The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution Study Guide

The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution by Francis Fukuyama

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Plot Summary

The Origins of Political Order is the first of two planned volumes by Francis Fukuyama examining how civilizations develop political institutions and what factors drive the direction of political development. He covers a period stretching from pre-history up to the late 18th century just prior to the French Revolution.

Fukuyama differs from some of the prevailing writers on political organization in that he does not assume that humans intentionally constructed their first social order. He finds biological evidence by comparison with modern chimpanzees that humans are naturally social animals who have always banded together even before organizing politically.

Fukuyama identifies three key elements of modern democracy as the presence of a strong state, a concept of the rule of law, and an accountable government. He traces the development of these three elements separately in a comparative look at the civilizations of ancient China, India, the Middle East and Europe. China was the first civilization to move from tribal organization into statehood, but while it had a strong central authority, Fukuyama argues, it never developed a rule of law or accountable government. India, by comparison, had a strong tradition of a rule of law handed down by the Hindu Brahmin priests, however it retained much of its kinship-based social organization and never developed a strong central authority. In the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire had religious rule of law and a strong central authority, but this authority was so intertwined with the religious authority that its political development was constrained.

It was in England that the three key elements first came together to form a modern democracy, Fukuyama argues. England had both the strong social organization and strong central authority that was independent from religious authority. When the English Parliament deposed James II and instated William III on the throne, it took the first major step toward being ruled by a sovereign assembly directly accountable to the people.

Fukuyama argues that the hierarchical bureaucracy of the Catholic Church was a model for state builders. It also played a key role in developing the concept of a rule of law, which was adopted in the political realm. When the Church became independent from the Holy Roman Empire under Pope Gregory, it freed the states of Europe to develop complex political organizations.

Fukuyama finds evidence of these modern state institutions existing even in the earliest states, although at different levels in different places at different times. By following these threads individually through history, he hopes to develop a method for examining modern political development. He explains that since the Industrial Revolution the world economic situation has changed drastically and that this must be accounted for in examining modern political development. This will be the subject of the second volume of the work.

Preface and Part I, Chapters 1-2

Preface and Part I, Chapters 1-2 Summary and Analysis

In a preface to the book, the author spells out his reasons for writing on his chosen subject. He provides the example of the political organization of Papua, New Guinea, which is largely tribal in organization despite the country having formally adopted representative democracy. He claims that no preceding book has addressed why this happens in some places. The general assumption is that the modern political state evolved somehow from tribal groups, but the evidence of New Guinea would seem to suggest that an evolutionary model is not always appropriate. There is also evidence that political systems sometimes "decay." Fukuyama states that his intention is to examine these two phenomenon beginning with pre-history and through to the French Revolution. He plans to write about modern political organizations in a following volume.

The first part of the book is entitled "Before the State." Chapter 1 is called "The Necessity of Politics." Fukuyama outlines the remarkable increase in the number of democratic countries in the world over most of the 20th Century. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, many previously democratic nations reverted to authoritarian rule and the number of democracies actually began to decline.

Fukuyama argues that while it is generally accepted that some form of democracy is assumed to be the most desirable form of government, little has been said about how this modern concept of democracy has come to exist. He begins by identifying the three main institutions of modern democracy as "1. the state, 2. the rule of law, [and] 3. accountable government." (p. 16) A successful modern democracy will possess all three things in balance, he says, which is no simple feat since the three institutions sometimes conflict. The state arises to wield power, for example, while accountable government exists to check power.

Fukuyama intends to examine where these three institutions came from. He adds that looking at the rise of political institutions must be viewed in light of the complementary process of political decay. He also believes that previous literature treated the subject as a universal phenomenon and did not look adequately at why different political institutions took different forms from country to country. Geography and size seem to play a role, he hints, but do not fully explain why, for instance, Scandinavia has a strong respect for the rule of law while its neighbor Russia has a history of corruption. The two very populous nations of China and India have developed very different political traditions, he notes.

