when they went out to see it, saying it was a "Charles Addams cartoon of a haunted house." Nevertheless, LBJ bought it for $20,000, as the first step in his grand plan to restore the original Johnson Ranch, but now to be known as the "LBJ Ranch."

The Hill Country was dry (except during torrential flooding, which washed away the topsoil) and irrigation was expensive, but favorable rulings by the FCC had made Lady Bird's KTBC radio station a lucrative source of advertising revenue. When they added a television station in 1952, their profits multiplied. Money being no object, LBJ brought in experts to build the dam his father had been unable to construct. Austin architect Max Brooke was hired to transform the "haunted house" into the kind of spiritual home LBJ craved and Lady Bird could learn to love. Horror turned to blessing and they created a working ranch, decorated with antiques and emblazoned everywhere with "LBJ." Mr. Sam's portrait hung in the living room. By 1952, a gregarious, pristine white house stood half a mile from the weather-beaten shack on the site where LBJ was born.

In September of 1952, a "hundred-year flood" washed everything into the Gulf of Mexico (and required Lady Bird and Lynda to be rescued after spending a rare, memorable night alone together), but the dam held and the LBJ Ranch survived to become the backdrop for LBJ's portrayal of himself as a self-made man and true Texan, proudly taking visitors on tours during which he dispensed western wisdom and witticisms. When in Washington, LBJ was almost constantly lonesome for his hills.

LBJ convinced journalists that the ranch was where he could relax and reflect; he loved to be photographed lying in his hammock. In reality, the ranch was a headache. Deep gullies still made farming impossible and filling them fixated LBJ, who was determined "not to be like Daddy." For LBJ, Johnson City was additionally poisoned by bitter memories of love lost.

LBJ's relations with his mother, who died in 1958, were complex. He supplemented her Social Security and rental income, but rarely wrote her, reversing the behavior of his student years, when a steady stream of correspondence passed between them. She wrote to him in Washington, expressing pride in his accomplishments, but he relegated responding to his staff and signature for him. Lady Bird, however, was unusually friendly with her mother-in-law.

LBJ's four siblings sometimes visited the ranch. They were nervous, frail-tempered people; Rebekah and Lucia managed to live relatively stable lives, but Josefa and Sam Houston had serious problems with alcohol and promiscuity. LBJ tried to help his little brother get established in Washington, but Sam Houston could not control himself and could not abide being his brother's "flunky." Josefa's and Sam Houston's problems may well have been genetic, for LBJ had to work hard not to drink to the point of losing control and Lady Bird had to accept being something of a "head wife" in LBJ's harem, having to watch him as he caressed other women in front of her.

Part 3 Chapter 18 Analysis

Chapter 18, "The Johnson Ranch," gives Caro an opportunity to summarize LBJ's Texas roots, which he examined in great length in the first volume of the biography. He fills in more detail on LBJ's ancestors and their knack for economic failure, which fired LBJ's determination to succeed. We meet his hapless siblings in a way that helps reveal LBJ's own demons of drink and womanizing. Lady Bird's forbearance is again underlined, for example when she is taken by surprise when LBJ announced he wanted to look at his aunt's house; hearing him strike a bargain with her for the terrible haunted house; being ignored when, quite out of character, she explodes, "How dare you?" Finally, she has to watch his sexual come-ons to visiting women.

Once again, however, we see LBJ succeeding in what he sets his mind and rising fortune, too. They said he couldn't build a dam that would hold back floodwaters; he built it and it held. They said he couldn't fill gullies that devalued his land for farming; he filled them. He hid the difficulties and turned his gussied-up ranch into a background for public relations activities. Once again, it is easy to pull for LBJ to succeed (except, perhaps, with his wandering hand).

Part 3 Chapter 19

Part 3 Chapter 19 Summary

Earlier Senate Democratic leaders had failed because they could not bridge the gap between ardent liberals and defiant conservatives and find ground for compromise. LBJ was determined to find a liberal with whom he could work and turned his attention to Hubert Horatio Humphrey of Minnesota.

Humphrey burst on the national political scene in 1948, delivering a fiery address to pull the Democratic convention in Philadelphia out of its defeatist doldrums. Democrats seemed resigned that their candidate, incumbent President Truman, would be defeated and party leaders wanted their platform's civil rights plank to be sufficiently bland so as not to antagonize the South. Humphrey was the thirty-seven-year-old mayor of Minneapolis who had secured passage of the nation's first effective Fair Employment Practices ordinance and worked to erase the city's reputation for anti-Semitism.

Humphrey's dedication to civil rights for blacks was firm and his rhetoric proven, so liberals who wanted a strong, Trumanesque plank (partly because they realized that the black vote in northern cities could be at least as crucial as the white South), turned to him to be their spokesman. He was warned that if he accepted the "crackpot crusade," he would risk a brilliant future. He had his own eyes set on a run for the Senate and a victory in Philadelphia would enhance his image in the Party; defeat in Philadelphia would bring on him blame for splitting the party. Civil rights were an issue on which there could be no compromise, in Humphrey's mind and he accepted.

He spoke for only eight minutes in the steaming hall, declaring that civil rights was 172 years late in coming; Democrats must step out of the shadows of states' rights and walk in the bright sunshine of human rights. They faced a spiritual crisis and had to stand up for freedom, hope and equality for all human beings. Only the southerners and a few conservative northerners failed to jump to their feet. Parades snaked noisily through the superheated hall and when the vote was taken, the liberals were triumphant.

Truman was angry. He feared the "crackpots" would cause the South to bolt the party. A few did. Most fell in behind Russell as a replacement for Truman. When Russell lost overwhelmingly, Strom Thurmond headed the breakaway Dixiecrat Party, which carried four southern states in the general election. The key to Truman's surprise victory was the allegiance of blacks in the big cities, rallied by Humphrey's speech. Humphrey won his Senate race by a landslide and came to Washington in 1949, acclaimed by *Time* magazine as, "the Number One prospect for liberalism in this country."

Humphrey got off on the wrong foot with his new colleagues. He spoke about good prospects of passing civil rights legislation, provided members were honest and sincere; he condemned filibuster as an undemocratic technique; he forced the Senate Dining Room to serve a black staff member; and he accepted national chairmanship of the

ADA. The new Democratic Majority Leader (who already disliked the "pip-squeak in Philadelphia") was offended by such early boldness. He refused him the committee memberships he requested (Foreign Relations and Agriculture) and seized every occasion to affront the Minnesotan. As Humphrey charged forward, the Big Bulls ostracized him and opposed him even when he was right. The chair refused to recognize him when he rose to speak. The naturally gregarious Humphrey was miserable and in despair. He smiled through tears.

Until 1951, LBJ followed the Big Bulls and was distinctly cold towards Humphrey. Then, one spring day, he took him aside, said how much he envied Humphrey's articulateness and logic, but urged him to talk about anything other than the NAACP. The two began talking regularly and Humphrey no longer felt himself a pariah. He allowed LBJ to fill in the holes in his political education (although he had earned a master's degree in political science). LBJ urged him to be pragmatic, learn to count and study his colleagues like a psychiatrist in order to know how to appeal to their vanity, needs and ambitions. Humphrey knew he sat at the feet of a political giant.

Humphrey's admiration for LBJ verged on awe: his bigness, his strength, his subtlety and his ferocity. The interplay between the two was complex. Both were unabashedly ambitious; both yearned to be president. Humphrey's successful crusade for social justice in Minneapolis, however, stood at odds with most of LBJ's concerns in 1951. Still, LBJ reasoned, Humphrey could be useful to him as a bridge to northern liberals, perhaps the only hopes for controlling the liberal extremists in order to bring unity to Senate Democrats. Humphrey could be a peace emissary, helping to facilitate building common ground. To be president, LBJ needed personal rapprochement with the liberal wing he had abandoned to side with the South. If not won over, Humphrey might exercise his eloquence as a powerful barrier to LBJ's immediate concern of building for himself true power in the Senate as a base. He therefore encouraged Humphrey to view his role as a bridge between hostile camps as a means of advancing his own presidential dreams; LBJ let Humphrey believe he was no threat to his attaining his goal. If for no other reason, no southerner could be elected president.

The key for LBJ was to overcome Humphrey's suspicion that he might be required to betray his cherished principles, so he portrayed himself as an FDR man at heart, the great man's protégé. Humphrey could see that LBJ was also Russell's protégé, trying through him to become captain of the southerners rather than their captive. Humphrey knew that LBJ had to conceal his liberalism as he bided his time. LBJ wined and dined Humphrey, convincing him they were not only comrades-in-arms, but friends. LBJ read in Humphrey's open face a weakness he could exploit. He set out to teach Humphrey of the need for compromise and its efficacy in winning the fight for social justice: genuinely helping poor, underprivileged people. He stressed that compromise was not a dirty word and perfectionism was dangerous. The framers of the Constitution were compromisers. Trotting is better than standing still if you can't gallop.

LBJ began telling Big Dogs that Humphrey wasn't so bad a guy. He encouraged Walter George to take advantage of his interest in foreign affairs and advised Russell that Humphrey's views on agriculture were remarkably like his own. Humphrey learned to

treat Russell with deference and this opened the door to southerners viewing him as a human being rather than a civil rights foe. Senators came to like him, as Johnson had and Humphrey knew that he owed the removal of his stigma to LBJ. He also appreciated that what LBJ gave he could also take away. The two men remained loyal to their convictions throughout 1951-1952, but the Whip made no attempt to build the Humphrey bridge.

Part 3 Chapter 19 Analysis

Chapter 19, "The Orator of the Dawn," focuses on Hubert Humphrey and how LBJ took his fellow freshman senator under his wing when the outspoken young liberal got off on the wrong foot with his new colleagues. Humphrey's formal education in political science had not prepared him to deal with the Senate's traditionalism and he was a pariah. LBJ, who had spent his first years studying the institution carefully, had valuable lessons to teach and he did everything required to make an ideological enemy into an invaluable ally in years to come.

Part 3 Chapter 20

Part 3 Chapter 20 Summary

Chapter 20 opens with LBJ talking to a reporter from *Nation's Business,* trying to convince him to narrow an article about the congressional whips to him alone. LBJ brags about how he already runs both houses of Congress, working around McFarland and through Rayburn. *Time's* Washington bureau chief also alerts his New York editors that this southerner wants the top job.

In 1952, however, another southerner made the run. Russell ran as much for his region as for himself. Democrats could re-nominate Truman or turn to Estes Kefauver who, as a senator from Tennessee, was considered a southerner by much of the country, though he was detested in the Deep South. His nomination could well result in another walkout, this one fatal, because Eisenhower was the likely Republican nominee. Eisenhower's immense popularity, even in the South, could return to the GOP control of Congress. Russell knew the old Confederacy would rally behind him. When Kefauver defeated Truman in the New Hampshire primary, the president withdrew, leaving in the run the elderly Vice President Barkley and Averell Harriman as Kefauver's declared challengers. Truman suggested Illinois Governor Adelai Stevenson, but the great orator declined. Russell, convinced that he was the only man who could defeat Eisenhower in the South, shocked the National Press Club by throwing his hat into the ring.

Russell knew he had a solid base at the convention, controlling 262 southern votes out of the total 1,230. He counted on Senate colleagues delivering a substantial number more. The South greeted his candidacy with euphoria and LBJ, putting his ambitions on hold, lent Connolly and two speechwriters to the Russell campaign and made sure the Georgian's campaign would be well financed without the dignified senator having to "soil his hands" with such matters. Russell came close to begging Truman for his endorsement, but the president declined, saying Russell would be a great president if he was from anywhere but the South; party unity was Truman's highest priority. Russell by this point had convinced himself that he had a chance of winning and pressed forward, trying for a while to present himself as a moderate on racial issues, but without yielding on core principles.

In late June 1952, Russell began a tour of the North by visiting New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania and out west to Wyoming, California and Colorado; it was widely acknowledged that he might be the best man in the race, but he was unelectable, being a southerner. Nevertheless, Russell arrived at the Democratic Convention in Chicago filled with hope. He looked for Walter George's nominating speech to work a miracle. LBJ enthusiastically led the parade in his support, followed almost exclusively by southerners. When Stevenson agreed to run, the nomination was virtually his. Russell was crushed by the rejection of his beloved Southland and his health declined after the convention. He lost the zest for legislative battles, turned bitter and began retreating into an ivory tower.

LBJ and Lady Bird tried to raise his spirits and Russell, appreciative of LBJ's help in the primary campaign, focused his hope for a southern president, eventually, on LBJ. He had seen that people across the North liked the young Texan; LBJ seemed to have a foot in their camp (while preserving belief in "constitutional principles") and had already demonstrated in the Senate ample political qualifications. LBJ knew that to realize his and Russell's, dream he would have to get the nation to stop thinking of him as a southerner; this created a dilemma, because his path to power in the Senate was clearly linked to the Southern Bloc.

The Red Scare emerged as a major issue in the 1952 election; Joe McCarthy adroitly put Stevenson under suspicion. The smiling general Ike promised to go to Korea and was swept into office with fifty-five percent of the popular vote and a landside in the Electoral College. The GOP took control of both houses of Congress. McFarland, a fixture in the Senate, became the second straight Majority Leader to have his career cut short by accepting the post. His successor, as Minority Leader, would be relieved of the pressure for passing the president's legislation, so the job became more attractive to many senators. LBJ wanted the job and began politicking among his colleagues (including the freshly-elected John F. Kennedy). Russell again turned down the job and suggested LBJ take it, with his support.

That was enough to give LBJ the job, but he was determined to gather liberal support in order to avoid the factionalism that hamstrung his predecessors. Realizing that this would be a hard sell, he offered help with choice committee assignments and other favors. Most liberals were determined to block LBJ's election. His closeness to FDR was remembered and after LBJ convinced Stevenson as the party head not to come to Washington until after the Senate had organized (in order not to appear to be meddling), the liberals' hopes were quashed. Humphrey, however, held out, maintaining the Democratic Party needed to remain dedicated to a broad, liberal agenda. LBJ began a phone blitz, making promises ("candy") and calling in favors, seeking the unanimity that would guarantee his success as Leader. He promised to bring Humphrey into the leadership circle and told him confidently, backed by count sheets, that he had the votes to be elected; having the upper hand, he adopted a take-charge, no-nonsense air during what Humphrey said was an "awful meeting."

On January 2, 1953, LBJ did, indeed, prevail, following Russell's nomination and laudatory speech. His opponent had few supporters and Humphrey moved that the election be declared unanimous, without taking a formal vote. LBJ received Humphrey alone as representative of the liberals and agreed to increase their representation on the Policy Committee and other bodies. LBJ was willing to deal, but only through Humphrey personally. Humphrey pledged his allegiance, thus cementing his own power.

LBJ was forty-four-years-old and still in his first term in the Senate, when he became Leader. His ascent came through taking the "Senate way," by winning the support of true power centers and working quietly behind closed doors. Having attained power, he could allow his new Senate mannerisms to fade. He was the picture of self-satisfaction.

BOOKRAGS

Part 3 Chapter 20 Analysis

"Gettysburg," the title of Chapter 20, was the site of the greatest of the Civil War battles, the one generally considered the turning point in that conflict. Fresh from a victory over Union forces at Chancellorsville, VA, Confederate General Robert E. Lee, wanted to press the battle north, to head off expected Union attacks in Mississippi and to exploit Pennsylvania's rich farmlands to compensate for the earlier loss of crops on the southern battlefields. It proved a miscalculation and the South's unity of command never recovered.

Caro frequently uses the image of the Battle of Gettysburg as a metaphor for the "Lost Cause." Southern senators, Russell, the historian, first among them, saw the ability to obstruct anti-southern legislation through the filibuster as the region's ongoing revenge for that crushing Union victory. They seem never to focus on the aftermath: President Lincoln's stirring Gettysburg Address, delivered at the dedication of the cemetery honoring the battle's staggering 7,000 honored war dead, because Lincoln's call for reconciliation died with him. It was buried beneath memories of Sherman's brutal march to the sea and the Northern military occupation known as Reconstruction. Russell was convinced that only the election of a southerner to the presidency would truly end the Civil War. His reasoning is never spelled out. Perhaps it was the pure symbolism of their ostracism from the office being ended. Perhaps it was having in office someone who appreciated their genteel culture and, from his point of view, successful resolution of the racial problem through strict segregation of the races.

At any rate, having failed in his "quixotic" race, Russell grew determined that LBJ would be the southerner to occupy the White House. Quixotic is, of course, a reference to Spanish novelist Miguel Cervantes's tragic-comic hero, Don Quixote, a half-crazed nobleman who imagined himself anointed a medieval knight battling on behalf of his unrequited love. Russell was by no means crazed and his love for the South was hardly unrequited. It was, however, impossible in the early 1950s, as even his supporters saw.

Humphrey, whom we met in Chapter 18, appears as LBJ's rival for the vacant job of Democratic Leader and despite their growing friendship, his admiration for the Texan and LBJ's efforts to get him to appreciate the value of compromise in politics, the Minnesotan was unable to back him. Caro shows LBJ's determination not merely to win the office, but to win unanimously, in order to be positioned for real achievements and in order not to be destroyed by the office like his two predecessors. When it became obvious that LBJ would prevail, Humphrey wisely moved that the election be proclaimed unanimous. This led to LBJ's acceptance of Humphrey as the lone spokesman for the liberal wing of the party, creating a power base for Humphrey, whose own ambition for the presidency was pronounced. We will see the two men linked throughout the rest of this volume and the fourth volume, currently being written, will doubtless develop the picture clearly, when in 1964, Humphrey was elected Vice President to LBJ's presidency.

Part 3 Chapter 21

Part 3 Chapter 21 Summary

LBJ realized that he had to become an effective leader of an effective party, eliminating Democratic disorganization and inefficiency. He would have to persuade southerners to surrender their powers without realizing they were doing so and then, in order to reach his higher goal, would have to use his new power to support causes the South hated.

Northern senators felt the seniority system excluded them from key committees and LBJ recognized that the party was wasting expertise. The Leader had no discretion in making committee assignments, so LBJ began looking at the open slots as squares on a chessboard and freshman senators as his game pieces. He had four openings on major committees to open with, but little hope that colleagues with seniority would pass them up. LBJ took to the telephone to learn how best to bend them to his will and then used his full arsenal of charm to achieve his goal. He sold with logic: Eisenhower's victory did not result solely from his immense popularity; the GOP already held a grip on the fastest growing part of America, the suburbs, but had made inroads into the cities, where the old Democratic machines were in decay. Unless the Democrats took immediate action to organize and produce impressive legislative results, the GOP could swamp them in 1954. LBJ had to bring new blood to the committees.

On the Foreign Relations Committee (where two Democratic vacancies were to be filled), Republicans were poised to roll back the Marshall Plan and Truman's containment policy. LBJ argued that Democrats could not afford not to utilize Humphrey and Mike Mansfield, two foreign policy experts, to stand up to Robert Taft. Nor could they afford the luxury of consigning former Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington to a minor committee. With pleasant humor the Texan appealed for fairness: give every senator at least one major assignment before allowing others to claim two or more. He appealed to the Big Dogs who had lost their chairmanships by saying that a strong Democratic program would restore their gavels.

LBJ appealed to Russell's patriotism and devotion to the Senate, pleading that he help make real senators out of the newcomers by giving them the kind of leg up on good committee assignments that the two of them had by good fortune obtained. Russell warned that LBJ was playing with dynamite and refused to support his plan actively, but agreed not to oppose it either. LBJ pressed his logic on Walter George, ranking Democrat on Foreign Relations, playing up Russell's non-opposition and received tacit agreement, provided senior senators were willing not to press their requests for the two open seats. Because Harry Bird was fond of LBJ and not passionately interested in foreign affairs, his agreement came easily. Three other seniors, however, badly wanted the remaining slot. Walter Magnuson considered himself capable of out thinking and out talking the GOP members and refused to compromise the seniority system.

LBJ's quest would likely have failed had Republican Wayne Morse not grown disillusioned with Eisenhower and become an Independent. To keep Morse from siding with the Democrats, the Republicans proposed adding one of their members to any committee on which Morse served; this would require changing Senate rules and LBJ began politicking to enlarge the scope of the change, so that nine committees would be expanded and four reduced. Unprecedented harmony reigned and LBJ had three new squares to play with, including one on Appropriations, the only committee assignment Magnuson wanted more than Foreign Affairs. When LBJ talked the remaining two contenders to step aside, he installed Humphrey and Mansfield. To give himself another square to work with, LBJ suggested that Humphrey relinquish his seat on Agriculture, the Minnesotan at first balked, since his state was heavily agricultural, but LBJ convinced him, for the good of the nation, to concentrate on foreign policy. Earle Clements wanted Agriculture badly and to get it relinquished two useful committee assignments.

LBJ made dozens of such moves and in every case, it was strictly voluntary. Having gotten all the individual senators to agree, LBJ turned his attention to the party elders who would have to approve the appointments. LBJ prowled his office, rehearsing his sales pitch and then made the rounds to present it, with due deference. He played on George and McClellan's desire to help him be a good Leader. He wouldn't be able to do it if "those damned northern crazies" were "always tearing at his flanks." He warned that the Republicans were poised to undo twenty years of Democratic foreign and domestic progress. "The greatest salesman one-on-one who ever lived" won the day when, with Russell's nod, each of his assignments was confirmed. Journalists gushed with enthusiasm for Johnson Rule and the new committee members were fulsome in their appreciation. LBJ could point to the fact that he had consulted Russell and the rest of the southerners every step of the way.

In 1946, the Senate had created two policy committees for each party, hoping to end the strife that crippled legislation. They proved ineffective. LBJ proposed creating new staff for the Policy Committee. Donald Cook, having previously worked for LBJ, declined to serve as head of legal activities. His next two choices were no less willing to put up with him, but he cobbled together a competent staff. LBJ did not intend to have the Policy Committee deal with issues (he had had a lifelong aversion to issues), feeling they could only divide the party.

LBJ saw the staff's role as analyzing bills, determining who might oppose them and devising compromises that would quell dissent. This would put LBJ in a position to shape legislation. LBJ insisted on seniority for assigning senators to the Policy Committee, because he knew he could count on the incumbents. He easily controlled the new liberals he nominated and impressed upon the committee members that as the minority party, their decisions had to be unanimous in order to carry weight. Everything was done informally, with "traditional senatorial bonhomie and clubbiness," and proved the perfect setting for blurring issues and making controversies quietly go away. As they came increasingly to rubber-stamp LBJ's decisions, the Democrats began appearing unified. Full-blown party caucuses became superfluous and faded from the scene.

LBJ next requested, in the name of the Policy Committee, that standing committee chairmen assign a staff liaison person to keep it appraised of where bills stood on a weekly basis, in order to facilitate keeping a timetable of all pending legislation. Russell liked the seemingly innocuous idea and it was implemented. This marked, however, the first incursion into the sovereignty of the chairmen. LBJ's argument was flawless: it would help head off the end-of-session logjam. Staff analysis of bills would help senators explore their thinking, mediate disputes, etc. Baker began meeting with the fifteen designated staff directors as a group and learned about the working of their committees as they gradually grew comfortable answering his increasingly probing questions.

By the mid-1950s LBJ began meeting with the group and dominating them as he would not have been able to dominate the chairmen. The Big Bulls loudly praised these useful innovations, not realizing how badly they had been tricked.

Part 3 Chapter 21 Analysis

Chapter 21, "The Whole Stack," concludes Part 4 of *Master of the Senate*. It draws its title from LBJ's recollection that "I shoved in my whole stack" as the new Republican-controlled Congress convened in 1953. The imagery is poker, but the game he played was chess. The Big Bulls, who had an enormous vested interest in the status quo, had innumerable opportunities to block the freshman senator, but missed every one, so completely did he sell them on the proposition that every aspect served the national and Democratic good, preserved their perks and would return their lost gavels. The press was not deluded when it saw great potential in the new Johnson Rule; LBJ's objectives were valid and beneficial. That each aspect such as staffing committees based on competence and coordinating the work of the various committees, concentrated additional, unprecedented power in LBJ's hands, went unnoticed. He was a political genius, not a would-be Master of the Senate.

God is said to be in the details and so was LBJ. Caro fills this final chapter in Part 4 "Looking for It," with fascinating details on how individual senators were maneuvered into the position LBJ wanted. He again emerges as a likeable character and hard not to pull for.

Part 4 Chapter 22

Part 4 Chapter 22 Summary

As Democratic Leader of the Senate, LBJ was one of the most prominent and influential Democrats in the country. Democrats were close to panic over Eisenhower's popularity. He had appeared statesmanlike even before the inauguration, touring the Korean front, rejecting any idea of an all-out offensive and declaring it his intention to bring the troops home. America liked Ike. The Republicans in control of the Senate, Taft and the Old Guard, however, did not share this sentiment and LBJ saw an opportunity in supporting Ike's policies against the right-wingers. Fighting for decades under FDR and Truman, Ike had *de facto* supported the internationalism that the Democrats' natural enemies now wanted to tear down. Rayburn and Russell both agreed with LBJ's assessment. Mr. Sam knew and liked Ike, admired his candor, truthfulness and judgment; he had already pledged to deliver ninety-five percent of the Democratic votes in the House to back his defense policies. Russell, the patriot, considered Eisenhower a great military leader and worried about the world impact of Democratic hostility to the president.

LBJ worked his colleagues, continually pounding the point that it was suicide to oppose Eisenhower's foreign policy and statesmanship and patriotism to support it. When the president's first State of the Union address called for "true bipartisanship," the Policy Committee unanimously approved and pledged an all-out defense of NATO. The Old Guard had, during the campaign, condemned the Yalta Agreements and Truman's abandonment of Eastern Europe to communist slavery. Eisenhower learned from the State Department not only that there had been no "secret" agreements at Yalta, but that if the Senate repudiated it, the Allies would have no legal basis for occupying Berlin and Vienna. Taft began arguing that Russia had already subverted Yalta. Eisenhower drafted a proposal to reject this thesis and speak blandly of hopes that the satellites would regain self-determination.

Republicans readied amendments and LBJ phoned the *Times* in support of the president's non-partisan position. Taft won in committee and the Secretary of State phoned LBJ to strategize over heading off even harsher GOP amendments. Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin's death allowed moderate Republicans to call for a moratorium on rhetoric while a new leadership developed in the USSR. LBJ and the forty-seven unified Democrats emerged as constructive *vis-à-vis* the Republicans.

Having won the first major battle, LBJ held the Democrats together to secure confirmation of Eisenhower's nominee for Ambassador to Russia. The Old Guard tarred Chip Bohlen for his minor role at Yalta and spread rumors of FBI evidence of his homosexuality. The Administration held firm and LBJ delivered 45 of 47 votes for confirmation, a better showing than the GOP.