Chapter 2 is called "The State of Nature." Fukuyama summarizes the philosophies of some of the best known political theorists including Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Aristotle. Although they all have different viewpoints on why humans formed political orders, all except Aristotle assumed humans to be solitary

individuals who voluntarily gave up some of their personal freedoms in order to gain protection from a larger political group. Aristotle alone among them actually assumed that humans were naturally political.

Fukuyama shares the view of Aristotle, and uses a comparison with chimpanzees to support a theory that humans have evolved a natural tendency to form groups. Chimpanzees regularly form into bands up to a few dozen individuals and show some basic social organization and hierarchy. Fukuyama introduces studies that showed that chimps learn to trust or distrust one another based on previous experiences. They recognize and show preference to their own relatives. They appear to have a natural tendency to seek to cooperate with one another. They form alliances with one another to challenge or defend the hierarchy of individuals within the band.

Fukuyama sees in chimps the basic "building blocks" from which a theory of political development can be built. He notes that we share 99 percent of our DNA with chimps, but that 1 percent is very crucial. The biggest difference, he states, is that humans have language. With language comes the ability to form and express abstract thoughts and cooperate at a higher level. It also makes religion possible, something that Fukuyama addresses in a future chapter.

Like chimps, humans have a natural tendency to favor their relatives and friends and to cooperate with others. They also seek and desire recognition, just as chimps fight to obtain a higher place in the social order. Humans have religion and other abstract notions, and they place value on these notions. These four things, Fukuyama claims, provide the framework through which political order naturally evolves into more and more complex manifestations.

Part I, Chapters 3-5

Part I, Chapters 3-5 Summary and Analysis

Chapter 3 is called "The Tyranny of Cousins." Fukuyama addresses the earliest forms of human political organization. The first kind of organization, he theorizes, was based on kinship. The concept of kinship could be carried to as many generations as desired to create a bond between people. The farther back in time a common ancestor lived, the larger the group of descendants who might claim an alliance based on their common kinship. These kinds of groups were flexible, and kinship was determined in different ways in different places. Most common was the method of "agnation," Fukuyama explains, where kinship was based on the male line of descendents. Some groups had a matrilineal organization, however, where kinship was determined by the female line. Some kinship groups were flexible and would allow outsiders to join and assume an adopted relationship to the kinship group.

Many theorists have assumed that since almost all human civilizations were tribal at one point, that this represents a natural state in the development of political order. Fukuyama asks the question how kinship groups might organize into a larger tribe where the members might have only a weak and distant kinship. He proposes that it was religion that made tribal organization possible, especially the rudimentary religion of ancestor worship. Ancestor worship brought these distant common ancestors closer to the daily lives of their descendants and allowed a connection to form between an ever larger group of people. Ancestor worship allowed these large groups of "cousins" to expand the basic kinship groups into a larger tribal identity. The incentive to do so, Fukuyama suggests, was the development of agriculture.

Chapter 4 is called "Tribal Societies: Property, Justice, War." Fukuyama questions the prevailing thought that modern property rights evolved from the situation known as the "tragedy of the commons." This is the notion that commonly held property will be exploited by the public until it is no longer useful. Private property, this theory holds, arose as a way to provide incentive to a property owner to take care of his property and put it to its best use without depleting it.

Fukuyama does not concur with this theory. He again tracks the importance of kinship and religion in the earliest development of the idea of private property. The Greeks and Romans, for example, had a sacred fire that was kept burning in the hearth of their homes. Ancestor worship among other peoples was often connected with caring for a burial plot. Never was there a kind of "primitive communism," Fukuyama claims, where small groups of unrelated people cooperated to care for a communal piece of property. The modern communist attempts of the Soviet Union and China to "recreate" such a situation by forcing people onto communal farms was misguided, he claims.

Early concepts of justice were also based partly on kinship, Fukuyana writes. A responsibility to one's extended family required a response to any perceived wrongs. Early assemblies were arranged to settle disputes between individuals.

In addition to agriculture, Fukuyama claims, war was a second major motivation for the development of tribal communities. Conflict between tribes was natural, and eventually tribes developed a segment of good warriors who developed into a separate caste and eventually a military organization. This marked a shift from the mostly kinship-based organization of earlier groups, Fukuyama claims. People were being classified by their occupation or skill, and could be included or excluded from tribal groups without regard to their actual kinship status.

Chapter 5 is called "The Coming of the Leviathan." The title refers to the work by Thomas Hobbes on his theory of the role of the state. Fukuyama proposes five attributes that distinguish a state from a tribal organization. First, a state has a central authority. Second, that authority has a way to enforce itself. Third, the authority is based not on kinship, but on a defined territory. Fourth, the society of a state is stratified, often with a social hierarchy. Fifth, a state has an elaborate form of religion with a religious authority.

Fukuyama briefly summarizes some of the prevailing theories about why humans moved from tribal groups into forming states. He calls the first emergence of a state from a tribal society "pristine" state formation. Fukuyama rejects some of the theories on state formation and partly disagrees with others. He formulates his own set of probable contributors to the formation of states.

Violence is one contributor. A tribe that conquered another needed a way to keep control over the conquered people and so developed a system to do so. Not all examples of tribal conquest have led to the formation of states, however, so Fukuyama believes something more is needed to explain it. He notes that geographical location appears to be an important factor. Only when a group of people is relatively confined to a geographical location like a river valley is it possible for a hierarchical state to develop, he claims. The emergence of charismatic leaders can also contribute to state formation. The author gives the example of the Prophet Muhammad, whose instruction and teachings spread through tribal Arab groups providing a central Arab identity that made formation of a state possible.

With each situation, however, Fukuyama finds exceptions. Some places that were geographically confined did not form states, for example. There are too many factors interacting to claim one central theory, he writes, but these factors can be understood to play a role.

Part II, Chapters 6-7

Part II, Chapters 6-7 Summary and Analysis

Part II is called "State Building" and begins with Chapter 6, entitled "Chinese Tribalism." China has a long recorded history, Fukuyama explains, and since the beginning of that history tribalism has existed there. The number of these tribes was large, with some three thousand during the Xia Dynasty in about 2000 B.C. Through warfare and conquest, the number of political units, called "polities," decreased over time, falling sharply between the Shang and Western Zhao Dynasties between 1500 and 1200 B.C. By the beginning of the Qin Dynasty in 221 B.C., China had been unified into one state.

The large drop in the number of polities during the Zhao Dynasty was a result of the Zhao tribes' conquest of the Shang tribes. The political structure was still largely kin based, and one of the first acts of the Zhao leader upon conquering the Shang was to execute the Shang leader's heir and his own brothers in order to assume the sole role of emperor with only his own male heirs.

A king of feudalism arose in Zhao China, based on kinship. It differed from the feudalism that formed later in Europe, Fukuyama explains, in that the Chinese lords were granted power over territory based on their kinship group. The territory over which they had control was passed down through their kinship line. These groups also raised their own armies and imposed their own taxes. While they are sometimes called "states" in modern textbooks, Fukuyama writes, they were not truly states under his definition. Instead, Zhao China was a patrimonial society with portions of the country "owned" by kinships groups, with the property and people on it passed down through the male line.

Chapter 7 is called "War and the Rise of the Chinese State." The driving factor in the creation of a unified Chinese state under the Qin Dynasty was war, Fukuyama explains. He traces several of the institutional innovations that took place in the warring states of China to the presence of near constant warfare. Military organization improved and more of a reliance was placed on infantry and lightly armed soldiers. This also had the effect of encouraging promotion within the military based on merit, a concept that would be carried over to civilian institutions.