Next came a fight over the Bricker Amendment. The vain senator from Ohio was a hard-line backer of Taft and McCarthy. He introduced a joint resolution, S.J. Res. 1, on the

opening day of Congress. He called for a constitutional amendment to require positive congressional legislation before any international agreement would be binding on the U.S. Organized mailings to legislators yielded sixty-three senatorial cosponsors, enough to pass it. Afraid of constituents' passions, the Southern Bloc came onboard. Hoping to play down the split in his party, Eisenhower preferred not to speak out, but LBJ drew him out to announce "unalterable opposition," and for months, the GOP filled newspapers with verbiage, while LBJ in Texas quietly contemplated how to deal with this Gordian knot.

LBJ was in a delicate position. Looking forward some day to exercising presidential power, he could not afford to let it be limited. Immediately, however, he had to be able to convince conservative Texans that he wanted to see hated executive powers limited. Finally, assuming he found a solution, Democrats had to get full credit for rescuing the idolized president.

His solution was to have George, Dean of the Senate, offer an amendment of his own that would curb presidential authority just enough to polarize the Old Guard and Eisenhower as Bricker's had, but weak enough to draw moderate Republicans to its support. This would split the GOP and shift the balance of power to the Democrats, whose moderates would ostensibly gain its passage. Finally, LBJ would have to make sure the George amendment failed by margin a narrow enough that George would not be humiliated, since LBJ might need the old man's support in the future.

LBJ had staff attorney Gerald Siegel prepare a memorandum dissecting the flaws in S.J. Res. 1 and sold the case to George in a masterful, rapid-fire monologue. George's amendment specified that no provision of a treaty could supersede the Constitution and that no international agreement other than a treaty could become effective except by an act of Congress. This would rein in use of executive agreements and would apply to the widely unpopular U.N. Charter. The president was at first elated and Bricker was enraged. GOP leaders were reluctant to let Democrats save Eisenhower from their own extremists. Eventually Ike appreciated the danger of yielding initiative to the minority party and grew worried that the new amendment could someday bind the hands of the commander-in-chief.

The month-long "Bricker Debate" on the Senate floor was precisely the kind of dramatic, headline-grabbing shouting match that LBJ wanted. For the showdown, the White House dispatched eight liaison men to work the GOP cloakroom. LBJ alone counted votes in the Democratic cloakroom. Three proposals for a constitutional amendment would be brought to the floor: Bricker's first, then a brand-new, weak Knowland/Ferguson proposal favored by Eisenhower and third George's. He wanted the two GOP versions out of the way, so the final vote and defeat, would be only on the Democratic proposal. He had arranged enough defectors to prevent the once-unstoppable Bricker Amendment from gaining even a simple majority. When Knowland/Ferguson came up, LBJ arranged for a Democrat to move that the George Amendment be substituted; this would require only a simple majority.

The White House lobbied against this parliamentary maneuver, but it passed 61 to 30. That left only preventing the George Amendment from receiving two-thirds of the Senators' votes. This was the hardest task, as constituents were expecting *some* action to limit the executive branch. LBJ had arranged for three Democrats with "safe" seats to support the substitution, but defeat the amendment; he calculated that this was enough. If necessary, he had a few southerners prepared to absent themselves from the floor for the final voting. Still, LBJ's vote sheets were getting messy, as senators switched back and forth. When Knowland, red-faced and shouting, announced he would vote for George, since something was better than nothing, LBJ feared other GOP conservatives would follow him. Lehman rose to condemn isolationism. George made a final plea, bringing tears to Bricker's eyes. In the cloakroom, LBJ was calling in commitments. When a roll call resulted in precisely two-thirds of the members present in favor, LBJ had an ailing Harley Kilgore fetched from his office sofa and the groggy senator voted no. S.J. Res. 1 was defeated. The FDR/Truman foreign policy stood intact and the Democrats' popularity increased, as did LBJ's.

Part 4 Chapter 22 Analysis

Part 4 as its title, "Using It," suggests, covers LBJ exercising the power he had collected. Chapter 22, "Masterstrokes," includes LBJ's rallying and leading the Democrats to back the new Eisenhower Administration against attacks by the isolationist GOP Old Guard. In battles big and small, LBJ worked behind the scenes to formulate complex series of maneuvers and line up votes three times to thwart what seemed an inevitable rollback of the FDR/Truman legacy in foreign policy. To defeat the Bricker Amendment, he used an elderly colleague, but made certain that Walter George would not lose face as a result. In part, this was pragmatic: LBJ might need him again. It seems, however, that LBJ was sincerely concerned about hurting the Dean of the Senate's feelings.

Caro again succeeds in making a complex situation not only clear, but also lively and exciting. The Democrats come off looking like a dynamic, unified power while out of power, in sharp contrast to their divisiveness and ineffectuality in recent years. Their Leader no longer slouched in his seat, running his fingers through his hair in frustration. LBJ made things happen. His national fame rose and, because his accurate vote counting and ordering created the buffer he needed, he was able to safely cast his own vote in favor of the George Amendment, thereby ingratiating himself to his rich bankrollers who wanted the executive branch brought under control. LBJ protected himself in the short and long run; when he reached the White House, his hands would not be bound in foreign affairs.

Part 4 Chapter 23

Part 4 Chapter 23 Summary

LBJ did not lead the charge in the dominant domestic issue of the 1950s, Joseph R. McCarthy's demagogic witch-hunt for Reds infiltrating American society. He stepped forward only when there was no longer any risk in doing so.

In February1950, the junior senator from Wisconsin addressed a women's club in Wheeling, WV, where he announced that he had in his hand a list of 205 active State Department employees who were communists. In the years to come, McCarthy would misuse senatorial powers of investigation to destroy the lives and reputations of thousands of innocent citizens, knowing that the Senate's rules of decorum and civility would shield him from censure. Liberal senators were outraged by McCarthy's bald-faced lies and inventions and declared that the Senate was being debased by allowing him to assassinate characters in its halls. They repeatedly appealed to LBJ to at least put the Democratic Party on record against McCarthyism.

LBJ did nothing, since anti-Communism was popular in the South, particularly with LBJ's oil barons. Democrats could not afford to appear to be covering up any "wickedness" in the Truman Administration. Nor were McCarthy's use of rhetoric and smear tactics foreign to LBJ; six months before the Wheeling speech, LBJ had used both to destroy Leland Olds. LBJ was wary of McCarthy, who in his first term had proven himself a powerful force, helping defeat those he campaigned against and electing those he supported. Senators might arrange their schedules to avoid him, but could not afford to cross him. McCarthy had made it his business to learn a great deal about LBJ, including how he obtained money; LBJ did not need Washington to be reminded. Nor could LBJ, facing re-election in 1954, afford to alienate reactionary financial supporters. LBJ said in private that McCarthy was a no good, loud-mouthed drunk, but while he was riding high, counseled patience: "to kill a snake, you have to get it with one blow."

LBJ remained wary even after Russell called McCarthy a "huckster of hysteria" and "salesman of infamy" who was offensive to American fair play. He did not react even after McCarthy attacked Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxam, alienating Oxam's influential friend, Senator Harry Byrd, or when McCarthy assailed the secretary of state and liberal professors and embarrassed GOP senators grew willing to cooperate with liberal Democrats. LBJ regretted the hysteria, but said McCarthyism had to run its course. Off the record, LBJ said that as Majority Leader, he would appoint a select committee, stocked with irreproachable senators, to investigate McCarthy, but the Majority Leader was a McCarthy supporter.

In February of 1954, McCarthy alleged communists had infiltrated the U.S. Army and CBS broadcast clips of McCarthy terrorizing witnesses. A respected correspondent proclaimed it was time to end the silence and McCarthy's popularity plummeted.

McCarthy appointed his closest friend to chair the televised "Army-McCarthy Hearings," during which the Army counsel pronounced the famous words "Have you no sense of decency, sir at long last? Have you left no sense of decency?" At the conclusion of the hearings, GOP Senator Ralph Flanders introduced a resolution of censure, but LBJ stayed out of the fracas, until it was announced that the resolution would come to a vote.

Liberal Democrats wanted to go on record as a party, taking a moral stand on McCarthy, but LBJ persuaded them that this should not be a partisan issue. He worked with key Republicans to set up a bipartisan select committee, taking pains to get Leader Knowland to appoint the senators LBJ wanted and to and believe that he himself had thought up the list. The Select Committee did not condemn McCarthy's inquisition, but merely his bringing "dishonor and disrepute" on the Senate. The GOP split on the resolution, yet LBJ delivered all but three Democrats. McCarthy remained in the Senate until his death in 1957, but was reduced to a stumbling, fawning, nearly inarticulate alcoholic.

Part 4 Chapter 23 Analysis

Chapter 23, "Tail-Gunner Joe," takes its title from the nickname that Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy claimed to have earned as a decorated air ace in the Pacific theater during World War II. In reality, he had staffed a desk, debriefing the brave pilots who survived their dangerous missions. This epitomizes the man who lied and invented "evidence" that ruined the lives of innocent Americans in the five-year reign of terror he conducted against the Red Scare.

As in the MacArthur hearings in 1951, LBJ is a bit player in this drama. As Leader of the minority party, he could (and did) claim to have no authority to take action, but coming on the heels of his brilliant seizing of the initiative to save the president's freedom to conduct foreign policy, the argument was disingenuous. LBJ waited for McCarthy to dig his own grave, because it was imprudent for him to take a stand that could bring him no tangible advantage. LBJ used McCarthy-like tactics to destroy Leland Olds and LBJ's reactionary oil baron supporters were likely to brand any liberals with whom LBJ might have sided "soft on Communism," and LBJ wanted none of his own skeletons unearthed. The risk of frustrating those he led was too small to risk heading this campaign. Caro points out that LBJ's role ought not to be exaggerated. His efforts were purely pragmatic, timed perfectly to lose him nothing. LBJ as a moral coward will reappear in the civil rights battles that Caro will describe and his growing backbone on that issue will again occur only when it becomes politically expedient for him.

Part 4 Chapter 24

Part 4 Chapter 24 Summary

In the 1954 election, Democrats regained control of the House and came within one vote of controlling the Senate. Independent Wayne Morse had been feuding with LBJ, but sided with the Democrats in order to receive a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee through LBJ's intercessions. LBJ threw in a seat on Banking and Currency for good measure and was re-elected by acclamation as party leader. His two years as Minority Leader had infiltrated him into the internal workings of committees. No longer would he have to limit himself to monitoring and suggesting, mediating and unifying, bargaining and redacting.

Now, as Majority Leader, LBJ could dictate scheduling and often content. LBJ alone saw the big picture of the Senate, the alliances and trade-offs, the promises and threats, being made. He alone knew all the threads of committee work and how they were tied together. His manipulation of standing committees into submitting to the Policy Committee for rubber-stamping had little significance while Democrats were out of power; now LBJ dealt with final, Democratic bills and determined when and if they would reach the floor of the Senate. He began tightening the reins on the bit he had gently slid between the chairmen's teeth two years before.

LBJ began suggesting that he manage some bills on the floor, a tactic that chairmen would never have accepted, but many elderly senators had gotten so used to accepting LBJ's assistance and allowing him to field questions on the floor, that this seemed a logical extension. Younger chairmen were convinced that the more experienced Leader could better obtain the results they wanted: passage without amendments.

LBJ gradually accepted the surrender of power more so than he *took* it. He remained as fawning and deferential as ever to the Big Bulls, but with their backing he could afford to exercise power blatantly over the remaining Democrats. He let the veil drop. He no longer negotiated the checkerboard of committee assignments; he made seats dependent on personal loyalty to himself. He reverted to the seniority system when this served his purpose, while hinting that exceptions might be made to those who joined his team. He was more brutal with those he thought could not be won over; relegating them to committees he bragged were as "useless as tits on a bull." Those who received the assignments they wanted were delighted with the Johnson Rule, as were journalists.

Becoming chairman of Appropriations, seventy-seven-year-old Carl Hayden, was losing interest in chairing the Democratic Patronage Committee. He was very fond of LBJ, listened to him and gradually put Patronage into his hands. Senators again found good reason to be on LBJ's team. Hayden bequeathed chairmanship of Appropriations to an ailing colleague and LBJ offered to take the burden from his shoulders. LBJ took over a choice suite, G-14 and senators saw LBJ's friends getting large suites and "the troublesome ones" being relegated to smaller offices.

LBJ dropped the façade of courtesy in dealing with senators not on his team. He ignored their requests for return phone calls. He turned his back on them in the cloakroom. He set Baker at the entrance to the Senate to discourage certain members from entering at inconvenient times. LBJ studiously snubbed certain senators on the floor and never invited them to his office. He ran the courteous Senate like a longshoremen's union. He terrified senator's staff members.

In G-14, his first-term humility melted. He ordered it refurnished lavishly and displayed prominently a plaque bearing his father's motto: "You ain't learning nothin' when you're talking," but utterly ignored the advice. A phone call to Senator Stennis's wife, marked by tremendous attention to detail, lack of hurry and belaboring the obvious in his effusive praise, illustrates LBJ's new attitude. It was important that those listening realize he was not being sincere. His ruthlessness served to increase his power. Colleagues knew the price of even a single attempt at independence. Symington is presented as an example of the cruelty with which LBJ sought revenge. LBJ refused to understand why anyone might feel obliged to cross him and made the life of anyone who did miserable.

LBJ dusted off an old Senate rule, the "unanimous consent agreement." If all senators agreed to limit debate on a particular bill, it allowed for the total length of time to be set and allocated to proponents and opponents; the number of amendments that could be and debate on them could also be limited. Specific senators were named to control this. Before World War II, it was most often an end-of-session expediency. After the war, an inefficient Senate usually turned to it only after substantial debate had taken place. Already controlling the wording of bills so they were certain to pass, LBJ added the ability to hold major bills off the Calendar until he was specified as the senator who would control debate time. It was difficult to resist LBJ's argument that he was just trying to help the Senate function smoothly. Once everyone agreed, he used his prerogative as Majority Leader to get the floor and made his motion.

In LBJ's hands, unanimous consent agreement requests radically changed the Senate's nature as a deliberative body. There was no appeal to a unanimous consent agreement except by another unanimous consent agreement, so the first senator to speak, nearly always LBJ, held absolute control. The presiding officer had no authority to recognize any other senator unless the floor was yielded to him. Even when an amendment was allowed, it could not normally be debated or even explained and it had to be germane to the original provision, a major exception to the Senate's sacred Rule 14. Senate rules were left intact, but limited debate was achieved, because to object to an LBJ request was dangerous.

LBJ did not limit long-winded speeches, because these provided a useful smokescreen for back-room "horse-trading." Whenever he needed to stall for time, LBJ sent out a trusted glib speaker, very often Humphrey or Molly Malone. Once LBJ had his ducks in a row, the orator was expected to end quickly.

LBJ saw the legislator's role as voting and not saying principled things. Public discussion was dangerous to the conduct of government. This stemmed from LBJ's

discomfort working with large groups and his abhorrence of dissent. He did not hesitate to harass colleagues into doing what he wanted them to do and in his seventh year expected the Senate very rapidly to remold itself to his personality. The unanimous consent agreement became standard operating procedure on all major bills within six months of LBJ being named Leader.

Part 4 Chapter 24 Analysis

Chapter 24, "The 'Johnson Rule,'" refers to LBJ's further refinement of the revolution he had wrought as Minority Leader, assigning committees based on merit rather than seniority. Now, as Majority Leader, LBJ added a new criterion: personal loyalty to himself. He had woven himself into every facet of Senate life needed to reward team players by not only coveted committee assignments, but also patronage, prime SOP real estate and desks on the floor. When he snubbed a non-player, other senators knew better than to be civil towards them. Everyone understood and most complied.

The Johnson Rule was turned into a nearly foolproof tool within six months of LBJ's election as Majority Leader, when he made unanimous agreement resolutions the standard operating procedure for handling major bills. Working the back rooms, he would sell the need to expedite passage and would carefully frame a resolution that gave him sole power to limit debate and the offering of amendments. Senate Rule 14 made unanimous agreement resolutions the only exception to its most cherished and closely guarded principles and its use had been sparing in the past. LBJ did not want to *talk* about things, he wanted to *accomplish* them and with colleagues appreciating the danger of objecting to the Leader's motions, he was able to move forward at full bore. We will see this tool used throughout the rest of the book. Caro explains it carefully here and it is important to understand its mechanism before proceeding.

Part 4 Chapter 25

Part 4 Chapter 25 Summary

Mornings in LBJ's Senate were as sleepy and slow moving as ever, but just before noon, LBJ would push through the heavy double doors, approach his front-row-center desk and take charge. He knew what needed to be done and announced it, without notes. This was his turf, where he anticipated triumphs. At noon, whoever was presiding would bang the gavel and recognize the Senator from Texas. He moved unanimous consent to allow those committees and subcommittees he chose to meet while the Senate was in session. He moved unanimous consent to hold executive (closed) sessions. He shepherded nominations and international treaties through advise and consent. When clerks read Calendar Calls too slowly, LBJ grew impatient and growled, "C'mon, Get going!" He spirited non-controversial bills along swiftly, authoritatively announcing the upcoming schedule, giving *pro forma* acknowledgment to the Minority Leader's and relevant committee chairmen's undoubted cooperation. Any senator who interjected himself in the process endangered whatever legislation interested him.

Regional interests, resulting in voting blocs, made LBJ's task more difficult when dealing with controversial and major bills. He enjoyed, after all, only a one-vote majority in the Senate. Long negotiations were often required to reach the point that he could call for a unanimous consent resolution. LBJ never stood still. He threw himself around the chamber, bending senators' ears. As votes loomed closer, he grabbed arms and lapels, poked chests, cornered people and leaned in close. The sleepy old Senate was filled with his energy and passion.

LBJ had to know he had the votes before he moved on anything. He and Baker prowled around, counting votes. LBJ could often be seen working the phone booths, assuming his menacing posture as he spoke into the receiver. If he had things to say he wanted no one to hear, he made sure the area was clear. If anyone dared to stand fast against him, LBJ threw a tantrum, his face a fearsome "thundercloud." Then he would go to the next booth, where another senator awaited. Sometimes he would work two, three, or four "players" at once, juggling receivers in the aisle way. People could tell by the way he hung up the phones whether he had succeeded or not.

Preferring to persuade people face-to-face, LBJ pounced on prey seated in the cloakroom, pinning them in their chairs and speaking faster and faster, pleading, cajoling and threatening as needed for as long as it took. Once everyone's compliance was recorded on his tally sheets, LBJ wrote out his unanimous consent agreement text, sent it to the fastest typist and crashed through the doors to announce it.

Once he had enough votes to pass a bill, LBJ wanted the question called fast; there was no sense in giving Knowland time for his own count. Baker would be sent to convince scheduled speakers to yield back their time unused. LBJ would long-windedly advise colleagues that constituents could read everything they had to say in the

Congressional Record; senators need not hear it. As senators filed in for a vote, LBJ prowled restlessly, not listening to the concluding debates. He read faces to be sure his tallies were correct and grew frenzied. He ordered missing senators fetched and barked orders at the chair, or prompted action by muttered hints and speed-up and slow-down hand motions. If he lost a vote, LBJ was not above walking brazenly up to a colleague and demanding that he change his vote.

Part 4 Chapter 25 Analysis

In Chapter 25, "The Leader," Caro illustrates how LBJ ruled the Senate and how he sloughed off the manners he had forced himself to observe while establishing himself in the Senate. Now in power, there was no need to pretend. Caro emphasizes LBJ's air of command in the Senate by describing his non-stop motion. No longer does LBJ restrain himself from scratching or adjusting himself in public or loudly snorting his inhaler, much to the amusement of reporters in the Press Gallery. The tiger had not lost his stripes. This was his turf and what others thought no longer mattered. It only mattered that they conform to his will. Chapter 25 is light reading, filled with entertaining stories, but no particular concepts to grasp. Here LBJ is enjoying himself as "Master of the Senate."

Part 4 Chapter 26

Part 4 Chapter 26 Summary

LBJ's exercise of power made the Senate work. Bills emerged from committees more swiftly and, with all points of contention already ironed out, they passed quickly. The annual reciprocal trade bill provides an example. It normally tied the Senate up for weeks, but in 1955, LBJ moved all the dickering into the Finance Committee, where, out of the public view, senators had no reason to posture. There LBJ could obtain compromises, secure a unanimous consent agreement to limit debate and rally enough support to invoke Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, allowing the customary voice vote to be dispensed with. The act passed in three days.

The Upper Colorado River Reclamation Bill, hotly debated in session after session but never passed, also breezed through LBJ's system in three days. The Paris Accords, expected to cause a row, passed after two hours of floor debate. The dozen departmental appropriation bills that for decades clogged the Senate machinery, took only an hour to dispose of, following just an hour of debate. LBJ knew where every bill stood, even when a chairman refused to report. *Newsweek* marveled that in one day the Senate passed ninety bills in four hours and 43 minutes and credited LBJ for the most efficiently-run session in recent memory.

LBJ's leadership depended on his own interests. Russell had convinced most of the Southern Caucus that they had to help LBJ succeed if he was someday to be president. They would have to begin accepting bills tinged with liberalism in order for him to establish at least a modicum of rapport with liberals. He was no longer put in the embarrassing position of whether to attend Southern Caucus meetings; he was no longer invited.

When, however, issues arose that attacked the South's core values, LBJ was expected to march to "Dick Russell and His Dixieland Band," as he had for eighteen years. In November 1954, liberals renewed efforts to change Rule 22. LBJ quashed it by threatening zealous new senators with unwanted committee assignments and by getting Humphrey to convince his allies to give LBJ a little time to see what he could do with the South. LBJ allowed committees to hold onto bills he did not want to reach the floor and maneuvered Eisenhower to complain about the practice of attaching civil rights amendments to major bills. When this came up in the State of the Union address, LBJ outraced Knowland to be the first to shake the president's hand.

LBJ grew increasing aware that opposing Ike was politically unwise and found the Administration so deferential that *The New Republic* remarked there seemed to be little interest among Senate Democrats in seeing any of the liberal frontrunners take the White House in 1956. Without naming names, Truman, speaking at a tribute to Sam Rayburn, criticized "some mealy-mouthed senators who kiss Ike on both cheeks"; LBJ

caught the reference and snubbed Truman when he paid a nostalgic visit to the Senate. Drew Pearson again called LBJ Lyin' Down Lyndon.

In June of 1955, a liberal issue coincided with LBJ's ultimate goal and he responded. The White House proposed funding 70,000 public housing units over two years, but the Banking and Currency Committee, which had a strong liberal bloc, reported out a bill increasing this to 540,000 units over four years. Conservatives bridled at "socialism," and the Capehart Amendment was introduced, scaling it back again. Feigning pessimism over passage, LBJ drew criticism from the ADA for consistently avoiding action on liberal legislation, but behind the scenes, he was preparing a surprise. He worked the southerners, who wanted to help LBJ appear more liberal, to placate their constituents by voting against both the Capehart Amendment and the original proposal. He knew that their votes would be decisive in eliminating the former, but inconsequential on the latter. Humphrey effusively praised LBJ's legislative genius, seconded by Paul Douglas, previously an LBJ opponent. Douglas was invited to a victory party in G-14.

LBJ further improved his standing with liberals by securing the first increase in the minimum wage in six years. Eisenhower proposed a twenty percent increase, but no broadening of coverage. Douglas wanted more, but it was too much for the conservatives to accept. LBJ worked out in committee a compromise that neither side would embrace, then on the floor played on each side's fears and in the cloakroom managed to get just enough credibility to obtain a unanimous consent agreement that he would manage.

As the limited debate proceeded, LBJ watched who had wandered off and when all the strongest opponents were absent, cut off debate, defeated the amendment and passed the unamended bill before word could reach the cloakrooms. Outmaneuvered senators were livid, but workers received a dime more an hour than the Administration had asked. The Leader had again impressed Douglas. The press spoke of how LBJ moved mountains and ran a slick show. Liberal journalists repented for past criticism of his leadership and praised his service to the national interest. Southerners began campaigning for an LBJ run for the White House in 1956.

Part 4 Chapter 26 Analysis

"Zip, Zip," the title of Chapter 26, was Hubert Humphrey's reflection of how LBJ slipped through the Senate a minimum wage increase that seemed doomed to defeat. It fell short of what the liberals wanted, but gave more than the Administration proposed and the first action in six years. Organized labor was impressed and senators who had doubted even that LBJ's liberalism during New Deal days had been sincere, were forced to reconsider, or at the very least, recognize his legislative prowess. A year earlier, LBJ voted against raising the minimum wage and probably had not changed his principles. Principles were not foremost for LBJ, success at maneuvering was. Breaking the dam *was* important, as was consolidating power. In 1955, he succeeded masterfully.

Part 4 Chapter 27

Part 4 Chapter 27 Summary

During the 1955 session, LBJ workdays grew longer than ever, meeting his colleagues' urgent requests, racing between commitments, spinning the press. He often arrived home late at night, ashen-faced with fatigue, sleeping fitfully and often awakening to attend to details that came into his mind. Alcohol and nicotine got him through. He drank, smoked and talked through social dinners, but consumed heavy southern-style dinners at home "like a starving dog." His weight had risen from 185 pounds to 225 at his last full check-up at the Mayo Clinic.

Health crises had coincided with past career crises for LBJ. In 1937, he campaigned with stomach cramps that proved to be appendicitis. In 1948 he campaigned despite an agonizing infected kidney stone, then resumed campaigning after a three-day hospitalization, ignoring doctors' advice that he rest for six weeks.

Fear of a heart attack had been a constant in LBJ's life and colleagues, looking back, saw it approaching. In May, he complained of indigestion on the Senate floor. On June 18, George Smathers watched him gulp down his usual double meal and gave him a Coca-Cola to settle his stomach as they drove to Virginia. The next morning, he didn't look any better and Smathers suggested calling a doctor. LBJ passed an examination and kept up the exhausting pace.

On July 2, he was scheduled for another trip to Huntlands in Virginia. Before leaving, he kept to his schedule, but was uncharacteristically harsh with a journalist. As the limo drove, LBJ's chest hurt and belching brought no relief. Nor did baking soda, when they reached their destination. He could not breath as he tried to nap and Clinton Anderson, who happened to drop by, told him it looked like a coronary. Anderson knew the signs, because he had suffered one. LBJ flew into rage: the *Washington Post* was supposed to publish a story about him running for president and a heart attack would end his chances. Anderson convinced him to summon a doctor, who warned him to hurry back to Washington fast; it was a bad heart attack and LBJ would soon begin going into shock.

LBJ was calm as they drove to Bethesda Naval Hospital. He left instructions on who was to meet him there and how Senate work and the press were to be handled. Because no ambulance could be found, LBJ was transported in a hearse. The pain intensified. LBJ recalled where his will was stored and stated that "wonderful" Lady Bird was to get everything he had. An eyewitness declined to tell the author what LBJ said about Alice Glass.

Arriving at Bethesda, LBJ was told that he had suffered a very serious heart attack and would be "put under." Lady Bird reassured him. LBJ was preparing himself "for not being there anymore." He asked for one last cigarette, before going into shock. Lady

Bird was told his chances of survival were good if he survived the first twenty-four hours.