To support the military and warfare, some Chinese states began to register their populations in order to better raise armies and assess taxes. The system needed to assess and collect taxes led to the first appearance of a bureaucracy. A class of ministers developed among the nobility, but warfare and infighting began to deplete the numbers of nobility. As a result, ministerial positions were sometimes filled by non-nobles based on ability and merit. This system of bureaucracy would later develop into a central feature of the Chinese state.

Warfare also caused dislocation of many people and led to increased reflection on moral and political ideas, Fukuyama claims. It was in this environment that traveling

teachers such as Confucius operated, moving from place to place and spreading their social philosophy.

While these institutions were adopted at varying levels in different parts of China, it was among the Qin tribes under the leadership of Duke Xiao where the policies of Shang Yang, one of his advisers, were implemented. Shang dismantled the kinship system of property ownership and organized people into smaller family groups who were allowed to share or purchase their own property. These groups were then taxed directly by the state rather than through the aristocratic network that had handled the taxation under the previous system. Strict laws were put in place to enforce Shang's reforms, and his system came to be called "Legalism." Legalism stood in contrast to Confucianism, which called for primary responsibility to one's family over the state.

The success of the Qin in implementing these modern state institutions allowed them to conquer the whole of China and create a single state, Fukuyama argues. He notes that while the state adopted modern political institutions, it still did not have modern economic policies. He also addresses the question of why unification on such a large scale occurred in China but not in Europe, which shared a similar history of tribalism that developed into feudalism. He argues that the cultural and ethnic differences among the warring tribes of Europe were too great to allow for such unification.

Part II, Chapters 8-9

Part II, Chapters 8-9 Summary and Analysis

Chapter 8 is called "The Great Han System." The Qin system created the first unified Chinese state, but the dynasty collapsed with the death of the emperor in 210 B.C. At first, under advice of his Confucian ministers, the Qin emperor had recreated the feudal system that extended power to lords and increased the power of the Confucians. The Legalist minister Li Si realized that this weakened the efforts to build a unified state and convinced the emperor to turn against the Confucians, burn the texts on which their philosophy was based, and implement strict laws. These laws were so strict that a series of uprisings spread across the country and when the emperor died the system collapsed.

Under the subsequent rule, a two-track organization was adopted with part of the country under the kind of feudalism that had existed under the Zhao, with another part retaining the dictatorship structure of the Qin which held a tenuous control over the new "subkingdoms."

The emergence of the Han dynasty brought a combination of the Legalist system that eliminated the kinship-based feudal system and replaced it with a national administration. It also adopted the Confucian principles that an emperor was accountable to those he ruled, however, rather than the Legalist notion that rulers did not have to answer to their subjects. This was by no means democracy, Fukuyama is quick to explain. An emperor still has supreme power, but in the Confucian philosophy he is expected, through education, to understand that he rules in the interest of the people.

Under the Han government, many aspects of a modern bureaucracy were put in place. Appointees who had been selected by virtue of their kinship were gradually replaced with those appointed for their skill. A system was put in place to identify talented young men from all over the country and bring them into the civil service. The military was put under the ultimate control of civilian authorities. At the same time, an aristocratic class was preserved, which Fukuyama sees as crucial to the success of the Han government. Where the Qin pushed too far toward legalism in trying to create a unified state, the Han backed off and adopted some of the Confucian ideas that allowed for a political and cultural balance.

The Han system was not to last, however. Fukuyama covers its demise in Chapter 9, called "Political Decay and the Return of Patrimonial Government." The Han Dynasty lasted 400 years, but eventually the delicate balance that had made it successful shifted in the direction of the patrimonial aristocracy. One of the central ideas Fukuyama presents in his book is that there is an inverse relationship between the strength of a state and patrimonialism. In other words, the more a political unit is based on kinship and lineage, the weaker the central state authority. The reverse is also true, that a weak

kinship organization allows for a stronger central state authority. As the patrimonial aristocratic class grew richer under the Han Dynasty, they began to exert more power and influence, thereby weakening the state authority. By the sixth century, the Han Dynasty had dissolved into several smaller patrimonial kingdoms.

Remarkably, China would reunite again under the Song Dynasty, which Fukuyama describes in a later chapter. The author summarizes the Chinese state under the Han. While it was a modern state in structure, the authority was not constrained by rule of law and its leader was not formally limited. He remarks that the ability of the Chinese state to unify such a large area under a concentrated political power was unique. China's political path was very different than that of India, for example, which Fukuyama covers in the following chapter.

Part II, Chapters 10-13

Part II, Chapters 10-13 Summary and Analysis

Chapter 10 is called "The Indian Detour." The history of India's early political development was very different than China's, Fukuyama explains. Both societies began with tribal organizations that gradually became territorial chiefdoms and states, but India did not experience the long periods of warfare that eventually drove China to develop a more centralized state. India also had a religious element, the Brahmins, that constrained the development of a strong central authority.

This Brahmanic religion explained the world in terms of a transcendent existence where a person was reincarnated after death. By following the proper laws and rituals, a person could be reincarnated in a better situation than his current life. These laws and rituals were dictated by the class of Brahmins, who were of the highest social level. Thus, in India law was not based in the political realm but sprung from religion.

Chapter 11 is entitled "Varnas and Jatis." "Jatis" were traditional Indian groups based on a person's occupation. Members of a certain jati could only work and intermarry within that same group. Children could only adopt the occupation of their parents. "Varnas" were the four large groups of society with the Brahmins at the top and the "Sudras" at the bottom. One could only move upward among the Varnas by being reincarnated by virtue of having lived properly.

Fukuyama attacks some of the prevailing political theories, such as those of Karl Marx, that sought to find an economic source for political development. These theories looked for an economic cause to political development. They argued that the desire to improve one's economic standing and the need to protect property were the reasons humans initially agreed to submit to political authority. The Indian system would seem to contradict this notion, Fukuyama argues, since a member of a certain jati, for example the shoemaker jati, could only ever be a shoemaker, and the son of a shoemaker could only become a shoemaker. The Indian political system, which grew out of religion, did not allow for economic improvement within one lifetime. This is evidence, Fukuyama claims, that religion must be considered as an instrument of political development.

In India, the Brahmins also controlled access to education and literacy, which were maintained as a privilege of the higher classes. They thereby kept control over the political and military forces within India. This system has had repercussions up to the present day, Fukuyama explains. India has some of the best educated and successful people in the world, living in modern cities. But outside these cities are also some of the poorest and least educated people in the world.

Chapter 12 is called "Weaknesses of Indian Polities." Despite the fact that "Indian social development outran both political and economic development early on," (p. 175) India was united into a single political entity during the first millennium B.C. By this time, three

main kingdoms had developed, the Kashi, the Kosala and the Magadha. Fukuyama compares the Magadha kingdom to that of the Qin in China, since they played a similar role in becoming the group that unified the whole. Fukuyama describes the series of battles that led to the eventual establishment of the Mauryan empire in 321 B.C., named after Chandragupta Maurya, and centered in Maghada.

The Mauryan Empire was quite different than the Qin Dynasty. After conquering another kingdom, the Qin would eliminate the local ruling family and assert control. In India, local rulers simply pledged to serve the conquering king and were left in place to rule locally. The Mauryan Empire had no state-wide system of bureaucracy as the Qin did, and the notion of Legalism never took hold in India. The Mauryan Empire dissolved into its smaller components after the death of the emperor in 232 B.C.

A second Indian empire was created under the Gupta kings beginning in 320 A.D., also based in Maghada. Like the Mauryan Empire, it united various independent groups, but it fell eventually to foreign invaders in the sixth century.