Part 4 Chapter 27 Analysis

Chapter 27, "Go Ahead with the Blue," details LBJ's heart attack suffered on the heels of his great legislative victories in the summer of 1955. The title is taken from his decision that a previously ordered suit should be purchased: the blue one, which would be serviceable whether he lived or died. It is a brief, poignant prelude to Chapter 28, "Memories," which chronicles LBJ's physical and political recovery.

Part 4 Chapter 28

Part 4 Chapter 28 Summary

LBJ had suffered a myocardial infarction, the death or damaging of heart muscle resulting from arterial blockage. He was sedated for forty-eight hours and whenever lucid, he pumped Lady Bird for information on his condition. It was grave. On the fourth day, the press was told LBJ was resting comfortably and would not return to the Senate until January. Journalists wrote off his chances for the White House and even questioned his future as Senate Leader.

LBJ fell into deep depression and responded neither to medication nor to his mother's presence. He refused to speak. Aides clamored for access. Sam Rayburn visited with tears in his eyes. Baker pledged to follow him if he chose to resign his seat and run the radio station. The malaise ended when LBJ decided that the avalanche of letters coming to his office had to be answered by hand. "Project Impossible" was launched, with LBJ in command. Stenographers and typists set up shop at Bethesda, despite physicians' ordering complete rest and no excitement. LBJ snuck in listening to forbidden news reports on his music-only radio. He pried political news from visitors, including Vice President Richard Nixon and the Minority Leader. From his hospital bed, he became Leader again, through Baker. Mr. Sam's diagnosis was that it would kill him to relax and doctors eventually concurred.

Violent mood swings marked LBJ's hospital stay. To sooth him, Lady Bird read letters and editorials and maintained a scrapbook. LBJ examined it frequently, feeling more than ever an obsessive need to be loved. A grin returned to his face when he realized no one hade abandoned him. Most of all he craved, boy-like, the presence of Lady Bird and she stayed by his side continually for the five weeks he spent in Bethesda. Their daughters were neglected.

LBJ gave up smoking and took to drinking decaffeinated coffee. He became a fanatic calorie-counter and assigned Lady Bird to be the "keeper of the weight." Any miscalculation was dealt with as betrayal. When he came home, LBJ was a pound under the doctors' target weight.

In late August, LBJ returned to Texas to regain his health and learn to relax. He wanted the press to report that he was a prudent man who had learned to take care of himself. Busby ghostwrote "My Heart Attack Taught Me How to Live," and LBJ granted dozens of interviews. He emphasized his love of nature and getting to know the two daughters he had been too busy for before the crisis. He discovered they actually liked him. He claimed to read books, a life-long aversion and scattered volumes around for reporters to see. They bought the perfect patient image. In fact, however, the four months at the ranch were a nightmare for LBJ, filled with the black memories of his youth and dealing with his relatives. He fell into deeper despair than in the hospital.

Brother Sam Houston Johnson diagnosed the problem: concern that the heart attack had ruined his chances of becoming president. He appealed to a political columnist friend to save his brother by writing that LBJ was "bushy tailed and ambitious" to run in 1956 or 1960, whichever proved more propitious. Democrats, so united in praising him, could not possibly divide against him. This did the trick. LBJ laughed and took a walk. He began reminding people that FDR, with whom he had worked with early on, he emphasized, had served while infirm. Linking FDR and LBJ would help mend fences with liberals.

For the rest of his life, LBJ would fear another heart attack, but he followed doctors' advice on rest, relaxation and exercise. Warm water and music calmed his nerves and telephones kept him in touch. He drove staff at the ranch and in Washington to generate attention about their boss. Nevertheless, a letter-writing campaign failed to convince *Time* magazine to name LBJ its Man of the Year.

LBJ was lonely and invited so many people to visit the ranch that a four-room guesthouse had to be constructed. Money had to be raised continually, so LBJ worked at a headlong pace to increase radio and television advertising revenues. He used insider information to postpone purchasing KANG in Waco, TX, until the timing was right to make a fortune on the deal. LBJ seemed to be running faster than ever while ostensibly resting at the ranch.

In September, Eisenhower was more popular than ever when he suffered a form of heart attack more serious than LBJ's and it was widely assumed that he would not seek a second term. LBJ phoned his concern and began receiving daily reports on the president's condition. LBJ began developing plans to follow Russell's 1952 strategy to unify the South behind him. Then, when none of his likely challengers could muster a majority at the Democratic convention, he would be poised to become the compromise candidate. He did not want, however, to allow a "Stop Johnson" coalition to emerge too early, so he worked quietly to become not only Texas's favorite-son candidate, but the delegation's chairman as well. Then he could wait for the other candidates to destroy one another in the primaries.

Stevenson and Rayburn were scheduled to pay a courtesy call on LBJ days after Ike's heart attack and LBJ was infuriated when a leak brought a large contingent of reporters to the ranch. He arranged for them to elude the press most of the day and then commandeered the lawn chair press conference, concentrating on the fact that they did not intend to capitalize on the president's health. Politics had been tangential to their get together. In fact, LBJ had pressed Stevenson to confront Kefauver in at least a few state primaries to prove his unpopularity; Stevenson disliked that brand of campaigning, but heeded LBJ's advice.

LBJ also rallied Mr. Sam to back him to head the Texas delegation; LBJ reminded the Speaker that his rival had reneged on a pledge to back Stevenson in 1952. LBJ admitted he had no chance to gain the 1956 nomination, but wanted to position himself for 1960. Rayburn wanted to head off a party split, because Eisenhower's heart attack

had given the Democrats hope of regaining the White House. Rayburn instantly regretted agreeing to LBJ's Southern Bloc strategy, but gave into it.

As pleased as he had been at the volume of mail and press coverage his heart attack had generated, LBJ realized that Ike was vastly more important. Throughout the fall, LBJ lagged far behind Stevenson and Kefauver in Democratic favor and southern party chairmen had no loyalty to him. Despite statements that southerners and westerners could rally behind LBJ, Stevenson was building strength in both regions. Northern liberals stood ready to organize against him if he chose to become an open candidate, but Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., sent emissaries to offer financial support if LBJ were to declare himself and agree to add his son to the ticket. LBJ realized that the Ambassador was counting on Eisenhower to run again and win, so the financial offer, which LBJ scarcely need, was an investment in building JFK's national image for 1960. LBJ had little respect for JFK's contributions in the Senate and knew he was seriously ill. It was more important for LBJ to conceal his plans for 1956, so he turned the offer down.

Running hard, LBJ scheduled a major speech in Whitney, TX, to announce A Program with a Heart, a series of thirteen proposals he intended to introduce during the next session. It would broaden Social Security coverage, increase federal spending on medical research, school construction, highways and housing and would include a civil rights provision that southerners were likely to tolerate. He buried in the center of the list a provision to preserve natural gas from regulation; that would preserve his support in Texas and he hoped it would not draw too much attention. The band struck up "Back in the Saddle Again" as LBJ appeared on stage. The press hailed his return from the doors of death, but was not fooled on Number 7.

LBJ flew back to Washington on December 11, dined with Russell and the next morning spoke to reporters on Capitol Hill. They were stunned by how tan and thin he was, bursting with energy and confidence. He talked presidential strategy with Russell while flying to Atlanta for a check-up, which declared him fully recovered and ready to resume his leadership duties, provided he regulated his work hours and got enough rest. LBJ launched into work and steadily increased his pace. He flew out to meet Howard Hughes to make clear he would need "hard cash, adult basis" in 1956. He maneuvered to deny Kefauver the chair of a subcommittee investigating monopolies and the publicity it would bring him. LBJ grew so caught up in the race that he tried to schedule a meeting on December 25th.

LBJ's relations with Lady Bird changed in the six months following his heart attack. He asked her never to leave his bedside in Bethesda and she obeyed. On the ranch, she was always within earshot when he hollered. She was happier than anyone could remember having seen her, obviously in love with him and grateful for his survival. She seemed to forgive and forget everything he had done to make her life miserable. She adopted fashions he favored. She tried to get him to read books. When he refused, she read to him books and passages she felt would help him politically. She talked to journalists to help build his image. LBJ responded by allowing her a role in his life, began asking her opinions, praising her in public, even putting on a veneer of courtesy.

He obeyed when she suggested he had talked long enough on stage or urged him to slow down on scotch at cocktail parties.

The one thing that did not change was sexual infidelity. While recovering, LBJ had sex with a "good-looking girl" upstairs in the main house and used aides sleeping on the same floor as a cover-up. On Capitol Hill, his affair with the good-looking girl was common knowledge. Lady Bird had reconciled herself years before to such behavior and had stock answers whenever the subject came up.

Nor did LBJ stop abusing his staff, although he no longer allowed himself the luxury of carrying on for as long; he knew he had to force himself to relax. Outbursts became less frequent, shorter and less intense. He became a bit easier to live with as he made up his mind not to let anyone give him another heart attack.

Part 4 Chapter 28 Analysis

Chapter 28, "Memories," seems not as aptly titled as most. It continues the saga of LBJ's heart attack, in Bethesda Naval Hospital and at home on the LBJ Ranch. There, he labored to position himself to become the compromise candidate at the 1956 Democratic convention. In the hospital and at home, LBJ was subject to bouts of depression, during which he contemplated the end of his political career, but he always rallied. Being in Texas reminded him of his lowly beginnings and family failings, but memories are less prevalent in this chapter than in many others.

Caro quotes Bobby Kennedy's fury at LBJ's discourtesy in turning down his father's offer of financial backing for a 1956 run for the presidency with brother Jack on the ticket. This is the first mention of a feud that smoldered while LBJ served as JFK's vice president and RFK was attorney general and chief advisor. RFK remained in office for a while under LBJ, but eventually resigned, won a Senate seat from New York and in 1968 openly challenged LBJ for the Democratic nomination. LBJ withdrew from the race, RFK was assassinated and Hubert Humphrey, LBJ's long-time ally, lost the election to Richard Nixon by a landslide. All of this will be covered, doubtlessly, in the fourth volume of this biography, but it is worth paying attention to these characters as they rise to prominence.

There is an oddly positioned interlude about LBJ being honored at Southwest Texas State Teachers College's 1955 Homecoming Day, pointing out how classmates remembered him. For those who have not read the earlier volumes in Caro's biography, they are confusing. Fortunately, the interlude is but a paragraph long.

Part 4 Chapter 29

Part 4 Chapter 29 Summary

Vice President Nixon welcomed LBJ back to the Senate and colleagues gave him a standing ovation as Congress opened for the 1956 session. After the quorum call he posed for pictures, shook hands and basked in the atmosphere of good feelings. Addressing the Women's National Press Club, he said he had learned his lesson about humility and proportions; he was going to be sensible.

LBJ played on everyone's compassion to gain whatever he wanted from them. He had been trying for years to recruit James H. Rowe's fulltime services, without success. LBJ knew that Rowe was the author of a secret memorandum that proved the key to Truman's 1948 victory and now held an almost mystical belief that Rowe could do the same for him. He refused to take no for an answer, getting mutual friends to intercede for him. LBJ even shed real tears as he begged him to help a dying friend. As soon as Rowe gave aboard, however, LBJ shed the pretense and reminded him, "I make the decisions. You don't."

LBJ used his heart attack on senators as well. Two senators died in 1956 and a third announced he was too sick to run again, so LBJ had a receptive audience. He took afternoon naps for a couple of weeks before he could no longer spare the time. Because his Whip was frequently absent, campaigning for reelection, LBJ asked Smathers to serve as the acting whip and kept him loaded with assignments that had to be performed to perfection. LBJ would need to be able to rely on him when he introduced the central proposal in his Program with a Heart.

By crushing Leland Olds in 1949, LBJ emasculated the FPC and profits to gas companies; prices charged to consumers soared. In 1954, Michigan and Wisconsin successfully sued the FPC to force it to act on consumers' behalf. While the FPC dragged its feet, the industry raised money and organized to educate Congress on the issues. While LBJ lay hospitalized, the House narrowly passed a bill nullifying the Supreme Court decision by exempting independent producers from FPC regulation. A companion measure was reported out of the Senate Commerce Committee. The Harris/Fulbright Natural Gas Bill was certain to be divisive. Even Democratic conservatives recognized the raw injustice of the present system and that it was in the national interest to regulate natural gas to benefit consumers, so a majority wanted something to be done. Southerners were split. LBJ was caught between the liberals he needed to conciliate if he would be president and the rabid reactionaries who supplied his funds. Eisenhower believed the bill would liberate business from unwarranted government interference and LBJ was planning to pass it using Republican votes when the heart attack struck. Acting Majority Leader Earle Clements was not up to managing this vote, so action had to await LBJ's return. Douglas opposed even bringing it up under Democratic sponsorship, fearing it would destroy the party's electoral chances in 1956.

The oil interests sent the "Secret Boss" of Texas, Ed Clark and the suave, well-liked John Connally to Washington to head a canny, mythical team. LBJ installed them in the Democratic Policy Committee office, allowed them to use his own office and threw his weight behind them. He made phone calls to colleagues and made clear that Clark and Connally spoke for him. LBJ courted key GOP senators, appealing to fears that Communism lurked behind any limitation on business and of course, by cash. LBJ's bagmen included trips to several Midwestern GOP offices.

Deregulation was so unpopular that it required a strong champion to pass. LBJ developed a devastatingly effective strategy. Northern newspapers had done such a good job showing the danger to the public that LBJ's first task was to turn down the heat in the Senate; he saw to it that liberals' speeches went unanswered and reporters had nothing to work with. Liberals complained about the puppet show, but had to admit LBJ was arranging it effectively. It was going so well that LBJ allowed himself a brief vacation in Florida, flying on his patrons' plane.

On Friday, February 3, 1956, a supporter of the bill, Senator Francis Case, announced he had been offered a $25,000 bribe, which made him understand the danger of money controlling government. He intended to vote no. The press sensed a juicy issue and it soon became clear there would be investigations. The oil lobbyists fled Washington. LBJ raged at Case, casting doubts on the story. When Case turned over the cash and the culprit's name, LBJ turned to impugning Case's motives: this was a deliberate attempt to sabotage the measure. LBJ announced that the Senate would launch a thorough investigation, but voting on deregulation would take place as scheduled. The government could not afford to prostrate itself before phantoms. The bill passed and Eisenhower was expected to sign it into law.

LBJ was not pleased when the Rules Committee appointed a three-member subcommittee to investigate campaign financing and knew two of its members, Hennings and Gore, could not easily be controlled. Because Hennings announced his intention to "get at the big boys if we can," LBJ knew his name was sure to come up if the committee did any digging. Many colleagues shared these fears and accepted his leadership in stopping the investigation. LBJ arranged with GOP Leader Knowland to pass a unanimous consent agreement to establish a Select Committee for Contribution Investigation with a narrow mandate: the Case situation.

Vice President Nixon ruled that it had exclusive jurisdiction and chairman George informed Case in writing that he was forbidden to appear before any other committee prior to testifying before the Select Committee. LBJ kept hammering away at Hennings and Gore in his office, to keep them busy. They exploded in rage when Case obeyed George. The Select Committee grilled Case for four hours, as though he were a defendant. When John Neff testified, a host of senatorial names surfaced, but somehow Connally was never mentioned. Editorials called for a broadened probe, but George issued a report leaving much unsaid and omitting any commendation for Case's courageous disclosure.

Nine days later, disapproving of the "great stench" around the passing of the Harris/Fulbright Natural Gas Bill, Eisenhower refused to sign it into law, despite his approving of its objectives. LBJ announced he found this act hard to understand.

The press had gotten wind of enough impropriety to keep the issue alive and the *Denver Post* wrote that LBJ's "slippery leadership of the oil bloc" had blunted a sharp campaign weapon. Demands for a full investigation escalated. It was demanded that the two party leaders correct known evils and a new Special Committee was created, with press fanfare, adequately budgeted and headed by Gore. The press was elated, but LBJ made sure Gore was powerless to issue subpoenas and surrounded by pro-oil colleagues. Hiring staff became such a laborious process that the national conventions began before action could be taken; these easily distracted the pubic and investigation petered out. The oilmen placed no blame on LBJ for the defeat of deregulation and their profits in 1956 were so great that they had no reason for dissatisfaction with anyone in government.

Oil deregulation was the only item in his Program with a Heart that truly interested LBJ. He included the other eleven measures only to blunt liberal criticism while not antagonizing conservatives, so he did little to prevent five other components from dying quiet deaths, or to prevent five others that did pass from being so under funded that they created little opposition. LBJ arranged to be absent (at the Mayo Clinic for a check-up) when the highway improvement vote was called, as the unions had sternly warned him against opposing it.

The final measure, however, dealing with Social Security, offered LBJ political benefits, so he reversed his 1955 opposition to expanding benefits to encompass health insurance. Supporting it now would set the Democrats clearly apart from the GOP (since the Administration strongly opposed the bill) and would swiftly mend fences with labor. LBJ declared to the AFL-CIO that, having lived through the Depression, he could not see how so great a country could do so little for older people. Counting votes scrupulously and realizing that the vote would be close, LBJ kept the Senate in session twelve hours a day. He focused his attention on Malone of Nevada, who had a special-interest bill up for consideration, which both conservatives and liberals opposed. LBJ suggested that he would get it passed if Malone voted for Social Security. LBJ convinced the Democrats to "support the leadership" on Malone's tungsten bill and it passed, without anyone knowing there was a deal. Knowland was taken by surprise when Malone made the final vote a 49 to 49 tie. LBJ then ordered doggedly loyal Earle Clements to change his nay vote to aye. In return, Clements received financial and speechwriting assistance, but not enough to prevent the infuriated doctors' lobby in Kentucky from turning him out of office in November.

Part 4 Chapter 29 Analysis

Chapter 29, "The Program with a Heart," shows how little LBJ's brush with death had changed him. He proposed a package of twelve bills calculated to improve his image among liberals. He knew southerners were willing to cut him some slack, wanting to see

him succeed where Russell had failed. Only one bill was of vital importance to LBJ, however and it was so decidedly illiberal, that he buried it in the center of the list. He maneuvered skillfully to pass deregulation of the gas industry, pleasing his rich and greedy Texas backers and escaped criticism when the president refused to sign the bill into law. Even without deregulation, the oil barons reaped enormous profits in 1956. The entire exercise had been for show. During the show, however, a staffer had mishandled a payoff to a senator with a conscience and LBJ had to head off an investigation that would certainly have led to his door. We see him manipulating as we have in the past, using intimidation and perfect timing to obtain precisely what he wanted.

Caro reserves for the final scene in "The Program with a Heart," LBJ's heartless manipulation of Senator Earle Clements, whom he claimed to truly love. Knowing the opposition Clements faced from physicians in his home state (the AMA had made it known in 1955 that it opposed any expansion of Social Security to include provision for medical insurance), LBJ publicly demanded Clements reverse his vote to allow the bill to pass. Caro outlines how LBJ tried to help the ex-senator in later years and quotes words uttered by LBJ that disproved any sorrow over what had befallen Clements. It is also the final scene in Part 4 "Using It." LBJ certainly used Earle Clements as he had heartlessly used many before.

Part 5 Chapter 30

Part 5 Chapter 30 Summary

Caro focuses narrowly on the situation in Bullock County, AL, to show how blacks were prevented from registering to vote in the 1950s by using the voucher system. Only five of the county's 11,000 blacks were registered when, on January 18, 1954, a half dozen more showed up at the county courthouse to apply. They were turned away. They knew well the tactics of violence and economic intimidation that could be used if they persisted, but persist they did. When turned away again, they hired one of a handful of black lawyers in Alabama, to "go to law" for them, but were informed that there was no law that could help them. Surprisingly, however, the District Court judge ruled that no board of registrars could "try to devise any scheme or artifice" to discriminate against black voters. This caused Bullock County board members resign and the state agency was charged with dragging its feet in filling vacancies.

All across the South, black citizens were victims of discrimination in voting, housing, employment and virtually every aspect of life; there was no law in place to help them. The three great Civil War Amendments (13, 14 and 15) outlawed slavery, guaranteed due process of law and the right to vote, but left it up to Congress to pass the legislation necessary to enforce them. In 1866, 1867 and 1875 Congress acted, but the vengeful nature of the laws it passed spawned resistance in the form of the Ku Klux Klan.

The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was the high point and end of such laws and the *laissez-faire* Supreme Court began rolling back the progress. In 1883 it struck down the 1875 act, leaving no federal protection for blacks and the states, to whom it assigned jurisdiction, were not about to water down racial segregation. In fact, they institutionalized it, passing laws that *required* "separate but equal accommodations" in transportation. In 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled this constitutional and "Jim Crow" laws were extended to all public facilities. Senator Theodore Bilbo of Mississippi published a book, *Take Your Choice: Separation or Mongrelization,* declaring it was better to see civilization blotted out by an atomic blast than gradually destroyed by intermarriage.

Creative means were found to circumvent the Fifteenth Amendment, so that in the 1940 elections, only two percent of southern blacks cast votes. In 1944, the Supreme Court, stocked by FDR with liberal justices, ruled that blacks could vote in primaries and returning black GIs demanding their rights increased the percentage of black voters to fifteen percent in 1948. Whites reacted violently and with determination to stem the tide. Southern legislatures instituted "literacy" tests to augment the voucher system, with subjective tests that could exclude anyone the administrators desired. Federal voting legislation was obviously needed and between 1946 and 1954, thirteen bills were introduced in Congress, but the South blocked them all. During this time, intimidation succeeded in reducing the number of black registrations and turnout at the voting booth. Blacks were truly democracy's outcasts.

In 1946, two-thirds of black Americans still lived in the South. Many returning veterans moved north and there faced bleak housing projects and scarce jobs but no formal segregation. Those seeking to use the G.I. Bill to go to college in the South could find no slots in overcrowded black colleges and were locked out of white ones. They grew determined to win in their own country the freedoms for which they had fought overseas.

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was founded in 1946 and lawsuits challenging school segregation spread, many won by Thurgood Marshall, a young black attorney. Voices of moderation began to be drowned out. A tide of human emotion was growing unstoppable. Some northern whites began condemning racial injustice and Jackie Robinson's success and popularity after breaking the color barrier in major league baseball helped spread a sense of outrage over discrimination based on skin color. Blacks in the North faced fewer barriers to voting and as they turned out in significant numbers, politicians began calculating their effect on their fates.

Truman surpassed his predecessor by asking Congress to making lynching a federal crime, to outlaw the poll tax, to ban discrimination in public facilities and to protect blacks' right to vote. The Senate blocked him in 1946, 1947 and 1948. In 1949, LBJ delivered his "We of the South" speech and Russell strengthened the rules against cloture. Civil rights legislation in 1950, 1951 and 1952 rarely made it to the Senate floor.

Eisenhower had little enthusiasm for civil rights, so his election in 1952 deflated hopes for progress, but on May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously that "separate but equal" was unconstitutional in the classroom *(Brown v. Board of Education).* The Klan was in disrepute, so southern defiance re-formed in White Citizens Councils, using more "reasonable" rhetoric, arguing that blacks ought to be grateful for having been raised from ignorance and savagery by whites. Hundreds of chapters sprung up across the South. Southern legislatures passed laws and regulations designed to frustrate the Supreme Court ruling. Blacks who demanded their children's educational rights found themselves unemployed.

When the 1955 school year began, only three southern states had made any attempt at compliance, making it clearer than ever that federal legislation was essential. The GOP-controlled Senate, however, had frustrated liberals' hopes of loosening Rule 22: the 1953 vote against it had been overwhelming. Even without southern committee chairmen, not one of the 61 civil rights bills introduced between 1953 and 1955 reached the floor. LBJ learned while recuperating from his heart attack that liberals, ashamed at their meek surrender, were determined to redeem themselves in 1956 and were drawing up a comprehensive civil rights bill.

That summer blacks and whites clashed in the streets, but attracted little press attention in the North. When, however, fourteen-year-old Emmett Till, was tortured and murdered in Mississippi, his mother in Chicago refused to let the crime be ignored. She had her son's disfigured body returned home for burial and his open coffin inflamed the black community and the northern press seized upon Till as its *cause célèbre.* Journalists

filled the courthouse when the murderers were brought to trial and a witness overcame his natural fear to testify, even refusing to address white lawyers as "sir." When it took the all-white jury only sixty-seven minutes to return a verdict of not guilty, southern blacks were enraged and determined to prevent such a defeat of justice from happening again. Blacks in the North rallied behind them, attending rallies and donating money to the cause. The NAACP, previously in debt, suddenly had a war chest to help victims and to fight in court. Northern papers began covering events in the South and whites began feeling responsible for what was happening there. Jewish organizations and labor unions rallied behind southern blacks, but southern whites scoffed at the fuss.

In December of 1955, Rosa Parks refused to move to the back of a bus and was arrested for violating Alabama's bus segregation laws. Her pastor, Martin Luther King, Jr., called for a boycott of buses. He declared the time had come to nonviolently stand up for the rights guaranteed them by the Supreme Court.

Part 5 Chapter 30 Analysis

Part 5 "The Great Cause," is made up of twelve chapters that follow the civil rights movement in 1956 and 1957. Chapter 30, "The Rising Tide," provides a background survey of the postwar struggle that prepared the stage for the greatest legislative challenge LBJ would face as Majority Leader. He was recovering from his heart attack when events in the South attracted the northern press coverage that ensured there would be a showdown. The Southern Bloc had successfully prevented even mild civil rights bills from reaching the Senate floor for a decade and violence against increasingly determined blacks had made it clear that federal legislation was the only solution.

We have been prepared in earlier sections for how the Southern Bloc controlled the Senate and its members' determination to maintain the constitutional principle of States' rights. Southerners controlled the key committees and could keep bills from ever reaching the Senate floor. There, Senate Rule 22 permitted the cut-off of unlimited debate only by rallying two-thirds of the full membership to invoke cloture. Liberals did not have sufficient votes. Russell spoke moderately, but kept a firm hand and expected his protégé, LBJ, to use his unprecedented powers to promote the cause. Southerners wanted LBJ some day to be president and were willing to allow him to rebuild bridges to northern liberals to help this come about, but expected his loyalty when the South's very way of life was threatened.

We will now begin seeing how LBJ returned, recovered, to Washington and dealt with the greatest question of the mid-1950s, maneuvering to preserve his most cherished dream.

Part 5 Chapter 31

Part 5 Chapter 31 Summary

LBJ's greatest legacy is the civil rights legislation that he championed as president and he sought to convince people that he had been unprejudiced his entire life. Biographers generally took him at his word. Bigoted men, however, financed his rise to power and tape recordings made in the Oval Office show that LBJ's unguarded conversations could match their insensitivity. His mouthing racial stereotypes have been well documented in the numerous biographies. During World War II, he talked about the "menace" of yellow dwarves; later, blacks and Latinos were proclaimed lazy and prone to drunkenness and violence. As NYA director for Texas, he kept blacks in their place with terms like nigger and boy.

The Texas Hill Country was too dry to support a cotton plantation economy, so blacks were less numerous than across the Deep South; while LBJ grew up among racial stereotypes and language, he never developed visceral revulsion toward blacks. His use of epithets resulted from the cruelty he was able to turn on anyone and in Congress, these helped him fit in among the true "nigger-haters" he needed as his political base.