Fukuyama characterizes the main difference between India and China in terms of the relative strengths of their culture and state. China's poitical organization was based on a strong centralized state, allowing it to mobilize large groups of people and accomplish large national projects like the Great Wall and irrigation projects. India's political organization was based on strong social traditions, particularly religion, allowing for a strong culture but preventing the development of a strong national unity. He suggests that a "better form of freedom" might result from a system that has both a strong society and a strong state in balance.

Chapter 13 is called "Slavery and the Muslim Exit from Tribalism." In this chapter, Fukuyama examines the practice of the Ottoman Empire of taking Christian European boys away from their families and putting them into a form of military slavery. The boys were raised as Muslims, educated, and put into service as administrators, soldiers and elite fighting men. The practice was unique to the Islamic Ottoman Empire, leading some to theorize that it had roots in that religion. Fukuyama disagrees. The practice arose as a way for central authorities to administer a state made up of tribal groups.

Arabic tribes had been united under the common religion of Islam but the Arab state was still largely tribal in nature. Disagreements between tribes led to infighting and made the development of a central authority difficult. Early rulers under the Abbasid empire learned that by importing foreigners and putting them into service of the state, they could create a controllable group of administrators that had no tribal alliances. Fukuyama sees a parallel in the writing of Plato in "The Republic" in which Plato proposes that a group of guardians be raised from children taken from their parents at an early age and taught loyalty only to the state.

Part II, Chapters 14-16

Part II, Chapters 14-16 Summary and Analysis

Chapter 14 is called "The Mamluks Save Islam." The Mamluks were the non-Islamic military slaves brought into service by the Arabic Ayyubid sultan and used to enforce rule for some 300 years. Fukuyama argues that without the service of the Mamluks, the religion of Islam might have been obliterated by outside conquerors. Over the course of the 300 years between 1250 and 1517, the Mamluks increased their power in the larger Islamic empire, eventually taking power for themselves. This disturbed the nature of their relation to the state, Fukuyama argues. Where before they had considerable influence over state matters, they were not themselves eligible to formally rule or to pass their status or property on to their children. This changed when they took power, but without any superior power to check their ambition they fell to infighting and lost effectiveness as a ruling group. As a result, they were not prepared to defend the invasion of the Ottomans in 1517, when the Mamluks were defeated.

Chapter 15 is called "The Functioning and Decline of the Ottoman State." Fukiyama examines the political and closely intertwined religious structure of the Ottomans in this chapter. The empire came to power when a group of tribes led by the Ottomans defeated the declining Mamluks in 1517. Their status as "outsiders" meant they brought no long standing political traditions, Fukuyama explains, and were able to create a system on their own. The Ottoman state adopted many of the aspects of a modern state and were able to rule a widespread regime from a centralized authority. They did this using the practice of military slavery and by creating an administration that prevented the formation of local ruling nobilities. It approached China in its ability to exert power from a central location, Fukuyama argues, but differed in the important area of religion. The Ottoman Empire had a religious establishment that created the laws, based on Islamic law, and also served as a judiciary. It had no established line of succession for the sultan leader, and infighting among factions struggling to take the leadership upon the death of a sultan weakened the state. Failure to develop a sustainable economy also led to the eventual undoing of the empire.

Chapter 16 is called "Christianity Undermines the Family." In the three civilizations that Fukuyama has described to this point, the Chinese, the Indian and the Middle Eastern, kinship and patrimonialism were never completely eliminated despite the efforts of those who assumed political power. The strong unified states that emerged in China and India reverted to patrimonialism, and in the Middle East the Ottomans were never able to fully subdue the tribal organizations of the outer reaches of the empire.

Europe was an exception, he argues. While kinship was important to the aristocratic classes who had significant property to pass on, it was not a strong force among the common people. Europe was much more individualistic in its social structure, and this individualistic society developed before its political development. Fukuyama traces this

rise of individualism and decline of kinship bonds to the efforts of the early Catholic Church.

The western Catholic Church was successful in converting many of the European tribes to Christianity, which came with four crucial prohibitions that Fukuyama argues were specifically intended to undermine the development of hierarchical kinship groups. The Church prohibited marriage between close relatives, prohibited marriage to widows of close relatives, did not allow the adoption of children and prohibited divorce. All of these practices were common among tribal groups in many parts of the world, Fukuyama explains, and led to the development of large kinship groups. By promoting marriage as a monogamous union, the Catholic Church intentionally weakened kinship bonds. By the time Europe began to move from feudalism into the formation of states, it had already developed into an individualistic society with weak kinship traditions. Meanwhile, the Catholic Church had developed into a religious bureaucracy with immense social influence. The Church was to play a crucial role in the development of a concept of the rule of law, which Fukuyama intends to address in Part III.

Part III, Chapters 17-18

Part III, Chapters 17-18 Summary and Analysis

Part II is called "The Rule of Law," and it opens with Chapter 17, entitled "The Origins of the Rule of Law." Fukuyama begins his discussion by defining how he uses the term "rule of law." He distinguishes between "law" and "legislation." "Law" as he defines it is a pre-existing body of "abstract rules of justice" from which "legislation" can spring so long is it is consistent with the rule of law. A rule of law is the concept that there is a law to which all people are accountable, even legislators and rulers.

Fukuyama begins with an examination of the development of the Common Law in Britain, which was an exception among European states he argues. The British Common Law was a set of previous judicial decisions on which future decisions were to be based. Fukiyama disagrees with the theory that Common Law came about simply as an evolution from traditional customs, or customary law. It only came into force because of the development of the strong central state in Britain following the Norman Conquest in the 11th century when courts were established across the country by the king, enforcing the common law adopted by the monarchy.

Christianity was an important part of the development of a rule of law, Fukuyama argues, because it introduced the concept that there was a higher religious law to which even kings were subject. In continental Europe, he writes, the Catholic Church played an even more central role in the establishment of the rule of law.

Fukuyama examines this role in Chapter 18, called "The Church Becomes a State." Fukyama describes the changing relationship the Christian church had with political authorities in Europe. When it became the official religion of the Roman Empire, religious rulers were completely subordinate to the Roman rulers. Secular authorities had the power to appoint bishops and other church officials. In 1073, Pope Gregory VII asserted that he had authority over all Christians, even secular leaders. Gregory undertook a series of reforms within the Church itself that ended the practice of selling offices and discouraged the marriage of priests, which had been allowed up to that point. The reason for these reforms was to remove the kinship ties that had allowed Church officials to pass along property and offices to family members.

Gregory clashed with the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV over his assertion of power, but Henry eventually conceded the Church's authority and allowed the Church to choose its own bishops. Through the efforts of the Church, a former set of Roman laws called the Justinian Code were rediscovered and adapted. The historic body of Church edicts and rulings were also codified into a formal set of "canon" law.

Part III, Chapters 19-21

Part III, Chapters 19-21 Summary and Analysis

Chapter 19 is called "The State Becomes a Church." Fukuyama examines the concept of the rule of law in world civilizations outside Europe. China had no strong religious authority and so, Fukuyama argues, had no strong concept of a rule of law. India had a strong tradition of religious rule of law, but the Brahmins who set it down and interpreted it were not well organized. In the Middle East, the rule of law was also based in religion. Secular law also developed to handle matters that fell outside the traditional religious law.

In Europe, the Church became independent from the political authority which allowed the state to develop its own similar and separate hierarchical structure. India had a hierarchical structure, but without a strong central authority. The Middle East had a strong religious authority, but it was so dependent on the political authority to uphold it that it never developed into an independent entity, thus never freeing the secular authority to develop on its own.

The Church's independence in Europe freed the secular authority to develop a stronger rule of law than in other parts of the world. The fact that European law was written, and emergence of a class of legal specialists also contributed to the strong rule of law in Europe.