LBJ had true empathy, however for the poor of all skin tones, rooted in his early days of manual labor, picking cotton, topping highways and plowing. He hated "nigger work," and did not deceive himself into thinking blacks really enjoyed the southern way of life. Experience taught him not to romanticize it.

In 1928-1929, LBJ taught in the "Mexican school" in Cortulla, TX and gained insights into his pupils' difficult lives. His heart went out to them and he looked for ways to help them break the bands of discrimination by filling them with ambition and hope for the future. He was the first Anglo teacher to care about them. Years later, as a congressman, this motivated him to maneuver against impossible odds to bring electricity to the lonely farms and ranches in the Texas Hill Country, translating sympathy into tangible action (albeit largely benefiting poor whites). The most important thing to LBJ was to be in the forefront, always advancing, to escape the Johnson family legacy of failure. He was willing to help others whenever this coincided with his higher goal of being somebody himself.

LBJ's heading the Texas NYA program from 1935 to 1937 brought him in close contact with large numbers of blacks and Mexican-Americans for the first time. LBJ threw himself into the task, sometimes expressing outrage at society's indifference to young people of color and convinced them that he was working hard to get them more than their fair share of the funding at his disposal. Superiors admired his work and broadmindedness on racial matters, but in reality, LBJ defended the expediency of having a volunteer Negro Advisory Committee rather than a black man on the payroll as prescribed. The dire consequences LBJ predicted in Texas did not occur in any

southern state that integrated their boards. He avoided hiring a black assistant as liaison to the black community. During his nineteen-month tenure, he funneled less than the mandated percentage of funds into black and Hispanic pockets, earning the Texas program the lowest ranking in the nation and superiors ordered him to make changes. Before the matter could come to a head, LBJ resigned in order to run for Congress.

As a congressman, LBJ kept up the appearance of supporting the poor and minorities, but in practice delivered little. He was lauded for running up and down the Capitol halls, active and overwhelming in his advocacy of the 1937 Wagner-Steagal Housing Act, which was intended to provide federal loans for slum clearance projects. He delivered a touching radio speech, "The Tarnish on the Violet Crown," describing his horror during a tour of a Mexican slum on Christmas morning. But when federal monies came to Austin, his nominee to administer them made sure the distribution was heavily weighted towards whites, who represented less than ten percent of the slum's residents. During his eleven years in the House, LBJ routinely lined up with the South to defeat anti-poll tax, anti-lynching and pro-FEPC legislation. Liberal colleagues saw him as disinterested and non-committal about civil rights. Campaigning for the Senate in 1948, LBJ condemned Truman's civil rights program as "a farce and a sham." Nevertheless, blacks who had benefited, however marginally, from LBJ's NYA work, rallied behind him as the least objectionable of the three candidates.

Part 5 Chapter 31 Analysis

Chapter 31, "The Compassion of Lyndon Johnson," investigates LBJ's background in Texas to explain how he could become black Americans' greatest champion in the halls of government, second only to Abraham Lincoln. It is a twenty-eight page summary of the earlier volumes, to enable those who are reading *Master of the Senate* as a self-contained volume, to understand what LBJ will do as senator in the years 1956 and 1957.

It reveals that LBJ was truly capable of compassion for the poor and oppressed, partly because he had performed manual labor himself and knew its hardships and partly because he loved political maneuvering, but most importantly because he wanted to be somebody and transcend his humble beginnings in the Texas Hill Country. It was expedient for him to keep alive his credentials in the powerful Southern Bloc and in the good graces of his right-wing financial bankers, partly by speaking their bigoted language. His cruel treatment of all subordinates, regardless of race, which Caro has abundantly shown throughout this volume, explains that it was probably more than inborn prejudice rather than using words like nigger to put people in their places. LBJ always sought just the right angle to hurt, or, when it fit his purpose, to charm, other people.

Caro shows disturbing evidence, overlooked by earlier biographers who too easily bought the official never-been-a-bigot LBJ line, of systematic discrimination in administering the Texas NYA. Caro's purpose in Chapter 31 is only to bring the reader up to speed and he succeeds in showing a man capable of compassion whenever this

coincided with his overriding passion for personal power. LBJ, beginning his senatorial career, which will be examined in the next chapter from the point of view of civil rights activities, is as always, amoral.

Part 5 Chapter 32

Part 5 Chapter 32 Summary

In June of 1945, a Mexican-American private in the U.S. Army died in battle in the Philippines. In 1948, his widow asked that his remains be returned to Corpus Christi, TX, for internment. She was refused the use of the local funeral home because, "the whites won't like it." Beatrice Longoria might have accepted the decision, had not the founder of the newly-formed American G.I. Forum not taken up her cause and contacted Texas legislators in Washington for help. LBJ's compassion overflowed and he offered to arrange for Pvt. Felix Longoria's burial with full honors in Arlington National Cemetery. He also impulsively called for a full investigation of this "un-American action." He telegraphed the widow pledging his support and offering to defray any costs. LBJ made sure the story made the *New York Times* and Walter Winchell's radio audience and he hand wrote Mrs. Longoria a heartfelt letter of condolence.

Expecting LBJ's fervor to help him politically in southern Texas, aides were surprised on the fourth day to hear chamber of commerce complaints and were resentful of the false publicity their town was attracting and portraying a different scenario from the one LBJ had received. They advised the senator to backtrack a bit. Early reaction from his conservative financial backers also worried LBJ and he knew that their control of Mexican-American votes through the *patrón* system (which had defeated him in 1946) far outweighed anything he could expect from individual friends of the Logorias.

The chamber of commerce decried LBJ's "itchy trigger finger" and told him the facts, in truth false rumors, about the situation. The widow and her mother-in-law, they claimed, were feuding over what to do with the body and the private's ailing father had been coerced into siding with Beatrice. The in-laws publicly denied any rift and deferred to the widow, but when the local American Legion chimed in, damage control became the order of the day. LBJ denied responsibility for the "stigma of this publicity" and distanced himself in answers to constituents' letters. He claimed his only concern was to provide a proper burial for a fallen constituent. When the family came to Washington, LBJ did not arrange an office visit or other common amenities. He attended the ceremony, but was not photographed and did not face the press. He sought to lay the issue to rest, but constituents pressured their conservative congressman to open an investigation. Connally arranged for a liberal Texan to be named to the committee, where he succeeded in keeping LBJ's name out of the record as much as possible.

LBJ wanted his role not to be vindicated but minimized and he was successful. The G.I. Forum, however, grew determined to advance Mexican-Americans' civil rights and LBJ successfully bound to himself its leader, Dr. Hector Garcia, who initiated the Logoria Affair. LBJ was the first U.S. senator to address a Mexican group and became the first federal officeholder to include Mexicans in the routine favors done for constituents. Through LBJ, Garcia gained power in local politics and, realizing LBJ could not afford cross the Anglo *patróns* growing rich off the *braceros* (rent a slaves), accepted his

opposition to a series of bills restricting illegal immigration. LBJ knew that minorities resented his record on civil rights, but also knew they had no one else to whom to turn. He could afford to offend the Houston NAACP by his We of the South speech and to vote with the South annually from 1949 to 1955. He knew to whom he owed his Majority Leader position and ambition always outweighed compassion for LBJ.

Part 5 Chapter 32 Analysis

"Proud to Be of Assistance," the title of Chapter 32, is applicable only to the opening scene, in which LBJ's compassion for a fallen constituent, moves him to a great public display whose political danger becomes all too quickly evident. The rest of the chapter could more aptly be entitled, "The Vanishing Act." This chapter examines LBJ's relations with Mexican-Americans in 1949. It shows that his earlier compassion remains alive, but underlines that whenever compassion and ambition collide in LBJ, ambition wins. Caro sheds light on the *patrón* system that put large blocks of Latino votes at a candidate's command without any necessity of campaigning among them. This discussion helps clarify earlier references to how LBJ lost his first bid for the Senate and won his second. It also shows clearly that the LBJ's compassion for the economic desires of people in power, people of use to him, outweighed any feelings he might hold for those whose backbreaking labor he had once shared.

Caro continues to emphasize here as in the previous chapter the disparity between what LBJ as president (and as he wrote his memoirs after leaving office) wanted people to believe about him and what the reality had been. While LBJ might not have been as prejudiced and uncaring as fellow Texans and fellow southerners, he was "proud to be of assistance" only when it was expedient for him to strike this pose.

Part 5 Chapter 33

Part 5 Chapter 33 Summary

Recovering from his heart attack on the ranch in 1955, LBJ grew convinced that gaining the Democratic nomination in 1956 was his surest path to the White House. Even if he lost, he would be the front-runner when popular Ike was out of the picture in 1960, so he spent the fall maneuvering to position and finance himself well. This left only the necessity of lessening liberal sentiment against him and this he intended to do by passing the Social Security act.

In 1956, the South was a gaping wound, opened by the Till murder case and white determination to stand off northern impositions. It was widened in February of 1956 when the Supreme Court ordered the University of Alabama to admit a black student, Autherine Juanita Lucy. She wanted to be a librarian and since no black institution offered a graduate program, "separate but equal" was moot. Lucy was admitted and attended classes under close protection for two days before being suspended for fear she might be lynched. She sued the university, charging conspiracy, was expelled and fled in fear for her life to New York City. There, Thurgood Marshall told reporters that all American citizens had lost when bigots managed to defy the Supreme Court. The Deep South rallied around the White Citizens Councils and whooped up their victory.

It was the "drumbeat of footsteps on pavement" in Montgomery, however, that galvanized the nation. Earlier boycotts in the South had always failed within days, but they had lacked a leader of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s caliber and political sophistication. King turned down an academic career after earning his doctorate from Boston University, to serve "where I'm needed," in a parish ministry in the South. He was determined to win the white man's friendship and understanding rather than his defeat or humiliation and insisted that all protests be peaceful.

King was afraid for his life when police arrested him for a minor traffic infraction, but he was released on his own recognizance when blacks descended on the jail. He addressed seven packed meetings in a single evening and thereafter was guarded wherever he went. Whites responded by holding the largest pro-segregation rally in history, marked by filthy rhetoric. The "get-tough" tactics that in the past never failed to cow demonstrators was ineffective. The same was true for jailing marchers using an obscure anti-boycott ordinance; 115 turned themselves in voluntarily, turning the feared jailhouse door into "a glorious passage." King's house was bombed, but he called on followers to meet hate with love.

After the bombing, national press coverage increased and when television began broadcasting images from Montgomery, it touched northern hearts, rendering the marchers less vulnerable to violence and bolstering their courage. Segregation was overwhelmingly portrayed as injustice and cruelty and the marchers came to be admired for their sacrifice and determination. King emerged as a popular figure, calling for

individuals to stand up and be counted. He was welcomed to New York City by whites as well as blacks and invited the world to make pilgrimages to Montgomery.

On November 13, 1956, King, in court for his trial, was advised that the city had come up with another tactic to end the strike: they would make it illegal for people to carpool the strikers without obtaining a commercial license. King feared that with winter approaching, this might succeed. At that point, however, the Supreme Court declared segregation on buses unconstitutional. King had won and was welcomed politely aboard a bus the next morning and took a front seat.

The Klan rallied in furious protest, bombing black churches and homes. King and Ralph Abernathy founded the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to launch civil rights protests across the South. Blacks could sit wherever they pleased on buses in Alabama, but could partake of no other civic amenities. With their self-respect enlivened, blacks were ready to heed calls for widespread non-violent resistance.

Southern Democrats in the Senate grew alarmed. They had always been able to count for support on conservatives in states having small black populations; now it was eroding by conscience, by embarrassment and by political expediency. Northern black voters had been loyal to the party of Lincoln until FDR saved them from destitution through New Deal programs and thereafter they voted solidly Democratic. After the war, however, an exodus of southern blacks to the industrial cities of the North was so massive that by 1956, half of all black Americans lived outside the South; this changed the situation. Finding themselves free to vote, they exercised the right overwhelmingly and savvy leaders made them question whether the Democrats would ever grant them justice. In 1952, white party leaders simplistically blamed their losses on Ike's vast popularity, but by 1956, they understood that they would have to fight for black votes. Northern blacks made it clear that they intended to speak for southern blacks denied the voting booth and the atrocities of 1956 galvanized them.

The GOP, or course, realized the benefits it could reap and announced it would no longer oppose the "Powell Amendments" introduced every session by one of three blacks sitting in Congress. The president believed neither that legislation alone could change morality nor that coercion could cure all problems. He had many southern friends, shared their prejudices and believed it was a mistake to proceed too quickly. He would do his duty to enforce Court decisions, but refused to endorse its decisions publicly and this emboldened southerners' defiance. Eisenhower wanted to position the GOP to exercise the kind of control FDR had built for the Democrats, so in his 1956 State of the Union address, he proposed a voting rights initiative, which was the first civil right legislation submitted by his administration.

Attorney General Herbert Brownell, a longtime fighter against the "scourge of segregation," was given permission to draft the bill. The atrocities of 1956 convinced him to broaden its scope from voting rights to full protection. He wanted the authority to institute suits in the name of the United States to redress past injustices and prevent new ones by obtaining judicial injunctions. Ike feared this went too far, but liberals welcomed it.

Many legislators wanted to be seen introducing civil rights bills in 1956, but they agreed to set pride aside and unite behind a Rayburn favorite, Richard Bolling from Missouri. Bolling in turn asked to have his bill subordinated to Brownell's. Although the Speaker was an ardent southerner, he left Bolling confident that Mr. Sam would throw his weight behind a voting rights bill at the proper time. Liberals cared less about the content of the bill than establishing the precedent of having to pass *something*.

In the Senate, Douglas prepared "a model bill" similar to Brownell's and Hennings of Missouri introduced four separate civil rights bills, which quickly cleared the subcommittee he chaired and were sent to the Judiciary, also chaired by a liberal, Harley Kilgore. There was hope that a civil rights bill would finally reach the Senate floor for a highly public fight. Liberals realized that the South could still talk it to death, discovering they had fewer votes than in 1953, but decided not to reveal this by pushing the issue.

Liberal hopes were dashed when Kilgore died and LBJ adhered to the seniority system to install as Judiciary Chairman the senator most committed to killing off civil rights legislation and openly defiant of *Brown,* James O. Eastland of Mississippi. The ADA, NAACP and liberal journals screamed foul, because Eastland would also have jurisdiction over the nomination of federal courts and judges. LBJ was flooded with protest letters, to no avail.

Part 5 Chapter 33 Analysis

Chapter 33, "Footsteps" draws its title from the thousands of blacks in Montgomery, AL, to endured walking to work rather than ride segregated buses. It shows how the emergence of Martin Luther King, Jr. as an articulate spokesman kept the protests from failing as many a protest had failed before and from turning violent. He and his followers endured violence but refrained from returning it and the northern press spread respect for their courage and determination. The times were beginning to change and the reticent Eisenhower Administration introduced its first civil rights legislation. Caro shows the battle lines forming and LBJ reverting to seniority to position a strict segregationist to help him block progress until after the 1956 presidential election, which had become his primary focus.

Part 5 Chapter 34

Part 5 Chapter 34 Summary

LBJ's presidential hopes were threatened, not only by the Eastland matter, but also by southern senators' "Declaration of Constitutional Principles." Drafted by Thurmon and edited by Russell (and promptly abbreviated by the press to the "Southern Manifesto"), it declared that recent Supreme Court decisions had no basis and represented a "clear abuse of judicial power," encroaching on "the reserved rights of the states." It boiled down the separate-but-equal doctrine to the right of parents to direct the lives and education of their children in any way they chose. Moreover, *Brown* would provoke hatred and suspicion between the races, where friendship and understanding had existed for ninety years through segregation. Nineteen southern senators and eighty-one representatives pledged unity in doing everything lawful to reverse the decision and prevent its implementation. George was selected to read the text in the Senate.

LBJ appeared trapped. He would have to get the civil rights issue tamped down in Congress but not be seen doing this. LBJ and the two senators from Tennessee (Kefauver and Gore) did not sign. Notably, all three had aspirations for national office. LBJ would later intimate that he refused to sign on principle. At the time he claimed, perhaps disingenuously, that he had never seen it, which journalists he counted on to accept his words uncritically did, indeed, accept this claim. Russell supported LBJ's dissension and rallied colleagues not to hold it against him; Russell knew LBJ's heart, if not his signature, was with them, his words had proved that. Southerners united in declaring LBJ an attractive and well-qualified candidate for president.

Wanting to help LBJ in his desperate quest to be nominated for the presidency in 1956, Rayburn knew he had to stop H.R. 627 and convinced Congressman Bolling to hold off until 1957; that would prevent the Democrats' convention from being divided. Foot-dragging kept it in committee until it was too late in the session for it to be passed by the full House and considered in the Senate. LBJ appeared to have finessed a year's delay in confronting the controversial measure.

Douglas was willing, on principle, to incur the Leader's vengeful wrath and risk party disunity at a critical juncture, by refusing to give unanimous consent to H.R. 627 going to the Judiciary Committee rather than to the Senate Calendar. This would be only a symbolic protest, but if liberals could get the Senate to adjourn for the conventions and return in the fall, there was still hope of consideration. The women marching in Montgomery deserved a sign that Democrats supported them and black voters deserved to see someone standing up for their rights and redressing their wrongs. If they were too long ignored, there would be a revolution.

Wary of LBJ, a handful of Senate liberals devised an end run around the customary elaborate and slow procedure, whereby House bills were printed and approved before being dispatched to the Senate. If it could be intercepted in the House, "hand

engrossed," and hand carried to the Senate, there could be time to open debate. Douglas was assigned to be the messenger and Lehman the sentry on the Senate floor. Their timing was off, however and Baker, posted to make sure the bill was quickly referred to committee as soon as it reached the Senate, prevailed. With due solemnity Southerners laughed at the liberals' failure.

As a final effort, Douglas introduced a petition to discharge the committee from further consideration of H.R. 627, in order to trigger discussion on the issue. Russell suggested a tactic to LBJ to defeat this unpopular ploy. LBJ installed George in the chair to rule Douglas out of order, since petitions could be filed only during the morning hour, except by unanimous consent. Douglas announced he would file the next morning. LBJ moved that the Senate stand in *recess*. The next day, when Douglas renewed his motion, George informed him he was out of order. By recessing rather than adjourning, LBJ had prolonged the legislative "day," and when a frustrated Douglas moved for unanimous consent, Russell objected. LBJ was prepared to prolong the day for as long as necessary. Both party leaders rejected Douglas's call for a five-minute adjournment; it was their exclusive prerogative to make such motions and Knowland was anxious to move forward on to Eisenhower's indispensable legislation.

Journalists laughed at the idealistic senators failing to do their parliamentary homework, but themselves failed to realize that the closing date of the session could have been changed and the vital substance of H.R. 627 taken up. Douglas, dejected, told the Senate it bore a heavy burden on its conscience; Russell gloated that the rules would never be changed and there would always be senators vigilant and armed to oppose whatever "nefarious schemes" might be presented in the future. LBJ had won the day, but wanted vengeance on the rebel liberals; he asked for a roll-call vote on the Douglas adjournment motion, in order to humiliate him. Only five colleagues dared stand by Douglas. The Senate dam had held once again and LBJ emerged unscathed.

Part 5 Chapter 34 Analysis

Chapter 34, "Finesses," shows that avoidance of controversy was so essential to LBJ's plans in the election year of 1956 that he had to finesse his way through any confrontation with civil rights proponents and opponents. Caro shows the maneuvering both sides used and the advantage LBJ and his mentor, Russell, gained by mastering the loopholes Senate rules and precedents offered. Some of the material Caro covers is arcane, requiring close reading, but the drama of the moment is sufficiently high that it keeps the reader engaged. For instance, the Senate Judiciary Committee had only fifteen members and since sixteen signatures were required to invoke cloture (since Judiciary had no written rules governing its procedures, it reverted to the Senate's standing rules), there was no danger whatsoever in allowing H.R. 627 to reach the floor.

The liberals' plot to use hand engrossing, a rarely used tactic, is instructive and entertaining, as is LBJ's use of the technicality of adjournment, versus recess. Considerably less edifying is LBJ's vengeance against Paul H. Douglas, a World War II hero and brilliant economist who had dared to rally fellow economists behind FDR's

New Deal. LBJ could have followed the usual procedure of defeating him with a voice vote, but insisted on crushing him before his colleagues, reporters and guests in the galleries.

Caro records Muriel Humphrey's and Howard Shuman's recollections of the crestfallen Douglas leaving the Senate chamber, determined to keep his head high, but clearly shaken. Douglas asked his aide to push the elevator button three times, "Let's pretend I'm a senator," he told Shunan bitterly. ADA National Chairman Joe Rauh said this was the dirtiest trick LBJ ever played, putting his foot on Douglas's face. LBJ emerged unscathed from the 1956 legislative session, but diminished as a human being. Earlier events like the crushing of Leland Olds prepared us for this, but it is, nevertheless, disappointing to view and Caro works hard to raise the moment's poignancy.

Part 5 Chapter 35

Part 5 Chapter 35 Summary

LBJ went to the Democratic convention in Chicago controlling the fifty-six votes of the Texas delegation that he chaired and seven southern states had adopted him as a "favorite son." Stevenson had won nearly all of the primaries he entered and was thought to be within striking range of the nomination; if only a couple of the large northern delegations switched to Stevenson as expected, he would have it. Kefauver held 202 votes and Harriman lagged far behind.

LBJ's last-minute passage of the Social Security bill failed to convince liberals he had changed; his ties to big business, cloakroom antics and record on other bills still left a sour taste in many mouths, as calls were being heard for the purification of political power. LBJ held back announcing his candidacy for fear of raising journalistic alarms. This tactic had the danger, however, of switching allegiance to Stevenson, the least liberal of the declared candidates.

Rayburn remained loyal to LBJ, but was convinced Stevenson would prevail before a deadlocked convention might turn to LBJ. LBJ was glum, hearing this assessment and he all but stopped running. Fearing humiliation, he told skeptical reporters he was just a favorite son, not a serious candidate and reminded them he had recently suffered a heart attack that still hurt. He convinced southerners that it would be harmful for him to appear merely a sectional candidate like Russell in 1952 and, while thanking them for their support, declined it.

Truman, who had been offended by Stevenson's comments about indifferent morality and untidiness in his administration, turned against him, suggesting to LBJ that he was throwing the convention open so anyone, LBJ included, could win. LBJ grabbed at this hope with urgency and desperation and declared himself the Democrat best qualified to defeat Eisenhower. When Stevenson, in an unguarded moment, advocated the platform support the Supreme Court's decision, southerners defected, further encouraging LBJ. He expected his Senate colleagues to support him and naturally assumed they would enjoy the kind of authority in their state delegations that he did in Texas. He was wrong. Governors and municipal leaders brokered power at national conventions and neither they nor influential labor leaders were behind LBJ. The Master of the Senate failed to understand that here the liberal "crazies" he defeated in the Senate, were heroes and in the 1956 session, LBJ had demonstrated he was not on their side of the "great issue." LBJ chose to overlook the evidence and pressed on.

Caught up in euphoria by signs bearing his name, LBJ hoped instead of counting and his highest hope lay in Rayburn and Russell, neither of whom was working actively for him, since each knew it was hopeless. He demanded their support and whined like a spoiled child. The three flew to Washington to confer with Eisenhower over the developing Suez conflict; LBJ convinced Russell to come to Chicago and rally southern

support. Phoning from LBJ's suite, he saw there was no hope and advised LBJ to concentrate on 1960.

Only LBJ thought he had a chance as the candidates began their final eighteen-hour marathon, working the "smoke-filled rooms" and state caucuses. LBJ attended only one, Texas's and then told the press that he would hold the Texas delegates "as long as the American people are interested." He sat in his suite, awaiting visitors, rather than running the gauntlet like his competitors. He still feared being seen running, but camera crews thronging the hallway outside his door made it appear he was the epicenter of convention maneuvering and LBJ reveled in the attention. The luminaries who visited LBJ were coming not to support his candidacy, but to seek his support of them and the influence they were sure he could exert on southern delegations. Southerners, however, needed to back someone who would be there to the end in order to keep the platform from incorporating civil rights planks that would offend them. When LBJ continued to demure, Stevenson won the day.

Truman was chagrined that his announcement had failed to stop Stevenson, whose people were doing all the right things to secure the nomination. They pledged southerners that as president Stevenson would be sympathetic to their concerns and warned that if they refused to supply the votes he needed, he would be beholding to the northerners who would. Northerners were warned that LBJ might be their candidate if they allowed the convention to deadlock and that was the liberals' worst nightmare. Friends Walter Reuther and Eleanor Roosevelt defected to Stevenson. By 5 A.M. a rumbled, sleepy, disbelieving LBJ was warned to move fast to throw Texas's support behind Stevenson before it was too late to wield any power at the convention.

Tuesday morning, LBJ refused to allow his name to be placed in the nomination and southerners were annoyed he had delayed the announcement so long. Truman declared that Stevenson was too "defeatist" to be elected, but by then no one was listening to him. The hallway outside LBJ's suite, where he cloistered himself in the afternoon, emptied of reporters. Stevenson and his campaign manager paid a previously arranged call, but courteously turned down LBJ's request for assurance that the civil rights plank would be acceptable to the South. There was no longer any reason for the victors to bargain.

At midnight, LBJ reversed himself and told a press conference he was still in the fight. Connally nominated him loudly and hyperbolically as a forceful and persuasive leader of men, a hard worker since his youth. Rayburn suggested other delegations join the Texans in the whooping parade given to LBJ and allowed it to go over the prescribed time limit. Watching on television, Russell advised LBJ never to make his mistake by becoming a sectional candidate and aides again urged LBJ to withdraw. He refused to join the other favorite sons, releasing their votes to Stevenson and forbade the Texas delegates from changing their vote in order to have the honor of throwing Stevenson over the top. Friends for years afterwards were bewildered by LBJ's behavior at the 1956 convention.

At his midnight press conference before the final vote, LBJ declared he would not accept nomination as vice president, but his advisors energetically campaigned for him with Stevenson. The candidate complemented LBJ, but would not commit to him and Rayburn advised LBJ not to accept the job. The Speaker adamantly opposed Stevenson's decision to open the selection to the convention and LBJ was only slightly less violently opposed. It would set off a mad scramble that could only be divisive. LBJ lacked the adroitness to influence the choice. The South wanted only to block Kefauver from getting the nod, but could unite behind no one else. LBJ favored Humphrey, but could not risk alienating his financial backers. Texas voted for Gore, but when Rayburn supported JFK, LBJ seized the microphone to change their vote and declared (wrongly) that the battle was over. Gore withdrew in favor of Kefauver and JFK moved that it be made unanimous. LBJ was glum, his face full of pain: he disliked both men on the ticket and held no hope they would win.

The press had a field day on LBJ's failure to corral southern votes, his bloopers about both candidates and his absence from the thick of battle. His defeat was likened to Russell's four years earlier and the label of regional candidate threatened to sink his future plans.

Part 5 Chapter 35 Analysis

Chapter 35, "Convention," might better have been called "The Jungle of National Convention," Richard Rovere's phrase published in *The New Yorker*. It shows LBJ blinded to the cool, objective counting of votes he practiced so effectively in the Senate. The man whom we have seen gathering power in the Senate by listening intently and acting decisively on what he learned, in Chicago listened to no advice that ran counter to his blind ambition. Even Rayburn and Russell were unable to get him to accept reality. LBJ clearly had no idea how his voting record and his backroom manipulating successes, created doubt about, if not outright fear of, him.

Missing from Caro's narrative are any of the consolations that were rendered to Russell when he lost in 1948, that he was the best man for the White House but, alas, an unelectable southerner. Russell counseled LBJ never to be seen as a sectional candidate, but it seems that in 1956, LBJ was rejected for who he was and what he had done rather than from whence he came. LBJ lost every fight he entered in Chicago in 1956; two men he hated headed the ticket and would face a nearly invincible Republican. LBJ had not positioned himself for 1960, as had JFK, Gore and even Humphrey and as we saw earlier, he had insulted the powerful Kennedy clan. He reaped only the things he most feared (besides another heart attack): humiliation and ridicule.

In Chapter 16, a wag had remarked irreverently about Douglas MacArthur's tardiness arriving for his Senate hearing, that it had taken awhile to get him down from his cross, so high had the haughty general set himself and his views above everyone else. The Senate took pains not to humiliate MacArthur, but removed him from the pillar on which Americans had blindly set him. LBJ, after savaging Leland Olds and Paul Douglas, was

due for comeuppance and so substandard was his performance in Chicago, that it is hard to feel sorry for him. He earned the ridicule heaped on him by ignoring his political instincts. LBJ emerges from Chapter 36 a fallible human being. It remains to be seen how he will take up the pieces, but from the Preface on, we have known the answer: he will amaze everyone by championing voting rights for blacks.

Part 5 Chapter 36

Part 5 Chapter 36 Summary

In the fall of 1956, international crises moved Americans to rally behind their incumbent warrior president and Eisenhower buried his opponent in the Electoral College. Democrats, however, hung on to both houses of Congress, so LBJ seemed assured of retaining his job as Majority Leader. LBJ, however, had sunk into one of his black depressions. Lehman questioned LBJ's ability to lead the Senate in an era when principle had to prevail over party unity and LBJ knew he would have to join the fight for civil rights or lose any chance of being president, but he could not afford to lose his southern base.

LBJ was convinced liberals hated him, despite reassurances that they were merely displeased with his positions and conduct on key issues. LBJ used charm to convince them of his total altruism and the brilliance with which he overcame obstacles as Leader. Aides convinced him to get to know Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., the noted Harvard historian and phrasemaker. When they met, it was a non-stop LBJ monologue: he had no ambition, no political future, no aptitude for the presidency; he just wanted to serve out his current term in the Senate and retire to Texas. He impressed Schlesinger with his intellect while discussing the Senate, the challenges he faced and the timing, persuasion and knowledge that got bills through.

LBJ fascinated Schlesinger with thumbnail sketches of his Democratic colleagues, their strengths and weaknesses, where to find them at any given time, how they responded to various lobbyists, all accompanied by brilliant imitations. Their Leader, LBJ stated, had to play every position on the football team, demonstrating each dramatically. Finally, with annoyance LBJ decried the liberals' distorting of his views on civil rights. Schlesinger likened the meeting to spending two hours under hypnosis.

LBJ also began courting the Grahams of *Washington Post* fame with a visit to the LBJ Ranch. Katherine Graham said afterwards she better understood LBJ, he was more a southwesterner than a southerner, an individualistic pioneer, not prejudiced in the way of the Deep South. He smothered the Grahams with hospitality, charm and colorful stories, trying to get them understand that civil rights required "rough stuff" rather than idealism and speeches. Phil Graham liked the South and wanted to see a southerner elected president, so he advised LBJ to clean himself up on civil rights. They became fast friends.

LBJ had greater trouble winning over other liberals, particularly those who knew him. Those who planned on introducing a sixteen-point Democratic Declaration and repealing Rule 22 to eliminate the South's tool that thwarted them in the past saw him as the enemy. The time had come for change and LBJ could not be allowed to obstruct it. Even non-liberals felt that shaking some of the Texas image off the Democratic Party was the only way of heading off disaster in the 1958 congressional elections. They had

to been seen opposing Eisenhower's policies. Two liberal Democratic coalitions were formed to press the offensive: the National Committee for an Effective Congress and the Democratic Advisory Council. The *New York Times* declared that calling the filibuster free speech was a travesty and Rule 22 had to go. *The Nation* spoke of LBJ getting a vote of no confidence and influential political cartoonist Herblock depicted LBJ poised to scuttle the liberal agenda.

Furthermore, pollsters and analysts showed that Stevenson lost ground among black voters from 1952 to 1956 and that blacks gaining franchise by migrating north were instrumental in the lopsided GOP victory. With the ascendancy of Eastland to chair the Judiciary Committee, they were growing convinced that the Democrats would continue to oppose their liberation and looked forward to retiring the southern chairmen in 1958. Unless Democrats redirected themselves, they could not only lose the White House for decades, but also see scores of congressional districts fall to the GOP. The Republicans had no stakes to lose in the cities and everything to gain, so they could afford to be bold. Knowland promised the NAACP that he would fight for civil rights legislation in 1957,and Nixon was working intensely to position his party on the right side of the issue. He endorsed reintroducing the Brownell Bill that year, but early enough in the session so that it could not be swept aside.

White hostility to school desegregation had also been on the rise across the South since the election and Byrd spoke of the gravest crisis to face whites since the War between the States, intermarriage was the inevitable end of desegregation, so "massive resistance" was the duty of all white people in America. Efforts were intensifying to limit the registration of black voters and, in every arena, to keep the black man "in his place." White sympathizers were persecuted, leaving only extremists on the field. The Klan was resurrected and grew active.

Blacks, in the wake of their victory in Montgomery, planned not only bus boycotts in other cities, but broader initiatives to integrate schools and parks. White bombers and snipers challenged their efforts and an attempt was made on King's life. Another clerical activist was murdered when he announced he and his followers would sit in the front of a bus and the rest were arrested. The perpetrators felt invincible and this was reinforced every time the attorney general claimed he was helpless to act without a new federal law. A sign of their power was the defeat of George by Governor Herman Talmadge, an unabashed segregationist. The Rebels were yelling for victory, not compromise and they knew they controlled invincible power in the Senate.

LBJ received three telegrams on the ranch during Christmas vacation, warning him bluntly that he had either to make the 1957 session an accomplishment for civil rights or forget the presidency. The Grahams had spoken. Rowe warned him of the "nightmare" ahead unless he quickly changed his public impression. He suggested that LBJ reconcile with Truman and Stevenson and put a newly elected liberal, John Carroll, on the Judiciary Committee. Since civil libertarians already controlled that committee, it would only be symbolic, but also impressive. Then LBJ must pass civil rights legislation.

LBJ had already realized what he had to do in 1957: produce. Southerners were more strongly stacked on committees than ever and the chairmen might, in a direct confrontation with the Leader, prevail as of old. If he lost the South, he could be voted out of the leadership, unless enough liberals would rally behind him. With more senators than ever sympathetic to the plight of blacks, LBJ might be able to command a majority on civil rights bills, but doubted he could get the two-thirds needed to end a filibuster, because western senators supportive of civil rights would oppose cloture as the last defense of their own states in the future. In fact, any filibuster, closed down or not, would emphasize Democratic divisions and wreck LBJ's plans. His only hope of the White House was to convince southerners not to use their most effective weapon.

The only thing going for LBJ was Russell's determination to elect him president. When LBJ got Russell and the Grahams together at the ranch, Russell was convinced to cut LBJ some slack. Humphrey, however, who had announced his intention of moving to amend Rule 22 as soon as the session began, infuriated Russell and he demanded the Minnesotan's exclusion from the Senate leadership. LBJ complied and forced Humphrey to deliver a speech calling for less militancy among liberals as the way to make progress. The potentially crippling conflict over Rule 22 faded away. When Smathers declined LBJ's offer of the position of Whip, he gave it to the respected, mild-mannered Mike Mansfield of Montana.

The liberals agreed to introduce a motion to have the Senate adopt rules for the current session, with the ultimate intention of allowing a simple majority, rather than two-thirds, to invoke cloture. Nixon agreed to preside over the Senate at critical moments. Anderson would offer the motion, then Douglas would ask for a ruling on whether it was in order and inquire under what rules the Senate was proceeding. Nixon would reply that they were operating under standard parliamentary procedure and that the new body could adopt rules of its own. Until specific rules were adopted, simple majority would rule.

Russell recognized the threat and that the GOP, "pandering" to the NAACP, would make it a party issue to ensure all forty-seven Republican senators (including those unenthusiastic about civil rights) would support Nixon. The plot might work, so Russell convened the Southern Caucus. Russell calmly told the press that if Nixon opened this "Pandora's box," there would be a king-sized filibuster, as all thirty-nine rules, not just Rule 22, would be carefully reviewed. All legislative business would be hung up. Russell knew it would not come to this, because LBJ would use the Majority Leader's prerogative of prior recognition to move that Anderson's motion be tabled. Thereafter, liberals would be limited to making a "parliamentary inquiry" about what would happen next and Nixon could only give an advisory opinion. Nixon admitted that whenever Senate membership changes, the new body might adopt new rules; his opinion was that old Rule 22 was unconstitutional. LBJ's maneuver, however, required the Senate to vote first on his motion, to table Anderson's motion.

LBJ postponed the first meeting of his rubber-stamp Democratic Steering Committee until after the voting on changing the rules and let it be known that choice committee assignments would be given out on the basis of how senators voted. Twenty-one

Democrats voted their conscience against twenty-seven who buckled to LBJ and the rebels were dealt with ruthlessly. The newly elected Senator from Idaho, Frank Church, was non-committal to LBJ's friendly career advice and realized as soon as he cast a "no" vote that he had made a big mistake. Keeping count in the back row, LBJ threw down his pen and then ignored Church for six months. Baker reminded Church about LBJ's long memory.

Russell, too, had shown his true colors. LBJ's future mattered less than preserving the South and in the first test of 1957, LBJ had been allowed no slack. The liberal press resumed its attacks on LBJ's "generally destructive role" in the "unholy alliance." They were convinced LBJ would not change, but they were wrong. LBJ's ultimate goal now required that he release the compassion pent up in his nature and use his talent for ruthless deception, cheating and betrayal on behalf of sixteen million blacks yearning to be free. LBJ's loyalty on Rule 22 made the southerners more amenable to his arguments to allow a token civil rights bill to pass. Times were changing, he said; we Democrats look bad; the Republicans are making civil rights their issue; Knowland and Nixon both need the black vote and will court it; we have only a one-vote margin and could easily lose our committee chairmanships; a vote on cloture might pass, so using the filibuster this year might hurt us in years to come; it might forever afterwards leave the South defenseless.

LBJ then explained why there was no need to filibuster: the Brownell Bill could be amended to water it down; it wasn't that popular among Republicans. Southerners could count on him to give them a do-nothing bill they could allow to pass. We're up against a wall, he argued and can no longer get everything we want; let's get most of it. LBJ frightened the southerners into supporting him and Russell hinted in follow-up that passing a civil rights bill would help LBJ become president.

Three new southern senators were amazed at this attitude. Among the old-timers, those interested in expanding the South's economy saw the utility of having LBJ in the White House; moderates and outright racists also saw the value for other reasons. LBJ was able to tailor his long conversations to each man's interests and attitudes. LBJ and Russell thoroughly but subtly convinced them that he was one of them and surely better for them in the White House than a Humphrey. Only Thurmond remained suspicious.

A strange rumor spread over Capitol Hill that LBJ was going to pass a civil rights bill in 1957. It made headlines. It would take four months of hard work before LBJ could water down the bill to the point he had promised. The heart of the bill was Part III, which would make segregation illegal in schools and other public places. LBJ tried first to convince southerners that if a "jury trial amendment" were added, passage would be safe because no white jury would ever convict a white man. His colleagues didn't buy it. The danger of "mongrelization" was too great to take a chance on federal judges finding a way around the provision. Led by Russell, they demanded that Part III be removed. Liberals categorically rejected any tampering with Part III and the inclusion of a jury trial amendment, realizing that it would make a mockery of the bill.

LBJ's first task was to search for common ground where none seemed to exist. Russell assured LBJ that he would personally lead the filibuster to defeat Part III. Liberals wanted vengeance for past frustrations. Civil libertarians were confident that victory was near and the popular press said that the southerners' days of strangling legislation were numbered. LBJ understood that he was dealing with a primal clash of cultures.

Eisenhower pushed for early action on the Brownell bill and GOP leaders strategized how to proceed. There would be no problem in the House and their counts showed that Knowland could rally all but twenty-five senators, relying on help from the Majority Leader who claimed to have served notice on the southerners. The NAACP would lobby for and win, cloture if a filibuster was launched. Hennings introduced a Senate bill similar to Brownell's, had it referred to his own three-man subcommittee and was confident he could report it out to Judiciary without hearings. It was early enough in the session that Eastland's delaying tactics would not work again; a majority of the committee members strongly supported civil rights.

The Senate reality quickly burst the bubble of optimism. Henning's subcommittee was expanded and stocked with southerners, so hearings promised to be time-consuming. Eastland was gloating about the fate Henning's report faced in Judiciary and Russell told reporters he would not compromise on his state's constitutional rights. They reported that the gauntlet had been cast. Russell's goal was to put off what might be inevitable Congress by Congress, so time was on his side. Add the threat of filibuster, which would hold up essential business and it would be prudent simply to drop the bill.

LBJ had agreed with Knowland to get the bill to the floor by mid-February, but Russell "screwed them," through April. It turned out that he was abetted by LBJ, who stepped back while searching for some means of emasculating the bill. Debate over the Middle Eastern crisis provided a convenient diversion from civil rights. If Eastland chose to report it out, after the Easter recess, the bill would be stacked up behind the thirteen appropriations bills needed to keep the government functioning. The press grew pessimistic. Philip Graham editorialized that "Civil rights seems to be waiting for the millennium."

LBJ lost hope and retreated into uncharacteristic inaction. The press blamed him for inaction and his response was lackluster, saying he wasn't opposed to some action, once Eastland finished his business. Hennings accused the Leader of "the same old hocus-pocus." The *Progressive* published an article entitled "The Legend of Lyndon Johnson," accusing him of being dangerous not because he was a bigot, but because he was controlled by Russell and not a "leader of great causes, but the broker of little ones." LBJ needed to rally from this depression and he did when he returned from Texas after Easter. No one knew what had changed him, but LBJ's level of activity increased markedly; all hesitation was gone.

Part 5 Chapter 36 Analysis

Chapter 36, "Choices," again shows a depressed and ineffectual LBJ. He bounded back from his convention defeat and from Stevenson's electoral debacle, only to find his job as Majority Leader challenged by liberals, who were convinced he was the major obstacle to the aggressive civil rights package they were planning. They dared speak publicly of removing him. LBJ's response, promises to both sides that he stood with them, is reminiscent of his earlier "half a loaf" strategy. He played the key role in Russell's plan to head off a change to Rule 22, thereby demonstrating his loyalty to the South, even though ham-handed tactics alienated the very liberals he knew he had to court. Then came the actual bill. The heart of it was sacred and inviolable to the liberals, but anathema to the southerners.

Finding no possibility for common ground in this confrontation of ideologies, LBJ fell into depression and induced inactivity, which served only to bring down on his head greater criticism of and scorn for his leadership in the press. Everything looked hopeless. He had left Chicago in 1956 with high hopes for 1960, provided he built bridges to the liberals. In 1957, he found no construction tools at hand and he saw 1960 slipping away. He had done a brilliant job of selling a token civil rights bill to his southern colleagues, by playing on their fears of something worse happening if they held out against compromise. He was by the spring of 1957, however, unable to deliver on his promises. His myth as a master parliamentarian was being questioned along with his racial views. He would have to rally from depression, as he always had before, or lose everything. The blindness of Chicago was gone, now that he was back home in the Senate and Caro promises at the end of Chapter 36, that we will see the old LBJ when he returns from three weeks spent in Texas.

Part 5 Chapter 37

Part 5 Chapter 37 Summary

LBJ, the master salesman, needed to believe completely in and hold absolute conviction for what he was selling before he could act effectively. He had the ability to force himself to believe totally in anything he chose and was able to reverse himself completely. He willed whatever was in his mind to be reality. He needed to "rev up" or "work up" to action by talking to himself, convincing himself and building the emotion it would take to lead. To advocate for civil rights, he had to feel wholeheartedly what it meant to have black skin and suffer injustice and indignity. He summoned up frustrating memories of teaching in Cotulla and listened to his black domestic staff's experience driving his car across the South twice a year. He willed himself to understand and built up anger and passion within himself over the indignities non-whites suffered. Empathy had resided in him for decades, but it had been expedient for him to hold it in check. Now it was expedient to gamble and set it loose. LBJ returned to Washington after the Easter recess still not knowing how he would do it, but determined that he would pass a civil rights bill. As always, he began by doing a lot of listening.

In private, LBJ met with senators, staff members, lobbyists and lawyers and listened for what they were *not* saying. Among southerners, he observed less defiance, sometimes almost shame, when they turned to Part IV, dealing with voting rights alone. They had hypnotized themselves to accept that all other aspects of segregation were natural and right, but they realized that all Americans had the right to vote. They were constitutionalists, after all and while they might despise the Fourteenth Amendment, it was the law of the land. LBJ saw his opportunity to eliminate Part III and attach to Part IV the jury trial amendment. Southerners might forego the filibuster. Never before had southerners put a price on cooperation, but now they had.

The resulting law would be weak in comparison to what liberals and black leaders wanted, but would gain for blacks the foothold they needed to empower themselves by voting out of office those officials who wrote bad laws and to replace them with people who would make changes. LBJ relied on southerners not seeing what he saw and allowing his bill to become law. His challenge was to destroy the mystique of the South's invincibility on the issue of civil rights; he had to "break the virginity" with a weak bill and others would follow more easily. Once a bill was passed, it could be amended far more easily than creating it.

Part 5 Chapter 37 Analysis

Chapter 37, "The 'Working Up,'" explores the amorality that allowed LBJ to adopt and advocate any position. Once he worked himself up to believing wholeheartedly that black Americans deserved to be freed from oppression, he recovered his ability to function as a leader. His masterful ability to listen intently was restored and he paid

particular attention to the cardinal rule that it is most important to discover what other people are not saying. This always reveals an opponent's vulnerabilities and for southern senators this was voting rights. Only there did they display no visceral reaction. Start there, start small and larger victories would inevitably follow. LBJ saw that if he could "break the virginity" of the Senate with a targeted voting rights bill, gains across the spectrum of civil rights would more easily follow. It is so obvious that accomplishing this will be an enormous task that Caro doesn't bother to discuss it. He ends Chapter 38 on a positive, nearly altruistic note: passing this bill will serve LBJ's personal dreams, to be sure, but more importantly, it will be deeply significant for the dreams of sixteen million American citizens whose skin color was black.

Part 5 Chapter 38

Part 5 Chapter 38 Summary

LBJ had his work cut out for him. A large majority of civil libertarian-minded senators in both parties would oppose his changes to the bill and if Russell, realizing the southerners were friendless, felt threatened by a comprehensive bill, he would begin filibustering as early in the legislative process as possible. To head this off, LBJ had to find at least eleven votes immediately that were willing to vote as a bloc with the southerners against cloture. This seemed impossible, given the climate of the day, but LBJ found a way. He would arrange a *quid pro quo* with northwesterners fighting for public control of the enormous power of the turbulent waters of the Snake River passing through Hells Canyon. The Eisenhower Administration had consistently blocked public construction of a dam and it had been a hot political issue in Idaho and Oregon in 1956. Neighboring states, needing cheap electrical power and water tamed for irrigation, had a stake, represented by a dozen Democratic senators. They lacked sufficient allies to build their dam and so few blacks inhabited their states that they faced no political backlash if they sided with the South.

Similarly, most southerners were too focused on civil rights to care about any dam, although many, Russell included, had opposed it in the past. The few who remained philosophically opposed to such acts of "socialism" were advised by LBJ that the House wouldn't pass nor would the president sign the bill, so passage by the Senate was meaningless. Russell was won over and so was the whole South. LBJ worked out the intricate procedural details, sealed a gentlemen's deal and the South agreed to allow a civil rights bill on the Calendar. They would, of course, vote against it *pro forma* to satisfy their constituents, but vowed not to filibuster.

Since none of this activity was seen, while Eastland's foot-dragging was obvious, liberals grew increasingly discouraged and LBJ shared the blame with Eisenhower. The press took note when LBJ turned up the heat to gain passage of the Hells Canyon bill and that the southerners did not filibuster to prevent the Republicans from introducing a motion to bypass the Judiciary by sending the House-passed civil rights bill to the Calendar. Close analysis of the voting showed that a strange alliance had formed and the liberals who "defected" by voting against bringing civil rights to the Calendar endured harsh criticism, but maintained there had been no *quid pro quo*. Southerners revealed the details, but the westerners continued to deliver the votes they had promised.

Part 5 Chapter 38 Analysis

Chapter 38, "Hell's Canyon," examines the skilled, but profoundly cynical, way in which LBJ got a civil rights bill on the Senate Calendar, once he had decided it had to be done. He found another bloc of senators whose most-cherished project had been

repeatedly defeated for lack of allies and mated them with the southerners whose greatest fear was lacking sufficient votes to ward off cloture. In the Northwest, damming the Snake River at Hell's Canyon was a high priority and black backlash was insignificant, so a trade-off appeared natural to LBJ.

Southerners had opposed Hell's Canyon bills because they generally found federal projects offensive. Gain their support by cynically pointing out that the project would never come to fruition even if they supported it (Eisenhower would veto it) and all the pieces were in place. LBJ had to endure more public criticism by working in private to affect the deal and the liberal northwesterners he recruited would have to face their colleagues' wrath for going along with it. The first piece in the puzzle, however, was put in place. LBJ's first steps towards following his conscience were amorally, but effectively, taken.

In Chapter 38, we see an ambitious, eloquent, young Frank Church of Idaho emerging from the isolation his naïve misstep that opposing LBJ had won for him. Church will become an important figure in the chapters to come, as will Wayne Morse and Richard Neuberger of Oregon and other liberals who have thus far been cast as LBJ's opponents. Caro reminds us, in passing, that LBJ's crushing of Leland Olds had strengthened the position of opponents to public works projects, which now played into his hands; proponents needed his help. Without being reminded, the reader will realize that LBJ has to be careful not to antagonize his oil and natural gas backers.

Part 5 Chapter 39

Part 5 Chapter 39 Summary

Having proved he could conceive a broad strategy on a national scale, LBJ had next to work tactically on the volatile battlefield of the Senate floor. He would need to seize the precisely right moment to strike decisively as soon as an opportunity presented itself. LBJ had to recruit liberal Democrats and Republicans.

The "Douglas Group" refused to compromise on Part III, their dream bill. They lacked the master chess player's ability to look several moves ahead to see the value of having the 1957 bill defeated by the Democrats and use that as an issue to win control of the Senate and its committees in 1958. They counted votes and believed they could beat the South on cloture and get everything they wanted.

As the Fourth of July recess approached, Russell asked, for the first time in his Senate career, not to be interrupted as he opened the discussion of H.R. 6127. He argued that Part III was not a wholly new clause, but rather an amendment to three leftover, unnoticed fragments of civil rights laws still on the books. Russell had carefully studied transcripts of the subcommittee hearings and discovered discrepancies and evasions that he proceeded to point out, questioning underlying motives.

The existing law, Section 1985 of Title 42 of the U.S. Code, automatically invoked Section 1993 (a Reconstruction-era measure), which would empower the president to use military troops to enforce judicial edicts, including *Brown and* permit his attorney general to sue individuals in civil court, even if the aggrieved parties declined to prosecute. Passing Part III would grant the government broad power to let segregationists to rot in jail on an individual judge's whim, without recourse to trial by jury. Brownwell and his supporters had concealed the frightful specter of government by injunction and bayonet.

Russell then abandoned his dry, precise legal phraseology and painted a word picture: unspeakable confusion, bitterness and bloodshed. Concentration camps would dot the South. Therefore, filibuster would be "a lengthy educational campaign" to get these facts across to the country. Russell's urbane, masterful revelation of the "campaign of deception" that had been foisted on the Senate put proponents of Part III on the defensive. Midwestern conservative were put on guard against expansion of federal power and cautious about being responsible for a new Reconstruction that would violate the civil rights of southern whites.

As a great general, Russell found another weak spot in his opponents' lines and boldly suggested that the president was not aware of the full implications of the bill. Eisenhower admitted he had not participated in forming the language of his proposals and that he had intended primarily to pass a narrow voting rights bill. Reading the bill, he was uncomfortable with some phrases in Part III. Ike did not want to scare people to

death, admitted the bill was too broad and refused to lead on the issue of civil rights. Nevertheless, most GOP senators remained loyal Knowland.

In the backrooms, Russell surprised southerners by requiring that they keep their speeches germane, restrained and non-inflammatory, since they had a good case on the merits. This would restrain northerners' reactions. Not everyone agreed to this flawless strategy, but all obeyed. After learning what Russell intended to say in public, LBJ flew home to Texas to lay low, not wanting to be blamed for another civil rights defeat. He returned to Washington to face his Waterloo only when a telegram from Jim Rowe convinced him that unless he championed and passed a bill he could forget 1960. Getting credit for the victory was imperative.

LBJ's only guest on the Fourth of July was his cousin, William (Corky) Cox, who had revived LBJ's faltering 1937 congressional campaign. LBJ had been despondent that no prominent person would introduce him at small-town rallies and accepted his relatives' advice that he have fresh-faced Corky introduce him with a corny poem. It had worked so well in 1937 that twenty years later LBJ fetched Corky to the ranch for dinner. Corky died before Caro could interview him, so no one knows what they talked about, but LBJ returned to Washington and began fighting hard for what he had considered a lost cause days before.

LBJ arranged for Russell and Eisenhower to talk directly and highly confidentially, in the Oval Office, where the president's willingness to accept amendment was secured. The president told Brownell he was concerned that Part III would involve his administration in a myriad of unwanted school desegregation cases and said bluntly that LBJ had the power to kill the whole measure and was prepared to use it. Furthermore, LBJ would hold up important legislation, so he was going to compromise. Ike told the press it was a mistake to move too quickly in such a delicate field and that he wanted to concentrate on voting rights alone. This freed a few Republican senators to eliminate Part III, but Nixon and Knowland held most in line.

LBJ turned his attention to ADA chairman Joe Rauh. Rauh made no secret of the hatred he bore for the man who unnecessarily destroyed Olds and Douglas, so LBJ used Rauh's close friends, the Grahams and through them Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, to convince Rauh to cooperate with the Majority Leader. Rauh held firm for Part III.

Knowland was pressing for a vote before he would consider amendments and Nixon was predicting victory on Part III because the GOP had the votes to obtain cloture. Both sides tried to appear reasonable in public. Journalists failed to understand that Russell was adamant about eliminating Part III and amending Part IV before he would stop talking about bringing the bill to the floor and allow it to do so. For three days, a series of amendments to Part III were suggested (and some introduced) but rejected by zealots on both side.

LBJ was working in strict secrecy behind the scenes. On July 8, he deferred to the Minority Leader to announce the day's Order of Business, acknowledging that he had

been informed that Knowland intended to bring to the floor the civil rights bill and would block consideration of any other business until it had been disposed of. Knowland confirmed this. Robert Kerr of New York jumped to his feet to object that this would create an "extreme emergency" if his Niagara Falls bill was delayed; LBJ commiserated but washed his hands of the situation.

Rhetoric sharpened. The mood was sullen and hostile. LBJ had to achieve a workable compromise soon, before the impulsive, easily angered and overconfident Knowland moved for cloture. LBJ studied his colleagues and realized Clinton Anderson had been spending a lot more time at his desk than he usually did. He strolled over to inquire why. LBJ found in Anderson the most pragmatic, non-ideological member of the Douglas Group. He hated filibusters, obsessed about his own health and was unwilling to let the GOP leadership pretend to defend blacks when, in fact, they were determined to use the Democratic filibuster solely to gain advantage in the next election.

Anderson told LBJ that he had glued himself to the floor to learn why the southerners could not budge. What he was hearing, between the lines, was that fear of military force was behind it. Voting rights were acceptable. Anderson had marked up a copy of H.R. 6127, tinkering with the text, finally ending up by crossing out almost all of Part III. Anderson suggested LBJ have a southerner or other conservative introduce that solution and LBJ saw instantly what needed to be done: have Anderson do it. This would carry weight and be stronger still if a *good* Republican co-sponsored it. Anderson recruited George Aiken of Vermont. LBJ reported to Russell that he had found a way to deliver half of his promise. Russell verified that LBJ's assessment was accurate.

LBJ's abdication ended and he announced his plan to introduce a unanimous consent agreement next day to decide when to vote on Knowland's motion to bring the bill to the floor. He was back in the headlines. In the morning, he obtained the agreement and delivered a speech, saying that there would be no bitter, bloody brawl; the Senate was on trial and expected by Americans to succeed. He posed with Russell and Knowland for photographers. On July 16, Anderson offered the amendment and the Senate voted 71 to 18 to make H.R. 6127 its pending business. LBJ voted against it, announcing that he opposed the bill in its present form, but would allow it to be debated "out of decent respect for the convictions of others." The two leaders shook hands across the center aisle. LBJ knew he had won; Knowland did not realize he had lost.

As soon as the vote was taken, Anderson called up his amendment and LBJ made a "parliamentary inquiry" to get the chair to confirm Anderson/Aiken was now the pending question. LBJ gave senators four days to get their views on the record and then called the vote. Forty-six Republicans rejected Knowland's plea not to remove Part III; Midwestern moderate Democrats and a few liberals supported them and the Hells Canyon bloc's votes were called in as needed. LBJ had brought together an unusual but overwhelming coalition and Part III vanished, 52 to 38.

The NAACP and Joe Rauh were enraged and reviled LBJ as the culprit. The Senate was beneath contempt for going along. No one saw that there was still a civil rights bill

alive and it owed its life to LBJ's instantaneous realization that Clint Anderson had pin-pointed how to break the deadlock.

Part 5 Chapter 39 Analysis

"You Do It," was LBJ's invitation to colleague Clint Anderson to be the liberal who would rally non-southerners to remove the overwhelming obstacle to keeping civil rights legislation alive in 1957. Caro's thesis in Chapter 39 is that an inspired leader must be able to recognize the precise moment at which to act and then to act swiftly and decisively. He takes his time describing why Anderson was sitting in the Senate, listening to the filibuster intently when most liberals were disinterested. He analyzes the components in Anderson's past that made him the perfect tool for LBJ's plan and the lightening speed with which LBJ grasped this. It would take Knowland four days to see what LBJ intended and by then he was powerless to stop it. LBJ, Anderson and GOP co-sponsor Aiken emerge as decisive heroes, standing head-and-shoulders above their opponents, right and left, who can only whine about being victimized.

Russell, whom Caro has often called the South's general and acknowledged his attention to parliamentary detail, does the same. Caro opens his analysis of Russell's July 2, 1957, speech deconstructing H.R. 6127 and the dangers it posed for civil libertarians, by quoting the maxim that surprise is half the battle. As a military historian, Russell was doubtless familiar with Prussian Major General Karl von Clausewitz's 1832 monograph on military tactics, *On War*. It underlay both sides' prosecution of total war in both of the twentieth-century's world conflicts. Russell was prepared for an all-out fight and opened with a surprise attack: point out that the Senate did not yet realize what it was discussing. The extended debate he and his colleagues were about to embark upon was not the obstructionist filibuster that Americans hated, but a close examination of constitutional considerations that all civil libertarians ought to welcome. He won a psychological victory that eventually brought LBJ out of hiding in Texas and to Anderson's desk to find the key to winning his Waterloo. Waterloo refers to the epic 1815 battle, which Caro mentions but does not comment upon, that ended to Napoleon's efforts to conquer the whole of Europe. Clausewitz, who had earlier fought in Russia under Napoleon and played a major role in this joint British-Prussian battle, was most influenced in *On War* by Napoleonic doctrine.

The reader must again pay close attention, as Knowland had not, to the fine details of parliamentary language. Caro does an effective job of pointing this out as first Anderson and then LBJ outmaneuver Knowland to obtain precisely what the Minority Leader intended most to prevent: introduction of any amendments. From this point forward, such subtleties will prove crucial.

Part 5 Chapter 40

Part 5 Chapter 40 Summary

Like Part III, Part IV was phrased in terms of the attorney general seeking injunctions "in the name of the United States." This was the only condition under which American citizens could be deprived of their right to a jury trial in cases of criminal contempt. Southern senators would not compromise on removing this threat. Westerners, who remembered the jailing of railroad strikers on these grounds, were also wary of omitting some protection. Wyoming's elderly Joseph C. O'Mahoney, an ardent New Dealer, had vowed when FDR tried to pack the Supreme Court in 1937, that he would never allow such undemocratic measures to reach the Senate again, so he introduced the amendment that the South demanded. Till's murderers had been acquitted only two months earlier, so liberals were adamant that Part IV not be watered down. The Douglas Group vowed to fight to the end. Both sides claimed to occupy the moral high ground and Eisenhower opposed the O'Mahoney amendment as welcoming anarchy. Knowland made it a party issue and Nixon worked behind the scenes to build a bipartisan "no compromise" bloc. If he was going to forestall another filibuster, LBJ had to bridge the chasm and gain that compromise.

LBJ wandered the halls, pleading, threatening, storming and cajoling as always, but also spoke with every ingenious lawyer he could reach, searching for a way to break the logjam. He hit upon Benjamin V. Cohen, an absent-minded professor style lawyer who had collaborated with Cocoran and Rayburn on formulating the keystones of the New Deal before withdrawing to seclusion in the 1950s. LBJ invited him to lunch. Cohen told him about a recent article he had read that pointed out civil contempt proceedings did not require jury trials; their purpose was remedial, to coerce defendants into not repeating their illegal deeds. As soon as they agreed, their freedom was restored. Criminal complaints, aimed at punishing violators, required a jury trial. So, by including civil contempt provisions in Part IV, it would still be possible to enforce voting rights. LBJ understood instantly and sent O'Mahoney to Cohen to work out the language of the amendment he submitted to become the Senate's pending business as soon as Part III was disposed.

The South had been given enough to support this, but this still left LBJ fourteen votes short of a sure victory and the odds of swaying that many views was slim. No one could recall who came up with the idea of appealing to organized labor for support, promising that Part IV would restore to them during strikes the right to a jury trial that the Taft-Hartley Act of 1948 had stripped away. If they leaned on liberal senators, this would be enough and some liberal colleagues saw the wisdom of this move.

LBJ began applying his lifelong talent for making both sides of a conflict believe that he stood firmly with them. He worked on southerners' fears of that something worse could happen if they did not give blacks *something*. When old Matt Neely of West Virginia died (as was expected at any moment), the Republican governor would even the parties'

numbers in the Senate and Nixon would break the tie; Democrats would lose their chairmanships and any chance of controlling the civil rights legislation. Reconstruction would be back.

LBJ also portrayed himself as siding with moderately liberal Democrats, warning what southern chairmen could do to the legislation they needed and arguing that once blacks got the vote, every politician would be "kissing their ass," begging for support. Liberals distrusted LBJ in everything but his ability to count votes accurately. He told them they had to cool down in order for him to find the votes he was sure he could get. He held southerners in line by guaranteeing they lacked the support to prevent cloture.

As always, LBJ would not allow a vote until he knew he would win. He suggested that the GOP would hold up the projects that the senators from New York and Tennessee needed badly unless they allied with him and the civil rights matter was gotten out of the way. He reminded Republicans to be proud to be the party of Lincoln and Democrats to be the party of the downtrodden. He sought pity for the strain all this wrangling was putting on his ailing heart. Indeed, associates could not remember ever seeing anyone work as hard as LBJ during those days and, by telephone, long into the night.

Nevertheless, on July 26, the lines had stiffened and LBJ flew home to Texas. There he learned that the unions had not bought his logic and would not sell out the blacks to gain advantage for themselves. The Republicans stood remarkably united and southerners were getting close to resuming their filibuster. Monday and most of Tuesday were tense on the Senate floor; Republican leaders were gloating and taunting the southerners. The *Washington Post* published an open letter from eighty-one southern liberal leaders protesting the jury trial amendment.

Tuesday morning, two officers of Tuskegee Civic Association held a news conference on the steps of the SOB detailing the methods used in the South to prevent blacks from voting; eleven members of the Douglas Group stopped to listen, then went to the floor, where Russell was delivering anecdotes depicting a very different situation. Jacob Javits of New York rose to correct the record. Douglas followed, lamenting the recent race riots in Chicago and Detroit but observing that in the North abuses were not covered up and were being remedied. Red-faced over the holier-than-thou northern attitude, Russell defended segregation in all its aspects.

Northerners retorted that their blacks were allowed to vote but progress was being made by not burying their heads in the sand. Russell preferred that northerners not export a system that generated race riots. Shouts filled the chamber. McNamara of Michigan pointed out that the South, having done nothing in ninety years, obviously needed outside interference. The galleries exploded with applause (which was quelled) as the shouting exchange continued for three hours, Russell striking a martyr's pose. LBJ was slumping in his seat, miserable and irritated; seven months of effort to keep the debate civil had been lost. Focus had shifted from suffering human beings to constitutional principles. Douglas provoked him to schedule a vote so the Senate could move on to pressing problems. LBJ was losing control of the Senate as his

predecessors had; he was falling prisoner to the South. Knowland and Nixon were seizing control.

During the afternoon break George Reedy delivered a memo to LBJ summarizing an offhand remark made to him on Sunday as he walked with his children in an amusement park. A perceptive railway lobbyist said, "Any labor guy who is against jury trials ought to have his head examined." LBJ pounced on this opening. Railway brotherhoods had excluded blacks for almost a century and so had been overlooked. They had suffered greatly from criminal contempt proceedings in the 1880s and 1890s and were facing them again. Railroads were declining in importance in American life, but remained a powerful political force in the Midwest, so gaining their support might dislodge their conservative senators from the GOP leadership's grip. LBJ phoned Cy Anderson and asked for a formal statement of support. He followed up with a call to the United Mine Workers, whose activities had also been crippled by criminal injunctions. LBJ asked a friend to intercede with UMW president John L. Lewis. LBJ received a strong telegram from Lewis in the afternoon and knew it would move West Virginia into his "yea" column. Half the vote gap had been closed.

Church, nicknamed "Senator Sunday School" by the press, had been undergoing tutoring by his politically astute wife Bethine. She urged him to get involved in the civil rights campaign and to find some means of winning over LBJ. During consideration of Part III, he had asked O'Mahoney to have his name added as co-sponsor of his amendment. LBJ now appealed to Church's sense of duty and the challenge of making history. Church began thinking like a lawyer, searching for a solution. A light bulb switched on: if southern juries weren't all white, there would be convictions. He and O'Mahoney constructed an addendum guaranteeing registered black voters a new right: to sit on juries. This gimmick would appeal to liberals. Both sides would be able to tell constituents that they had won. LBJ restrained young Church from introducing his addendum immediately; they would wait for the perfect time.

Wednesday morning, Knowland still had the edge and for four more days, Russell objected to every version of every amendment. Full filibuster appeared near. The railway brotherhoods had not yet weighed in, so LBJ had Cy Anderson's quote typed up, but without name or attribution. He showed it and a cover letter by Reedy to various liberals to give them compelling reasons beyond the black-voting context for supporting the jury trial amendment. A reminder that voting with LBJ would be advantageous on other pieces of legislation accompanied this.

LBJ also pulled off the velvet gloves in direct talks with lobbyists for the railroad brotherhoods and postal workers unions. They might expect skeptical southern chairmen to rethink the bills before them of interest to these organizations, in return for help on this amendment. Nixon and Knowland pressed their own attack, but the gap was down to three at most.

LBJ scripted a melodrama for a full-house evening session. O'Mahoney would orate for a few minutes to set the stage and then Church would ask for the floor. O'Mahoney would yield with the understanding that he would regain it afterwards. LBJ asked

unanimous consent for this arrangement. Church would explain the jury service addendum and ask O'Mahoney's agreement to include it. Straight-faced, O'Mahoney would happily accept. Nimble-minded John Pastore would then feign skepticism to draw out of O'Mahoney and Church the benefits of their ideas so clearly that even the densest senator could grasp it. Pastore's performance changed some votes and overnight the railway brotherhoods telegraphed support. LBJ had all the ammunition he needed.

On August 1, a still-confident Knowland walked into LBJ's trap. LBJ knew his vote count to be more accurate than the Minority Leader's assumed support, so he asked whether Knowland still wanted a vote as soon as possible. Told yes, LBJ rose to announce the Senate would vote that evening. Nixon realized that the GOP had fragmented and began frantic lobbying. Late afternoon LBJ offered Knowland's unanimous consent agreement of the previous day. His opponent could hardly object to his own proposal. The final six hours of debate on civil rights began immediately. Behind the scenes, Nixon performed damage control. The president could not be reached; he was playing golf.

As vote time neared, the galleries filled to overflowing. Humphrey declared that the debate should not have strayed from its rightful focus: defending those who stood defenseless because they were disenfranchised. The outmaneuvered liberals called the gutted bill a travesty of justice, but Church pointed out that this was an indispensable first step. JFK rose to speak pragmatically and philosophically. LBJ had dressed impeccably for the occasion and made sure all attention was riveted on him, despite his silence. The ongoing speeches no longer mattered. Knowland made a last appeal to support the president and then LBJ asked for a roll call vote. Shortly after midnight, Nixon announced that the amendment was approved, 51 to 42. After the vote, Nixon raged, Knowland mourned and LBJ showed his gratitude: Church received a seat on Foreign Relations.

Part 5 Chapter 40 Analysis

Chapter 40, "Yeas and Nays," shows how LBJ explored every avenue, seized every opportunity and timed, scripted and staged the melodrama that prevented the GOP from killing off the only way he could pass a civil rights bill that the South would not oppose. Everyone agreed that H.R. 6127 was a shadow of the measure introduced by Eisenhower's attorney general, but it was a beginning. Because it offered labor unions hope of relief from judicial harassment during strikes, Midwestern liberals had to support it. The original intent of the bill, to free southern blacks from legalized oppression, became secondary in the final voting. Caro shows LBJ's restoration from depression and impotence to mastery of the Senate. He listens and acts decisively, without cruelty. He is an attractive character again.

Caro again displays how important attention to detail is in the workings of the Senate. Rules required that members not criticize colleagues or the states they represented; any who transgressed this rule was obliged, immediately, to yield the floor to the offended

party for response. When Russell's rising rage led him to point a finger of blame at specific northern cities where race violence had erupted, wanting to point out the hypocrisy of Yankees seeking to impose solutions on a South that suffered only individual acts of violence, he gave the North opportunities to break into his carefully-crafted arguments. Passion could derail even the most careful parliamentarian.

LBJ did not allow himself to lose his head. He simply had too much riding on this vote. Nixon, whose presidential ambitions also depended on passage of civil rights legislation, failed to see what LBJ saw: passing something, no matter however small would be politically valuable, but would open the doors for true progress. Blacks allowed to vote and serve on juries would not only be grateful, but also empowered to take control of their own destinies, more slowly than they and their liberal supporters wanted, but in a very real way. LBJ saw that and made it happen, against overwhelming odds.

Part 5 Chapter 41

Part 5 Chapter 41 Summary

The GOP had to decide how to react. Nixon favored defeating the now gutted bill and to start afresh in 1958. Eisenhower condemned allowing so many extraneous issues to intrude on the debate, leaving blacks still disenfranchised. Many black leaders urged the president not to sign the bill if it reached his desk. Liberals, realizing that the inclusion of a single white on a southern jury would result in a hung jury were angry with LBJ. The *New York Post* declared that slick LBJ made even Nixon look good.

Because the House and Senate bills had still to be reconciled in conference, the GOP saw hope of letting it die and the Democrats would receive the blame. That would help Republicans in the 1958 election. The Douglas Group fell in line with this reasoning. They assumed Russell and the southerners would be pleased to see it die. Liberals, however, supported and even quoted LBJ's assessment that the Senate system's virginity had to be broken in order for true progress to be made. An exhausted Phil Graham was recruited to win over a doubting Rauh. Rauh then set to work on Roy Wilkins, as did Humphrey. Wilkins agreed to call a meeting of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, in order to "thrash the problem out."

They met on the morning of the scheduled vote on the overall bill and after hours of debate declared that blacks were better off with the little it provided than without it. The Senate version was disappointing, but ought to be passed. It did, 72 to 18. Surprisingly, Rauh took the lead to push for reconciliation based on the stripped Senate version. Nixon did not want the GOP blamed for killing civil rights. Rayburn suggested a face-saving (and bill-strengthening) change to the Senate version, then pushed it through the House, 279 to 97 on August 27 and sent it to the Senate. There a few southern senators objected to the change (allowing judges to try minor voting rights offenses without a jury) and threatened to filibuster, but Russell reigned them in. Thurmond conducted the longest one-man filibuster in the Senate's history, but no one else joined him and the Senate passed the revised bill, 60 to 15 and Eisenhower signed it into law.

LBJ turned forty-nine on August 27; nine years earlier, he had spent his birthday worrying about the election the next day. LBJ felt that if a person had not accomplished something by the time he turned forty, he never would. He had vowed to leave politics if he lost his race for a Senate seat. In 1957, LBJ was achieving a great victory and he knew it. A favorable political cartoon buoyed his spirits, as did a visit from the Little League Baseball world champions, from Monterrey, Mexico. Democratic senators from across the political spectrum wished him happy birthday, then he and Lady Bird attended a Texas-sized gala party. LBJ was almost beside himself with joy at having at least gotten half a loaf (Hubert Humphrey later described it as more like a crumb).

Before the president managed to sign the bill, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus defied the Supreme Court decision by blocking black children from entering Central High

School. Having failed to talk Faubus out of such a confrontation, Eisenhower found himself forced to act and he ordered in the 101st Airborne Division, bayonets fixed. All the controversy over Part III was moot and Part IV, signed into law, proved useless in the hands of an administration lacking the will to use it. Black voter registrations in the Old Confederacy fell in 1958 and 1960. The value of the flawed Civil Rights Act of 1957 was breaking the Senate dam for the first time. It brought hope. The fight had revealed LBJ's mastery of legislative strategy on a grand, nationwide scale and on the small-scale, intricate level. He did not find common ground; he created it. The press hailed "Johnson's Masterpiece," and columnists rethought their views on LBJ. He was the modern Henry Clay

Liberals were not yet completely won over and as the ineffectiveness of the Act became clear, criticism grew. The "scent of magnolias" on LBJ, however, had lessened and he was the first southern Democrat since the Civil War with a chance of gaining a nomination for the presidency. He had done everything he could within the context of the Senate. As president in 1964 and 1965, he would ram through the great civil rights acts that corrected the deficiencies in the 1957 legislation. The speech LBJ delivered in 1957 announcing how he intended to vote began cautiously, reminding his constituents that they were repealing a "bayonet-type Reconstruction statute" and replacing it with "basic rights" provisions. He understood the disappointment of people who wanted more than the present bill would deliver, but rejected the view that it should be an all-or-nothing decision. The Senate would be there for years to come.

LBJ took pride that the debate had opened closed minds and dealt for the first time in memory not with partisan politics but with the effect laws have on real human beings. He denied that there was political capital to be reaped in this fight. Hate and prejudice could create only more hate and prejudice. Reconstruction had proved that. Civil rights were about dignity and unity for all, not about chasing votes. What they were achieving in 1957 was good for every state and as far as he was concerned, it was good for Texas, which "has been a part of the Union since Appomattox." This was the kind of phrase that could rally support, like "We shall overcome!"

Part 5 Chapter 41 Analysis

The very straightforward and relatively short Chapter 41, "Omens," completes Part V, "The Great Cause," and the meat of Caro's third monumental biography of LBJ. It details the fall out, much of it predictable, to a flawed victory, but makes clear the author's view that LBJ's 1957 victory in passing the first civil rights bill since 1875 was monumental. Without it, LBJ might well not have sat in the White House to sign the society-changing Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965. Had he remained just a southerner, he might not have been on the ticket in 1960 with JFK. He needed a chance to prove he could work with the liberals and to let his compassion show. In Chapter 41, Robert Caro makes the case that LBJ had accomplished this.

Part 6 Chapter 42

Part 6 Chapter 42 Summary

LBJ's next three years in the Senate were marked by a challenge to his style of leadership. The GOP lost badly in the 1958 elections and Democrats outnumbered them almost two to one in both houses. Most of the newly elected Democratic senators were liberals, eager to join the beleaguered liberals who were determined to stand up to LBJ. They demanded fuller representation on the Policy and Steering committees. Muskie and Proxmire were unwilling to kowtow. They refused to observe the traditional keep-quiet-and-learn period and delivered speeches early on and without invitation. Proxmire dared give a series of talks attacking the "one-man rule" in both houses of Congress and demanding more frequent party caucuses and more democratic committees. Political cartoonist Herblock depicted "King Lyndon" with the peasantry growing restless around him. LBJ dismissed the criticism as myth and deflection of blame. He refused to give in to liberal demands, but agreed to call more caucuses, so many that numbers of attendees quickly diminished.

LBJ's staff had to work hard to keep his hubris from showing. He expropriated more choice real estate in the SOP and furnished it opulently. Reporters called his suites "the Taj Mahal." He luxuriated in his space, began keeping visitors waiting and dismissing them swiftly. He treated colleagues as though they were his children. He saw no reason to watch his tongue in discussing their abilities and foibles. He let reporters know how cleverly he was manipulating them. He knew his power and referred to himself as the "President of the U.S. South Pennsylvania Avenue Division," surrounded by committee chairmen like a cabinet.

The last phase of LBJ's Senate career reprised the events of the first part. The launching of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, gave him an opportunity to revisit "preparedness." He was given control by Russell, created an able staff, avoided blaming the Administration and garnered publicity, "squeezing out of every possible drop of that mother's milk of politics." He again cultivated the press with leaks and briefings to his favorites. He let the scientists testify first to elevate the hearings, then brought in generals to sell the need for greater security in an era of budgetary cutbacks.

LBJ rejected dusting off the old siesta motif; a new era needed a new motto and he likened Sputnik to Pearl Harbor; they lost the battle but went on to win the war. LBJ again gave everything a sense of urgency staged for television. Eisenhower knew that LBJ was exaggerating the danger to America and did not want to turn the country into a "garrison state." LBJ received daily Pentagon briefings, but exaggerated them, creating the impression of a "missile gap." With the successful launching of the first U.S. satellite, Explorer, the media's interest in the issue diminished and LBJ's dropped shortly thereafter. He had exploited space as much as he could and issued a sparse final report only because one was expected. He gave no attention to bills passing through the Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, which he headed.

The final years of the decade were dreary. When it appeared an ill-drafted Supreme Court-ripping bill might pass, LBJ used his prerogative to move that the Senate adjourn. Liberals objected and demanded a roll call on his motion. LBJ stood with his clipboard in hand and made sure that every senator knew that he was recording his vote. Only eighteen dared cross him. In private, LBJ delivered a long monologue to Humphrey and a *New York Times* reporter how, step-by-step, to go about defending the court without filibustering while winning the thanks of liberals for their efforts. Anthony Lewis realized that LBJ wanted to be seen by people as a defender of civil liberties and might actually even believe in them. His game plan had the added advantage of forcing Nixon to antagonize either the liberals or the conservatives, damaging his own presidential hopes.

LBJ worked behind the scenes both to placate his Texas oil supporters and the liberals. He cooled towards civil rights, figuring that he had pushed Russell and the southerners in 1957 as far as he could. In 1960, the South used the filibuster it foreswore in 1957 to oppose another civil rights bill and LBJ fought off liberal attempts to invoke cloture. He worked with Eisenhower's new attorney general to weaken the bill to the point of meaninglessness and got it passed with southern acquiescence.

Part 6 Chapter 42 Analysis

Part 6 "After the Battle," is essentially a two-chapter postscript. Chapter 42, "Three More Years," follows the debate about whether the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was a triumph or a sell-out and LBJ's role in its passage (and gutting). It then deals lightly with the last three "dreary" years LBJ spent in the upper chamber. Caro shows the parallels between LBJ's earliest activities and the final ones, the "preparedness" hearings following the launch of Sputnik in 1957 modeling on those of 1950. Caro observes that LBJ's close identification with the American space program (the Johnson Space Center in Houston) dates from his vice presidential days rather than the senatorial hearings which garnered him much publicity but failed to engage his heart and soul in any meaningful way.

Part 6 Chapter 43

Part 6 Chapter 43 Summary

Caro proclaims that he intends to deal with LBJ's campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1960 and his decision to accept second place on the ticket when defeated, in the next volume of *The Years of Lyndon Johnson*. Only one item in LBJ's post-1960s career belongs in this volume.

Texas law was changed to allow LBJ to run simultaneously for vice president and for senator in 1960, but federal law required he resign from the Senate before his swearing in. LBJ wanted to keep real power in the Senate, rather than merely presiding over it in a ceremonial way. He saw no reason why he shouldn't be able to continue to chair the Democratic caucus. In December, he discussed this with select senators, but failed to gain the support he expected. LBJ convinced his Whip, Mike Mansfield, who would become Leader, to go along with his plans and to retain the Taj Mahal as the new vice president's office. LBJ saw himself as useful working in the Senate to get through the legislation that the "Bostons and Harvards" had no idea how to maneuver through. Baker was astonished and horrified that LBJ could consider this seriously, knowing how closely senators guarded their prerogatives against the Executive Branch. Liberal Democrats were not about to let LBJ get his toe in the doorway.

LBJ had not yet resigned his seat when the Democratic caucus convened on January 3, 1961, so he was still Majority Leader and called the meeting to order. They elected Mansfield his successor by acclamation, but LBJ did not hand over the gavel. Mansfield then moved that the Vice President-Elect preside at future conferences. LBJ had to recognize several colleagues who rose to object. The caucus was not open to former senators. This would make the Senate look ridiculous. It would set a dangerous precedent. LBJ refused to be uninvited. Under threat from Mansfield to resign as Leader unless they accepted his motion, the senators gave in, 46 to 17, but LBJ had been rebuffed and had created considerable animosity. Only Russell was able to convince LBJ to surrender his Senate power. Mansfield told the Democrats that JFK and LBJ both understood the proper demarcation between the branches of the government and they allowed a LBJ to continue to attend. He was no longer a threat to anyone. He called only two caucuses to order for brief business sessions. As vice president, LBJ quickly bored on the

Dais and began often stepping down.

Lady Bird later said the senate years were the happiest years of their lives. The Senate had been LBJ's home. Now he had left it.

Part 6 Chapter 43 Analysis

Chapter 43, "The Last Caucus," shows the Vice President-elect trying to retain the vast powers he had gathered as Leader once he moved over to the Executive Branch. It seems amazing that LBJ could have imagined this possible. The naiveté transcends even the week spent in Chicago in 1956 when he refused to believe he would not soon be president. Democratic colleagues were clearly uncomfortable having to consider his quixotic quest. In order not to end on such a piteous note, Caro quotes Lady Bird Johnson's analysis that the twelve years LBJ spent in the Senate were the best of their lives. Now they were over.

Characters

Lyndon Baines Johnson

LBJ is, of course, the center of *Master of the Senate*. This volume covers the years 1949 to 1960, detailing how he learned the ropes, identified a path to true power, seized it and used it. It summarizes materials detailed in the first two volumes, showing how he was formed by and ultimately overcame a life of poverty and a legacy of failure. At Southwest Texas State Teachers College at San Marcos he developed a lifelong talent for ingratiating himself to important older men (and sloughing off his reputation among fellow students for being an inveterate kiss-up).

He went to Washington as a congressional aide, became a leader among his colleagues and caught the eye of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. This led to his becoming the youngest person appointed to head a state administration by the New Deal's National Youth Administration (NYA), where he controlled an enormous budget, but brought to people of color in Texas less than their fair share of the federal monies. He left the NYA in 1937 to run for congress, winning a seat under suspicious conditions. The House was too large for LBJ to achieve true power, so he ran for the Senate in 1941 but was out-maneuvered by his opponent and settled into eight more years of restiveness. During World War II, he enlisted in the Navy and managed to avoid combat (while reaping publicity as a warrior). In 1948 he gambled everything and ran for the Senate again, winning another narrow, tainted election, arriving as "landslide Lyndon."

Initially LBJ sought to make a name for himself and stand out from the crowd, but he learned that this was not the Senate's way. He studied the institution closely and ingratiated himself to Richard Russell, head of the Southern Bloc. Fortune smiled on LBJ and he was in a position in 1950 to emulate President Truman's rise to national prominence a decade earlier by heading investigations of the nation's preparedness for war in Korea. LBJ used the forum effectively. He eagerly accepted the post of Democratic Party assistant leader (or Whip) and gathered information useful to colleagues to become an invaluable resource.

The GOP took control of the Senate when LBJ ascended to Leader, so there was no pressure on him to produce results, which lay in the Majority Leader's hands. LBJ used the time to gather the strings of true power in the Minority Leader's hands and transformed them into true power to control the entire legislative process when the Democrats regained the Senate in 1954. As Majority Leader he was truly the Master of the Senate. A heart attack in 1955, brought on by the pace and intensity with which he exercised his power (coupled with poor eating habits, alcohol and nicotine) gave him pause for reflection and reformation in order not to die before he could reach the White House.

LBJ was out of his element in his first run for the presidency in 1956, misjudging that his Senate power would translate into the larger arena and LBJ fell into deep depression.

He emerged from it to consolidate his Southern power base by derailing civil rights legislation and defeating the deregulation of the avaricious natural gas industry. He then moved to courting Democratic liberals in order to give himself another chance in 1960. The highlight of his Senate career (and thus of this volume) came in creating the common ground necessary to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1957.

LBJ was a physically imposing man, able to be loud, brass and crude or deferential as the situation required. He could convince everyone that he stood firmly by their side on any issue. He was obsessed by the prospects of an early death and fear of failure and humiliation like his ancestors had experienced. He felt a natural superiority as a white man over people of color, but none of the visceral revulsion that marked denizens of the Deep South. He learned through hard work the difficulty of physical labor and knew that southern propaganda about blacks' satisfaction with their status in society. He wanted to help the poor and dispossessed, but kept this impulse in check until it was expedient to act upon it. He was a philanderer and a shameless self-promoter, able to destroy friends and pass it off as just business. He had a genius for language and mimicry and used it to manipulate people. He had tremendous insight into human nature and an ability to translate that into programs of action.

Robert Gene Baker

Bobby Baker was a twenty-year-old Senate page in 1949 when LBJ took him aside and flattered him into revealing, "where the bodies are buried." Baker left his Pickham, SC, home at age fourteen in 1942 to become a Senate page. Hard work and hustle set him apart from his twenty-one young comrades and he ingratiated himself to senators by anticipating their needs. He revered the Senate and allowed Parliamentarian Charles Watkins to educate him. He was named chief page at age sixteen and was given a title on the Senate staff at eighteen, so he could remain after the mandatory retirement age of eighteen. The Senate was his home. His wedding reception was held in the Capitol in 1948.

The next year, LBJ used him as no freshman senator ever had before to learn how to achieve in and belong to that august body. Appreciative, Bobby readily steered him towards Richard Russell. Baker was beguiled by LBJ, drawn to him like a magnet and willing to be LBJ's favorite thin, -a lackey and bootlicker. When LBJ became the Senate Democratic Whip in 1951, he began sending Bobby on errands to collect information on how senators intended to vote. He became not only "the Mole," but also the son LBJ never had. When LBJ got Bobby named "Assistant, Democratic Cloakroom," he gained access to that sacred hideaway, where senators felt safe talking openly. Through him, LBJ knew everything that was going on. Bobby proved himself a good, impartial counter, because he held no strong convictions himself. Baker remained by LBJ's side throughout his Senate career, but was caught up in financial scandals.

William E. Borah

Borah, a Republican senator from Idaho and chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Coolidge through Roosevelt, was known as "the Lion of Idaho." He used his training as a Shakespearian actor to rally opposition against any attempt to involve America in international affairs between the two world wars. He was instrumental in passing the neutrality acts of 1936 and 1937, ignoring the deepening crisis in Europe and Asia. He died in January of 1940, as the German bombing of London shook his colleagues out of their stupor. Frank Church idolized Borah and wanted to emulate his Senate career; LBJ would use this ambition to fit Church into the drive towards victory in the 1957 Civil Rights Act battle.

Earl Browder

President of the American Communist Party, Browder was used by LBJ to tar the reputation of FPC chairman Leland Olds in 1949 hearings, for having shared a speakers' stage with him in the 1920s. Senator Joe McCarthy also used the specter of Browder in prosecuting the Red Scare in the mid-1950s.

Horace Busby

LBJ's Senate idea man and speechwriter, Busby was recruited in 1948 when his editorials in the University of Texas student newspaper caught the senator-elect's eye. Buzz was known to idolize FDR and LBJ imitated the late president to perfection in order to win him over. By 1951, Buzz was ready to return to private life, but produced draft reports for LBJ's Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

Ed Clark

The legendary "Secret Boss of Texas," Clark lobbied for oil and gas interests in Washington in 1956 and whose name LBJ had to keep out of subsequent investigations for fear he himself would be implemented.

John Connally

LBJ's chief administrative aide, Connally's talents led him to later hold office as JFK's Secretary of the Navy, Governor of Texas and Richard Nixon's Secretary of the Treasury. He made up for the low-caliber of talent that would tolerate LBJ's abusive management style. John Connally was totally loyal to LBJ for ten years, but declined to accompany LBJ to the Senate, accepting a job with the Austin law firm of Alvin J. Wirtz.

Seeing how badly his staff needed Connally's sophistication to function properly, he begged him to return. Connally would grant but a single Senate session of his time and

was so obviously unhappy about the prospects that LBJ let him off the hook, fearing Connally's attitude would infect others. When LBJ received the chairmanship of the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee in July of 1951, Wirtz volunteered Connally for assignments from his former boss. In 1956, he was retained by oil interests to lobby for the Harris/Fulbright Natural Gas Bill. The tall, well-spoken Texas lawyer was called upon often to advance LBJ's agenda and in he 1956 put LBJ's name into nomination for the presidency at the Democratic convention in Chicago.

Tom Connally

As Texas's senior senator when LBJ was seated in the Senate in 1949, Tom Connally sponsored LBJ at his swearing in. Connally declined, however, to buck the seniority system to give LBJ a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee that he chaired or on Finance, where he had long served. Crusty and irritable, Connally had feuded with LBJ's predecessor over who received credit and publicity for successful legislation and LBJ ordered his staff not to contend with the senior senator's staff. Connally supported President Truman's authority to fire General MacArthur.

Thomas G. Corcoran

Corcoran was the aide whom FDR used to convince legislators to follow his New Deal proposals. In partnership with James H. Rowe, Jr., he was LBJ's chief fundraiser in liberal circles and condemned the rottenness of LBJ's treatment of Leland Olds. He played a key role in LBJ" 1956 efforts to gain the Democratic nomination.

Helen Gahagan Douglas

A Barnard College graduate, Douglas was hailed as one of the "twelve most beautiful women in America." Wife of actor Melvyn Douglas and a star both on Broadway and the classical stages of Europe, Helen was touched by the plight of Oklahomans fleeing the Dust Bowl and entered California politics. In 1944 she won a seat in Congress, representing a Los Angeles district, where she was surrounded by admiring male colleagues, among them LBJ. She was a spokesperson for civil rights and other liberal causes, re-elected in 1946 and 1948 and expected to run for and win, a Senate seat in 1950. The "Number One Glamour Girl of the Democratic Party" first met LBJ in 1945, when he offered to help her organize an efficient office. She noted he was close to the Speaker and believed he shared her fervent admiration for FDR and the New Deal.

Douglas and LBJ shared their misery together on the day of FDR's funeral, in LBJ's hideaway. He frequently sat beside her on the House floor and defended her against the demagoguery of Mississippi Congressman John Rankin. Soon, Helen and LBJ were observed arriving and leaving the Capitol together, holding hands and attending parties together, all very openly. He particularly wanted Alice Glass to know about it, in order to hurt her. The affair cooled when Helen lost her 1949 Senate race to Richard M. Nixon,

who tarred her as soft on Communism. She retired from politics for good, but remained intimate friends with LBJ through his vice presidential years.

Paul Douglas

Democratic senator from Illinois, Douglas was leader of the liberal bloc skeptical about LBJ's motives and was rebellious against his leadership following the defeat of the 1956 Civil Rights Act. The last third of this volume shows LBJ trying to reach middle ground with the "Douglas Group" in order to reach a large enough compromise on the 1957 Civil Rights Act to ward off a southern filibuster. Douglas, like GOP Leader Knowland, tried to stand firm against compromise and hold his followers in line, but LBJ's argument that passing something, no matter how weakened, would advance the Great Cause carried the bill.

Dwight David Eisenhower

Eisenhower was vastly popular hero of World War II who won the presidency in 1952 and on his coat tails carried a majority in both houses of Congress. His years in office, discussed in this volume, were marked by the emergence of an organized civil rights movement, Supreme Court decisions forbidding segregation, international crises in Eastern Europe and the Middle East and the advent of the space age. Eisenhower declined to take the lead on integration and opposed the Court decisions as misplaced but vowed to enforce them as the law of the land. He was frustrated by the international situation and played into LBJ's hands when the USSR beat the U.S. in launching the world's first artificial satellite.

LBJ chaired another round of "preparedness" hearings that boosted his reputation. Eisenhower suffered a heart attack shortly after LBJ and appeared ready to retire from politics, but changed his mind and became the odds-on favorite. LBJ sought the Democratic nomination to position himself for 1960, but figured he had as good a chance against Ike in 1956 as anyone else. Eisenhower's massive electoral victory was taken as a personal matter, but closer examination showed that the GOP was making inroads into traditionally Democratic groups. Concern that letting the GOP take credit for passing civil right legislation while the Democrats were in the majority helped LBJ create the odd coalition he needed to amend the Administration's civil rights bill sufficiently to get it past a southern filibuster. Eisenhower watched rather than led.

Walter George

George was the Democratic senator from Georgia whom FDR tried to "purge" in the elections of 1938 for opposing his legislation. George succeeded the isolationist William Borah as chairman of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee and spearheaded passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in 1940. Everyday George pontificated in the Democratic cloakroom, telling stories of old Senate battles and LBJ sat attentively beside him, currying his favor. In 1952, LBJ set up George, as Dean of the Senate, to

introduce an alternative to S.J. Res. 1, the "Bricker Amendment," in order to defeat Old Guard Republican attempts to limit presidential authority in foreign affairs. In 1955 George was elected President *pro tempore* of the Senate and served until his retirement in 1957.

Alice Glass

Alice Glass was a tall, spectacularly beautiful small-town girl from Marlin, TX, with whom LBJ carried on the most serious extramarital affair of his life. It was conducted in secret because she was also the mistress (and future wife) of Charles Marsh, publisher of the *Austin American-Statesman*, a needed ally. Insiders thought it likely that he would divorce Lady Bird in order to marry Alice, but the romance faded after World War II and LBJ took up with Helen Gahagan Douglas.

Hubert Horatio Humphrey

Humphrey was the liberal senator from Minnesota who came to national prominence at the Democratic convention in 1948, delivering a fiery oration on behalf of a strong civil rights plank. Running on his progressive record as Mayor of Minneapolis, he won a seat in the Senate that year, but his ambition and outspokenness turned him into a pariah with the leadership. LBJ befriended his colleague, counseled him to conform and compromise whenever possible and gradually introduced him to the Big Bulls, whom Humphrey succeeded in charming.

Needing to court the liberals in order to be effective as Majority Leader, LBJ enlisted Humphrey as his de sole liaison with that faction, which profoundly suspected the Texan's motives and methods. They cooperated effectively, with the glib Minnesotan often being called upon to begin talking about it on the Senate floor while LBJ lined up votes behind the scenes. Humphrey was as open as LBJ about wanting some day to be president and LBJ was able to convince him that he would not be able to stand in his way since America would not put a southerner in the White House. They formed a close friendship, despite their ideological differences and Humphrey was a rich resource for Caro in writing this volume. Humphrey would be LBJ's running mate in 1964 and ran for president in 1968 when LBJ withdrew from the contest. He was badly defeated by Richard Nixon, because he was so closely associated with the administration's disastrous Viet Nam policies.

Walter Jenkins

Jenkins was LBJ's assistant and was broken by the boss's manipulations.

Lady Bird Johnson

Known always by the nickname given to her in childhood, Claudia Alta Taylor was a painfully shy young woman when LBJ married her. For most of this volume she appears loving and devoted to the man, who subjected her to great verbal cruelty, dismissed her abilities, demanded so much attention that she neglected her daughters and ultimately betrayed her with other women, sometimes in front of her.

Lady Bird emerged briefly during World War II when she ran his office while he was in the Pacific, but faded again when he returned. She owned the family radio station that provided a good deal of their income, but headed it in name only. She is shown blossoming after LBJ's heart attack, staying by his side, managing his diet, changing her wardrobe to please him and gradually gaining his respect. The First Lady who would talk to crowds and advocate policies can be seen in embryo in this volume. Here Lady Bird is a charming, gracious friend to Sam Rayburn, Richard Russell and LBJ's oft-ignored mother.

Martin Luther King, Jr.

King was a Harvard-educated Baptist preacher and social activist who came to national prominence organizing the boycotting of segregated municipal buses in Montgomery, AL. He was an advocate of Mahatma Gandhi's policy of non-violent resistance, which gained India its independence from Great Britain in 1948 and his rhetoric provided the voice that the civil rights movement needed.

William F. Knowland

A stocky, rumpled senator from California, Knowland became Republican Majority Leader after Robert Taft's death in 1953. In the mid-1950s, he supported Joe McCarthy. Seated in the front row across the aisle from LBJ, he was not LBJ's equal in parliamentary maneuvering. In the fight over the 1957 Civil Rights Act, he struggled to preserve GOP party unity in opposing the introduction of amendments, but did not see what LBJ had in mind with several subtle parliamentary motions and was bitter in defeat.

Joseph R. McCarthy

McCarthy was the junior senator from Wisconsin, who in 1950 created the "Red Scare" that terrorized the U.S. for years. McCarthy raised funds and manipulated the press as masterfully as LBJ, using influence and dollars as wantonly to bring down foes. LBJ, therefore, held off using his power as Majority Leader for as long as possible as colleagues grew enraged and embarrassed by McCarthy's tactics and clamored for his censure. Only after McCarthy's popularity plummeted following the nationally televised

Army Hearings did LBJ come around. The once powerful demagogue ended his term as a friendless drunkard.

Ernest McFarland

LBJ's immediate predecessor as Majority Leader, McFarland's concern about re-election kept him often out of Washington and his reluctance to tend to detail while in the city gave LBJ the perfect excuse for helping out. McFarland lost his seat in the GOP rout of 1952, allowing LBJ to become party Leader while the Democrats were the minority, relieved of the pressure to get legislative results.

Richard M. Nixon

Vice President of the U.S. during much of the time covered by this book, Nixon was as crafty and unscrupulous a politician as LBJ. During the 1957 Civil Rights Act maneuvering, he grasped LBJ's tactics but failed to count the votes as accurately. Nixon first won his Senate seat from California in 1950, defeating LBJ's lover, Congresswoman Helen Douglas, by smearing her as a communist.

Leland Olds

Olds was the Chairman of the New Deal"s Federal Power Commission (FPC) whose exemplary career LBJ destroyed in 1949 during public hearings over his renomination. After careers in the ministry, social work and teaching, Olds wrote left-leaning articles for a press service. Then, using his talent for analyzing massive amounts of data to determine fair pricing for public utilities, he caught the attention of FDR during his term as governor of New York.

Olds entered government service in Albany and was brought to Washington by FDR in 1933. He saw the New Deal as an effective means of righting the wrongs in American society superior to the more radical approaches he had examined in his earlier writings. Those writings came up when Olds's first term as chairman ended and the Senate acted on his renomination, but their importance relative to his record at FPC was deemed inconsequential and irrelevant. In 1949, however, LBJ needed to improve his credentials with the titans of Texas oil and gas who financed his campaigns and provided the money he needed to help colleagues, so he had to be seen prominently and effectively eliminated the threat Olds posed to them.

LBJ used his staff and Texas associates to isolate a handful of damning passages from Olds's early writings that could be presented in such a way as to paint him a communist (or very nearly one). LBJ developed a plan to present the evidence as dramatically as possible, with a minimum opportunity for rebuttal and he executed his plan flawlessly. Olds's career was ruined and his beloved FPC reduced to frightened ineffectiveness. Liberals would long remember the callous treatment and hold it against LBJ.

Sam Rayburn

The powerful Speaker of the House, "Mr. Sam" was a lonely old Texan whose frowning exterior caused most grownups to avoid him, but attracted children, who loved to listen to him. LBJ began courting his attention in 1931, but made little progress until he married Lady Bird in 1934 and the old man began doting on Johnson's painfully shy bride. Soon the feared power broker adopted LBJ as a kind of "professional son," seeking favors on his behalf and making him a regular at exclusive "Board of Education" sessions that he hosted in the afternoon in his hideaway. LBJ regularly amazed people by kissing Mr. Sam on the top of his balding head.

In 1939 LBJ alienated this benefactor whom he bragged was "just like a daddy to me" by getting between him and an even more powerful man, FDR, when both wanted to become the chief broker of patronage in Texas. The estrangement lasted until LBJ volunteered for the army after Pearl Harbor and the old man's heart melted and he welcomed back the prodigal son into his inner circle. Mr. Sam's portrait was the only one that hung in the living room of the Johnson Ranch; Lady Bird considered him the best of the common people from whom she and her husband sprang. LBJ retained the private key that Mr. Sam gave him to the hideaway where he held court every afternoon and LBJ was the only senator to attend the "Board of Education," keeping his fingers in House business with an eye to offering his services in coordinating matters of importance to colleagues. Mr. Sam supported LBJ's ambition to run for president and backed him in 1956, even though he knew that there was no chance.

George Reedy

Reedy was the United Press reporter whom Horace Busby recruited in April 1951 to succeed him as LBJ's chief speechwriter. LBJ doubled his UP salary and found that despite his conservative politics, Reedy was a master of catchy phrases.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

FDR, the President of the United States, whose landslide election in 1932 at the height of the Depression allowed him to ram through Congress in one hundred days the monumental, society-changing legislation of the New Deal. There was instant rapport between FDR and LBJ from their first meeting and he instructed officials to do everything they could to help him. LBJ often help relieve the president's loneliness in the White House when Eleanor was on extended trips and FDR took him in like one of his sons.

FDR was convinced of LBJ's total loyalty to the New Deal, recognized his political brilliance and used his power to advance his career as he did for few, if any, other congressmen. After the president's death in 1945, LBJ began distancing himself from the New Deal, since it was unpopular in Texas and the rest of the South, his first power

base. When he needed to build bridges to liberals in the mid-1950s, LBJ resurrected his image as an FDR intimate and favorite.

James H. Rowe, Jr.

A successful lawyer and one of Washington's most respected political insiders, Rowe spent more time with a young LBJ than with any of the other rising New Dealers. Nevertheless, he turned down an invitation to join the newly elected senator's staff in 1948 to succeed John Connally and was aghast at LBJ's treatment of Leland Olds, while understanding of LBJ's need to establish his credentials with the Texas oil barons. In 1956, Rowe joined LBJ's staff, won over by pressure brought to bear by colleagues solicitous of the poor and sick Lyndon's condition following his heart attack. Rowe was able to bear the pressure for only one month before resigning.

Richard Russell

Russell was the long-time senator from Georgia and the intellectual leader of the Southern Bloc. Dedicated to achieving his beloved father's never-realized dream of being a senator, Russell was a hard-working social recluse, master of parliamentary intricacies, historian, patriot and moderately spoken but tough-minded and resolute segregationist. He took LBJ under his wing (following much courting) and virtually gave him the posts of Whip and Leader. When his own run for the presidency shattered on the rock of being a southerner, he grew determined to realize the dream through LBJ and allowed him latitude in building bridges to the liberal wing of the Democratic party. He avoided using the filibuster in 1957 as LBJ engineered passage of the first civil rights legislation since 1875.

Gerald W. Siegel

A young, Yale-educated SEC attorney, Siegel was someone Donald Cook brought with him to service on LBJ's Senate Preparedness Subcommittee in 1950. In 1952 he was transferred to the Democratic Policy Committee, where his memorandum critical of S.J. Res. 1 proved crucial to defeating the Bricker Amendment.

Adlai E. Stevenson

Stevenson was the Democratic nominee for president in 1952, put forward by Harry S. Truman and defeated by Dwight D. Eisenhower. Wanting the nomination in 1956, LBJ manipulated Stevenson into entering the primaries to confront Estes Kefauver, the other leading contender, despite Stevenson's distaste for tree stump politicking. Stevenson did surprisingly well and looked likely to prevail until Truman withdrew his support in favor of Kefauver. LBJ saw this as his opening to become the compromise candidate in the event of a deadlock. Stevenson was nominated by an eloquent young JFK and went on to overwhelming defeat for a second time at the hands of the grinning incumbent.

Robert Taft, Jr.

Taft, a Republican Senator, was leader of the isolationist wing of the GOP and was willing to side with the Southern Bloc in defeating a vote on cloture in return for support on his efforts to pull the U.S. out of the U.N., NATO and other overseas involvements. His death in 1953 brought the more moderate and affable William Knowland to the post of Minority Leader, seated across the aisle from the more adept LBJ.

Harry S. Truman

FDR's successor as president in 1945, Truman received the vice presidential nomination in 1944 largely on the strength of the reputation for honest and thoroughness, which he earned heading a Senate committee investigating U.S. preparedness for World War II. Truman was not as open to LBJ as FDR had been and LBJ's treatment of his nominee Leland Olds did nothing to improve this. Truman softened his attitude, however, when LBJ made pains to be the first senator to pledge support at the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and dealt fairly with the administration chairing Preparedness Subcommittee hearings. In 1956, Truman withdrew his support from Adlai Stevenson, which LBJ saw as his opening to pursue the nomination as a compromise candidate. LBJ inherited Truman's Senate desk, but never seemed to care for the plainspoken, common man who unexpectedly became president.

William S. White

White was the chronicler of the U.S. Senate in his 1956 book *Citadel.* He was a major source for this volume and is frequently cited in the text.

Alvin J. Wirtz

A former Texas state senator, Wirtz was calm, studious and ruthless and the single most powerful figure in LBJ's congressional district and in his career beyond the House. The crafty attorney hired John Connally, LBJ's congressional aide, in 1948 when Connally firmly declined to follow the congressman to the Senate, but he succumbed to LBJ's flattery and came to consider him like the son he had never had. In 1949, Wirtz headed efforts to excerpt from Leland Olds's massive writings the few gems which, taken out of context, could sink his hopes of confirmation as chairman of the FPC.

Warren Woodward

Woodward was chief administrative assistant in LBJ's Senate office in 1948. "Woody," a veteran World War II airman, assisted John Connally in LBJ's House office in minor functions and was LBJ's fourth choice for the top spot; no one else wanted to be put on

the tyrant's payroll. Very unsophisticated, Woody became deeply dependent psychologically on LBJ.

Objects/Places

Brown & Root

Brown & Root was the Texas construction firm that bankrolled LBJ and provided him with luxurious transportation and vacation opportunities to impress his colleagues.

Filibuster

This is the nickname given to senators' cherished right to "extended discussion." The term derives from the Dutch word *vrijbuiter*, meaning freebooter or pirate and applied because members (particularly southern members) used it to pirate or hijack the legislative process. Senate Rule 22 required a two-thirds vote to cut off a filibuster, a process called cloture.

National Youth Administration

The NYA was created in 1935 to help students stay in high school or college by providing them part-time campus jobs and to help young people not in school to earn money in small-scale public works projects.

Senate Office Building

A grand, five-storied, colonnaded granite and marble building, the SOB (never to be abbreviated in official communications!) housed the 96 senators and about 1,100 staff and maintenance employees. It is as restrained, dignified and austere as the senators themselves. Suites were assigned to senators strictly by seniority and LBJ was given SOB 231: small, distant from the Capitol subway and near the snack bar.

Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee

This is the name of the seven-member subcommittee established under the Armed Services Committee to examine America's readiness to fight in Korea after the outbreak of hostilities there in mid-1950. LBJ immediately saw that heading such a body would boost his career, as the chairmanship of the Truman Committee had advanced an obscure senator to the vice presidency in 1944.

Senate Standing Rule 22

This Rule was a bipartisan addition to the Senate's standing rules to allow sixteen senators to invoke cloture on any pending matter, cutting off further debate. It was

added in 1917 to pacify an angry President Wilson who had fallen victim to a filibuster by "a little group of willful men." This conflicted with other standing rules, requiring a motion and vote to make a measure pending. This loophole was frequently utilized by southerners to keep bills from ever getting to the point that cloture could be considered.

Themes

Civil Rights

Considerable coverage is given in *Master of the Senate* to the building crisis of civil rights abuse in the Deep South after World War II, including anecdotes about methods used to block registration and voting and means of reinforcing segregation and the degradation this created. The emergence of Martin Luther King, Jr. as an eloquent spokesman and organizer of peaceful protest; the showdown precipitated by the Supreme Court's condemnation of "separate but equal" accommodations; and the resurrection of the Ku Klux Klan and white backlash. It also portrays, primarily in the person and thought of Richard Russell, the southern philosophy of segregation as an institution benefiting both races.

Only isolated incidences of the massive race riots that would mark the years of LBJ's presidency are dealt with in this volume and are used to point to why southerners feared a change in their established ways. Most importantly, it shows how LBJ, whose treatment of non-whites was prejudiced but not deeply bigoted, was converted to the great cause by self-serving expediency, but turned his full energy and intelligence to creating the ground for making progress where it appeared no progress was possible. In 1957, LBJ manipulated idealistic liberals and determined obstructionists to break the logjam. The flowering of civil rights will be told in volume four of Caro's biography.

Failure

The idealistic Johnsons of West Texas were failures who lost their lands and influence, creating in young LBJ a compulsive fear of failure and humiliation that *Master of the Senate* shows informed his actions in the Senate. The military failure of the South in the Civil War and of the societal failure of the North in imposing its views brutally on the South in Reconstruction underlie much of the volume. The failure of the Senate to rise to its potential as an institution of informed deliberation is a major theme, which combines with the failure of Democrats to stand up consistently for the downtrodden, to create the circumstances in which LBJ was able to position himself to wield true power.

Morality

LBJ's hard-working early life in West Texas taught him empathy for the poor and downtrodden and left him free of the racial bigotry that marked the Deep South. When conscience conflicted with ambition, LBJ suppressed it and operated with savage amorality; when convinced that his career would be advanced by doing right, LBJ was able to convince himself utterly to rally support for that higher goal. *Master of the Senate* shows plenty of LBJ's dark side: his doing very little to help blacks in Texas while appearing to be their champion, destroying a bureaucrat and a Senate colleague, blocking civil rights legislation in 1956, demeaning staff and his own wife and cheating

on Lady Bird quite openly. It also shows his "conversion" to the rightness of ensuring southern blacks the right to vote in 1957 and the energy and insight he brought to bear on passing the first civil rights legislation since 1875. Overall, LBJ emerges from the pages as an amoral pragmatist, surrounded on right and left by people whose dedication to conscience rendered them less effective.

Power

LBJ wanted to be President of the United States. He knew it, his backers knew it, his opponents knew it and the press knew it. The major obstacle to his ambition was his birth in Texas, which was the part of the former Confederacy. Everyone knew in the mid-twentieth century that no southerner could be elected president, but southerners wanted badly to prove everyone wrong. Southerners as individuals and as a bloc held inordinate power in the Senate, because of its strict adherence to the system of seniority for assigning committee appointments and- chairmanships. Since the committees controlled the Senate, for a southerner, a seat in this body was the surest path to the exercise of true power. This was normally a slow process, playing "work ups."

LBJ was too impatient for that. He needed to consolidate power over the Senate, something that the framers of the Constitution had insulated it against and a century and a half of precedent proved impossible. LBJ, however, transformed the unwanted, "do-nothing" job of Democratic Whip into a locus of information and help, thereby transforming it into a source of power. Elevated to Minority Leader, he further concentrated power in a context where there was no pressure to produce. When the Democrats regained control of the Senate, LBJ as Majority Leader was in a position to control all of the elements in the legislative process in such a way as to dictate. He had and he used this power effectively to create a national name for himself.

Support from powerful Texas oil magnates allowed LBJ to influence colleagues financially, but it also kept him as an ideological tether. These men were not loath to use their power. Southerner colleagues, however, wielded their power too frequently to preserve segregation and were not timid about wielding the surest method of preventing change: the filibuster. The power of the filibuster to cripple the government, however, infuriated opponents and the American people at large. For LBJ to attain national power meant leashing in the South without losing its support. To gain the power of the presidency, LBJ had to prove he would (and could) use his unprecedented senatorial power to deliver on the key issue of the mid-1950s: effective civil rights legislation. *Master of the Senate* is above all a study.

Style

Point of View

Master of the Senate is written in the third person, weaving together a massive amount of historical research and extensive interviews with people who knew, admired and feared the gigantic figure of LBJ. There are remarkably few extended quotations, but the text is peppered with snippets of conversations and recollections.

Setting

Master of the Senate is set primarily in the corridors of power in the north wing of the U.S. Capitol Building and the Old Senate Building in Washington, DC, between 1949 and 1960. The Senate Chamber consists of a raised Dais, where the presiding officer sits; a recessed well, where senators can stand facing their colleagues; and a series of four tiered rows of seats, where the senators normally sit at plain mahogany desks. Viewed from the public galleries above, the Chamber in the 1950s was a drab, unimpressive hall. Viewed from the well, it glows with details reminiscent of the Roman Senate.

Desks were assigned at the beginning of each session by seniority, so LBJ started off in the obscurity, but with the attainment of Democratic Leader status, moved to front-row center, across the center aisle from the Republican Leader. Each party had separate side entrances to the Chamber. Access to the cloakrooms, which offered plush seating and conversation space was closely guarded. The cloakroom was the scene for much of the all-important maneuvering that set the stage for formal debate and voting inside the Chamber. The House of Representative is reached by walking south through the rotunda into the south wing. This was the setting of volume two in Caro's multi-volume biography, but it stills play a part in this volume, because LBJ retained his private key to Speaker Sam Rayburn's private hideaway, in which he held "Board of Education" gatherings every day after adjournment. LBJ was the only senator who frequented these meetings, in order to keep his finger in House affairs and make himself invaluable to Senate colleagues.

The second focus of interest in the book is, by contrast to the drab Senate Chamber, a grand five-storied, colonnaded granite and marble structure, the Senate Office Building (SOB), located a few miles from the Capitol on Constitution Avenue, the city's busy major thoroughfare. It was opened in 1933 to provide offices and conference rooms for senators. As a freshman senator in 1949, LBJ was assigned a small suite of three offices, designated 231, which were small and distant from the subway connecting the SOB from the Capitol and near a busy snack bar. As Majority Leader, LBJ took control of space allocation and appropriated for himself a grander suite, designated G-14 and in his final years in the Senate, took over the remaining rooms in the western end of the Gallery Floor of the Senate wing, so majestically appointed that the press dubbed it the

Taj Mahal. In the offices we see LBJ berating his staff, working the telephones and holding meetings to bend colleagues to his will.

Language and Meaning

Master of the Senate unfolds chronologically in clear, straightforward and lively language. Because this is the third volume in a four-volume biography, Robert Caro faced the challenge of summarizing enough of the material he handled in detail in earlier volumes to allow the reader to enjoy and profit from this book alone. Instances where he leaves the reader confused are rare and cases of his inserting materials superfluous to LBJ's Senate years are rarer still. Caro often breaks his train of narrative to insert parenthetical scenes illustrative of the main point he is discussing, usually without confusing the reader. Chapters often begin with (and sometimes are entirely devoted to) an extended concentration on a specific individual (Richard Russell, General MacArthur, Leland Olds, Hubert Humphrey) or a place (West Texas, the LBJ Ranch, LBJ's D.C. home) or an event (Birmingham Bus Strike) before relating it to LBJ's career. Combined, these create the overall portrait of the man and the institution he loved. Inevitably, this requires repetition of material, which only sometimes becomes burdensome.

Structure

The Introduction sketches the who, what and why of LBJ's 1957 reversal on civil rights legislation. Part I, "The Dam," consisting of three chapters, sketches how the Senate was armored by the framers of the U.S. Constitution in the late eighteenth century "armor-plated" the Senate to serve as a "time out" against emotional majority rule. It also deals with how this allowed its evolution into a much ridiculed, do-nothing, obstructionist body by the mid-twentieth century.

Part II, "Learning," consists of eleven chapters devoted to showing how LBJ found his place in the Senate. It describes how the Senate operated in 1949, develops the character of Richard Russell, LBJ's mentor and benefactor and LBJ's relations with his Texas constituency, his colleagues and his wife. It shows him gathering power unexpectedly early in his Senate career and emergence as a leader. Part III, "Looking for It," consists of seven chapters devoted to LBJ's years as Democratic Party Whip, caught between the southerners and liberals, both of whom he will need to wield power in the Senate and (he hopes, some day) in the White House.

Several chapters are devoted to his recovery from a heart attack. Part V, "The Great Cause," deals in twelve chapters with LBJ's career as Majority Leader and the predicament the burgeoning civil rights movement created for him. It shows LBJ ineffective and defeated in his 1956 run for the presidency and that year's first attempt at passing a civil rights bill, then moves into the skilled maneuvering that won the legislative victory in 1957, which the Introduction promised would be the highlight of this volume. Part VI, "After the Battle," is a two-chapter postscript, setting the stage for the

final volume in Caro's massive study of LBJ. Seven pages of the chapter, "Debts," are personal essay. It thanks those who helped him research this volume, including his wife Ina at the head. Instead of formal foot or endnotes, there are 72 pages of notes, acknowledging resources used, identified by boldfaced headings. Bibliography and very serviceable index complete the tome.

Quotes

"Quips about Congress became a cottage industry among comedians: 'I never lack material for my humor column when Congress is in session,' Will Rogers said. The House and the Senate-the Senate of Webster, Clay and Calhoun, the Senate that had once been the 'Senate Supreme,' the preeminent entity of American government-had sunk in public estimation to a point at which it was little more than a joke." Part 1 Chapter 2, pg. 77.

"The Senate Office Building was, in January, 1949, a place of courtesy, of courtliness, of dignity, of restraint, of refinement and of uncompromising austerity and rigidity. Its corridors were corridors of power-of the Senate brand of power, cold and hard." Part 1 Chapter 3, pg. 89.

"'FDR-LBJ, FDR-LBJ-do you get it? What I want is for them to start thinking of me in terms of initials.' It was only presidents whom headline writers and the American public referred to by their initials; 'he was just so determined that someday he would be known as LBJ.'" Part 2 Chapter 4, pg. 111.

"A friend of Jenkins who would visit him in Washington and board with him for a few nights recalls him returning to his home so tired that he fell asleep in the bathtub. "Johnson was working him like a nigger slave," he says. And always Johnson was reminding the staff that the indispensable quality he required in them was 'loyalty'-and he defined what he meant by that: 'I want *real* loyalty. I want someone who will kiss my ass in Macy's window and stand up and say, Boy, wasn't that sweet!'" Chapter 2, pg. 129.

"Lyndon Johnson stood just inside the doorway, silently staring out over the Chamber, for what Jenkins would remember as 'quite a long time.' And was 'speaking to himself.' And if Jenkins would not recall Lyndon Johnson's exact words, he did recall the gist of what he said-that the Senate was 'the right.'" Part 2 Chapter 6, pg. 136.

"He ingratiated himself in a way by being fun to be with. He was a great mimic, a great storyteller and he always had a story ready. But it was always a light-hearted approach. He wouldn't approach them in a serious way. He stopped saying 'Senator, I need to talk to you about.'

"And at the first Democratic caucus, there was no grabbing of lapels, no leaning into the faces of his colleagues, not a trace of the former pomposity or aggressiveness. What there was was the friendliness and politeness of 'the junior to the senior,' and when he introduced himself, he did so with a deprecatory nickname that referred to his narrow, last-gasp victory in the recent election. Coupled with a grin, it was very charming. 'Howdy,' he said to old senators and new, southern senators and northern. 'Howdy, I'm Landslide Lyndon.'" Chapter 2, pg. 150.

"From his desk at the far end of the lowest arc, Lyndon Johnson watched the figures moving among the desks, coming up and down the center aisle, chatting together in the well. He watched which senators went over to other senators to chat with them-and which senators sat at their desks and let other senators come to *them*. He watched groups of senators talk and watched if they talked as equals. He watched groups of senators talk and watched which one the others listened to. And he watched with eyes that missed nothing." Part 2 Chapter 6, pg. 153.

"There was little fundamental difference between the racial views of Richard Russell-those views expressed with a courtliness and patrician charm that made men refer to him as 'knightly'-and the rantings of a Bilbo or Cotton Ed Smith, however much this Russell of the Russells of Georgia might feel that demagoguery was beneath him. The difference lay in their effectiveness. The knightliness accomplished what Richard Russell wanted it to accomplish: made it more difficult for the foes of his beloved Southland to prevail." Part 2 Chapter 7, pg. 198.

"When, at Thirtieth Place, he wanted something from her and she wasn't in the room, he would shout for her-'Birrrrrdd!' -in a voice one guest likened to a hog call. He told stories about her to amuse his friends, some the kind that many husbands tell about their wives, except that Johnson told them with a cutting scorn in his voice." Part 2 Chapter 9, pg. 227.

"'Congress has had an opportunity to know me, my conception of the FPC's work and what I was seeking to accomplish'; and, for ten years, again and again, Congress had approved what he was doing. If the statement had been read without interruption, it would have been an effective rebuttal of Lyle's charges.

"So he would not be allowed to read without interruption.

"Olds had hardly begun when Senator Capehart began firing questions at him. When Lyle's testimony had been interrupted-by Tobey-Johnson had quickly intervened, asking the senators to defer their questions until he had finished and Lyle had thereupon been allowed to read his prepared statement. Without interruption.

"When Olds's statement was interrupted, the Chairman did not intervene." Part 2 Chapter 11, pg. 261.

"The *New Republic* rectified the omission-with a vengeance. In an editorial entitled 'The enemies of Leland Olds,' the magazine said that 'Against Olds is a onetime liberal Senator, Lyndon Johnson, born into the family of a poor farmer, brought forward by the New Deal and carried into office by liberal and labor support. Johnson, who saw his first backer, Aubrey Williams, hounded out of government on charges of Communism, now is hounding Olds out on the same charges-Johnson, who boasted that 'Roosevelt was a Daddy to me.' How Roosevelt would have scorned such backsliding!' Increasingly, in newspaper articles and editorials, the subcommittee was identified as 'Johnson's subcommittee.'" Part 2 Chapter 11, pgs. 286-287.

"Leland Olds was standing in the corridor outside the hearing room, talking to his wife and Melwood Van Scoyoc, when Lyndon Johnson emerged and started to walk by. Then he stopped, came up behind Olds and put his hand on his shoulder.

"'Lee,' he said, 'I hope you understand there's nothing personal in this. We're still friends, aren't we? It's only politics, you know.'" Part 2 Chapter 12, pg. 303.

"No one was better than Johnson at making a reporter believe that the report to come would be *BIG!* Even when a promised Johnson 'bombshell' fell far short of expectations (as was the case with the procurement report), he was adept at explaining away the shortfall-and in a way that redounded still more to his credit. He had been privately promising James L. McConaughy major revelations about lagging defense deliveries; when the revelations proved less than major, he told McConaughy, as McConaughy reported in his weekly memo to his editors: 'Trouble is, the committee can't figure out a way to tell the public just how bad the situation is without revealing information damaging to security.'" Part 2 Chapter 13, pg. 326.

"The man who could not stand-'just could not *stand*'-to be merely 'one of a crowd'; had been one of the crowds so long. Now he would never be one of a crowd again. He was 'Johnson of the Watchdog Committee,' the 'Watchdog in Chief.' In a single great leap-with a single issue, preparedness; with a single instrument, a brand-new subcommittee-he had thrust himself up out of the mass of senators." Part 2 Chapter 14, pg. 349.

"'Roosevelt would pay people off in conversation or speeches,' Clark says. 'Johnson went right to the heart of it. The nitty-gritty. 'How much do you have to have to make this campaign go?' When senators returned to Washington after the 1952 elections, there was a new awareness on the north side of the Capitol. There was a vast source of campaign funds down in Texas and the conduit to it-the only conduit to it for most non-Texas senators, their only access to this money they might need badly one day-was Lyndon Johnson." Part 3 Chapter 17, pg. 413.

"'Johnson,' Steinberg recalls, 'was outraged when he learned he would be only one of four men featured in the article.' Wheeling his chair so close to Steinberg's that their knees touched and leaning forward so that their noses were only inches apart, he pressed the reporter back at an uncomfortable angle, seized one of his lapels to hold him steady and asked loudly, 'Why don't you do a whole big article on me alone?' When Steinberg asked ('from my strange sitting position'), 'What would the pitch be? -that you might be a Vice-Presidential candidate in 1952?' Johnson said, this time in a whisper and after a glance around to make sure that no one else was present, 'Vice President, hell! Who wants that?' His voice boomed out again. 'President! That's the angle you want to write about me.'" Part 3 Chapter 20, pg. 463.

"And then Johnson said, 'Since you had enough sense not to drive it to a vote down there and made it unanimous, I am perfectly willing to deal with you.' But, the new Leader said, 'I don't want you bringing in a lot of these other fellows. When you've got something that your people want, *you* come see me. I'll talk to you. I don't want to talk to these other fellows. Now you go back and tell your liberal friends that you're the one to

talk to me and that if they'll talk through you as their leader we can get some things done.'" Part 3 Chapter 20, pg. 485.

"Difficult though this would be, however, what would be even harder than getting the power would be what he would have to do with it once he got it. Power in the Senate might be in southern hands, but it was northern hands that held the prize at which he was really aiming. He could reach it only with northern support and to get that support, he would have to make the Democratic Party in the Senate more responsive to northern wishes, would have to advance liberal causes. He would have to use the power that he took from the South on behalf of causes that the South hated." Part 3 Chapter 21, pg. 489.

"Johnson had hit, in fact, every target at which he had aimed in the battle. Wanting to show the public a hero President, unparalleled in his knowledge of foreign affairs, being opposed in foreign affairs by his own party and being rescued from that party by the Democrats, he had succeeded in doing exactly that. Wanting to demonstrate that despite GOP control of both White House and Senate, the Democrats had taken the initiative on the issue, he had, by arranging for the final vote to be not on a Republican but on a Democratic bill, done exactly that. He had wanted the Bricker Amendment defeated and it had been defeated. He wanted the George Amendment substituted, at first and it had been substituted. He had wanted the George Amendment blocked at last and at last it had been blocked.

"Moreover, it had been blocked by a single vote." Part 4 Chapter 22, pg. 540.

"In the nearly century and a half since the committee system had been solidified in 1816, no Leader had been able to curb the chairmen's power.

"Now, in 1955, that was no longer true. Two years earlier, Lyndon Johnson had gently slipped a bit between the teeth of the Democratic senators who had once been committee chairmen and who would be chairmen again, so gently that the chairmen had hardly noticed it was there and the reins attached to it had been kept loose. But it was there. And now the reins were being tightened." Part 4 Chapter 23, pg. 560.

"Johnson's agreements limited debate so drastically that with their increased use the very nature of the Senate was altered. From the moment a motion for one of his agreements was made on the Senate floor, the body's normally loose functioning was transformed into something very strict indeed." Part 4 Chapter 24, pg. 575.

"'Oh, he was just jumping, screaming, hollering and pounding the desk. Johnson said, 'Well, Spessard, I had a little vote. If you fellows aren't on the job around here, I've got legislation to pass.' He just slipped it right on through there. Zip! Oh boy, they were furious with him.'

"While both sides were furious, however, the fury of the liberal side was tempered by the realization that not only had an increase in the minimum wage finally been achieved, the increase to a dollar was higher than the ninety-cent increase that the Administration had proposed. As Reedy was to say, 'Obviously we were proceeding on the 'half a loaf'

theory. But it seems to me that the scoffers must be men and women who have never been hungry.'" Part 4 Chapter 26, pg. 611.

"He was kept sedated for forty-eight hours, but there were intervals of consciousness, during one of which it became apparent that sedation had not dulled his ability to obtain information that someone did not want to give him. Lady Bird may have been determined not to let him know the doctors' estimate of his chances of survival during this initial period following the attack, but he got the information from her anyway. She had been sitting almost constantly at his bedside, but she left the room for a few minutes and when she returned, he spoke as if doctors had visited him during her absence.

"'I've just heard the bad news,' he said.

"'What news? What do you mean?' she said.

"'I know the doctors feel I only have one chance in ten of pulling through.'

"'Nonsense!' she blurted out. 'They say it's fifty-fifty.'" Part 4 Chapter 28 pg. 625.

"Lyndon Johnson could not allow such an investigation. The 'big boys' in question were *his* big boys-Herman and George and Sid and Clint and the other oilmen with whose lobbying efforts he had been so closely connected. They were Ed Clark and John Connally, who had worked right out of his office. Any 'thorough and complete' investigation could hardly help turning up his name. It had to be stopped.

"And he stopped it-on the next day, Tuesday, February 8, 1956, a day of fast-paced and often brutal, maneuvering in the Capitol and the Senate Office Building." Part 4 Chapter 29, pg. 668.

"Johnson, who had been reading a newspaper in the back seat, 'suddenly ... lowered the newspaper and leaned forward,' and said 'Chief, does it bother you when people don't call you by name?'

"Parker was to recall that 'I answered cautiously but honestly,' 'Well, sir, I do wonder. My name is Robert Parker.' And that was evidently not an answer acceptable to Johnson. 'Johnson slammed the paper onto the seat as if he was slapping my face. He leaned close to my ear. 'Let me tell you one thing, nigger,' he shouted. 'As long as you are black and you're gonna be black till the day you die, no one's gonna call you by your goddamn name. So no matter what you are called, nigger, you just let it roll off your back like water and you'll make it. Just pretend you're a goddamn piece of furniture.'" Part 5 Chapter 31, pg. 717.

"'There ain't gonna be no integration,' he told Huie. 'There ain't gonna be no nigger votin'. *And the sooner everybody in this country realizes it, the better.* If any more pressure is put on us, the Tallahatchie River won't hold all the niggers that'll be thrown into it.' Publication of the case would be valuable, therefore, to 'put the North and the

NAACP and the niggers *on notice*'; it might even force the repeat of school integration, 'just like Prohibition.'" Part 5 Chapter 33, pgs. 762-763.

"None of the liberal senators or their staff members appear to have realized the significance of the word Johnson used, but they were to learn it the next morning, when Douglas made his motion. Walter George, back on the dais, told him it was out of order because petitions could be filed only during the morning hour. Douglas said this *was* the morning hour. George recognized the Majority Leader. While the southerners and many Republicans, in the words of one reporter, 'sat there grinning like so many happy owls,' Johnson said that of course it wasn't: the 'morning hour,' Johnson reminded Douglas, was the first hour of each new legislative day. A legislative day begins after each adjournment, not after a recess, so there would be no morning hour until the Senate adjourned, except, of course by unanimous consent. Douglas asked for such consent. Russell said, 'I object.'" Part 5 Chapter 34, pg. 797.

"Lyndon Johnson's failure to acknowledge these realities ran counter to the previous pattern of his political life. A political convention is at bottom an exercise in counting and if he had been counting delegates as he counted senators-coldly, unemotionally, looking unflinchingly at reality, no matter how unpleasant that reality might be-he would have seen that he had no chance for the nomination. But in Chicago, he was hearing what he wanted to hear, believing what he wanted to believe." Part 5 Chapter 35, pg. 815.

"Before the convention, Lyndon Johnson had been almost universally portrayed as an enormously powerful and influential figure in the Democratic Party. By the end of the convention, it had become obvious that that portrait was overdrawn. His image as a brilliant political strategist had also been smudged. 'Lyndon Johnson's reputation as an uncommonly astute Senate leader remains unimpaired, but the fact has been established-as it was not before-that in the jungle of national convention he cannot employ the gifts he uses in the Senate.'" Part 5 Chapter 35, pg. 827.

"'We've got a motion here that Clint Anderson is going to offer and it relates to a matter that is not important to your state.' Johnson said. 'The people of your state don't care how you vote on this one way or the other, but the leadership cares. It means a lot to me. So I just point this out to you. Your first vote is coming up and I hope you'll keep it in mind, because I like you and I see big things in your future and I want for you to get off on the right foot in the Senate.'" Part 5 Chapter 36, pg. 859.

"It took a long time, Rauh says, for him to realize that 'Felix and Phil and Johnson had had a very thorough talk,' and that the afternoon in the country was 'a cute way for Lyndon to exercise his will.' At the conclusion of the vote, Lyndon Johnson and William Knowland, each seated at their front-row desks, leaned across the center aisle and shook hands. Both had broad smiles on their faces, Johnson because he had won, Knowland because he didn't realize he had lost." Part 5 Chapter 39, pg. 940.

"Paul Douglas used a memorable phrase: the bill, he said, reminded him of Lincoln's old saying that 'it was like a soup made from the shadow of a crow which had starved to death.' Within a day, it seemed, that saying was being repeated over dinner tables in

Georgetown and Cleveland Park. And as time passed and the ineffectiveness of the Act became increasingly evident, liberal criticism was to grow louder. That evening, Joe Rauh and Paul Sifton, chief lobbyist for Reuther's WAW, bumped into Nixon and Rogers right outside the Chamber. 'They stopped us and we compared notes on how the votes were going to go and it was clear it was going to go very badly,' Rauh was to recall. 'It was clear that Johnson had the votes.' Nixon could barely contain his anger. Encountering Johnson in the Senate Reception Room, he said, smiling tightly, 'You've really got your bullwhip on your boys tonight, Lyndon.' As he started to walk by, Johnson replied angrily, 'Yes, Dick and from the way you've been trying to drive your fellows, you must have a thirty-thirty strapped to your hip, but it's not doing you any good.' 'Just wait,' Nixon said grimly (and incorrectly). 'You'll find out.'" Part 5 Chapter 40, pg. 983.

Topics for Discussion

Did LBJ's use of the "N" word make him a racist in the 1950s? If he were alive, would he use it?

What quality or trait that most helped LBJ fit in when he reached the Senate?

What quality or trait most threatened his fitting in?

How is LBJ's smoking symbolic of his phases of his Senate career?

What was the Taj Mahal? What does it say about LBJ?

What held Richard Russell back from being president and what was it about LBJ that made him think he could do better?

How did LBJ relate to Hubert Humphrey in the Senate?

How did LBJ relate to Richard Nixon in the Senate?

Why did Lady Bird put up with LBJ? Would you have, in her place?

What was Sam Johnson's legacy to his famous son?

If you were Leland Olds, would you have tried to get even with LBJ? If so, how? If not-why not?

Should LBJ have sought the vice presidential nomination in 1956?

Was LBJ's consolidation of power as Majority Leader a good thing or a bad thing for the Senate and for the country?