In Chapter 20, called "Oriental Despotism," Fukuyama returns to the special case of China, which has never had a strong rule of law to the present day. Despite this, China has repeatedly returned to a strong central state. He describes China under the "evil" Empress Wu as an example of how Chinese leaders established legitimacy. The Chinese had a concept called the Mandate of Heaven, which was the belief that an emperor ruled by virtue of having been chosen as part of the natural order. The Mandate of Heaven was not achieved by election or by any special religious recognition. Instead, it was usually recognized by consensus whenever the leadership changed hands, which often happened by way of war.

Once the emperor received the Mandate of Heaven, his power was "virtually unlimited" Fukuyama writes, yet China never became tyrannical. (p. 302) He examines why this is in Chapter 21, called "Stationary Bandits." He attacks the economic theory that early political leaders were simply stationary bandits out to maximize what they could take from a large group of people. Fukuyama uses the example of the Ming Dynasty to demonstrate that this was not always true. He points out that the Chinese emperors were limited by the sheer practical problem of ruling such a large area. Collecting taxes was difficult and much of the emperor's power had to be delegated. These factors kept Chinese rulers in check for the most part.

Part IV, Chapter 22-23

Part IV, Chapter 22-23 Summary and Analysis

Part IV is called "Accountable Government." It opens with Chapter 22, "The Rise of Political Accountability." Fukuyama defines accountability as when rulers feel they are responsible to the ruled and place the interest of the people over their own. Fukuyama provides some examples of this definition and proposes to examine four differing results from European states relating to accountability. The first is "weak absolutism" as appeared in France and Spain, the second "Successful absolutism" as appeared in Russia, the third is "failed oligarchy" as occurred in Hungary and Poland, and the fourth "accountable government" as arose in England and Denmark.

Chapter 23 is called "Rente Seekers" and looks at the example of France. In the final years of the French monarchy in the 18th century, the monarchy was deeply in debt. The king held a central power, but only weakly. The groups that opposed the king were not sufficiently organized, however, to mount any serious challenge to his authority. This resulted in a situation where the monarch was absolute, but his real power was weak. The rent seekers referred to in the chapter title were the French aristocrats who sought above all else to obtain from the king an office where they would receive a flow of revenue in the form of rent payed them for their own use. This system was protected under the French rule of law, and it prevented the growth of an accountable state. The system was eliminated after the French Revolution, a necessary step for accountable state building to occur, Fukuyama argues.

Part IV, Chapter 24-25

Part IV, Chapter 24-25 Summary and Analysis

Chapter 24 is called "Patrimonialism Crosses the Atlantic." Fukuyama next turns to the unique political history of Latin America. Latin America is unique in the modern world in that individual incomes are relatively high, but economic growth is slow. Also, Latin American countries are predominantly democratic, but have little regard for the rule of law. Corruption and tax evasion are common. Fukuyama traces these political factors back to Spain, which set out to replicate its own largely feudal system when it conquered and settled the peoples of Latin America. The large grants of land awarded under this system were passed down through generations and contribute even today to the large gap between the poor and wealthy people of Latin America.

Chapter 25 is called "East of the Elbe" and looks at Hungary and Russia as two more examples of states that failed to develop accountability. In the case of Hungary in the 15th century, a group of nobles succeeded in forcing the king to be accountable to them, but he was not accountable to the population at large. Hungary had a king who was constitutionally constrained, but ultimately the central authority of the state was so weak that it could not defend itself against outside powers. In 1526, Hungary was overrun and the king killed, and the territory divided up among its neighbors.

Part IV, Chapters 26-28

Part IV, Chapters 26-28 Summary and Analysis

Chapter 26 is called "Toward a More Perfect Absolutism." Fukuyama looks at the political development of Russia, which was closer to that of the Chinese and Ottomans than to Western Europe, he claims. Russia developed a system that was very similar to that of the Ottomans, but never shared that empire's respect for a rule of law. Some parts of the state did develop "free" political traditions, as in Novgorod where local leaders were elected and answered to a representative body, but these traditions were quashed by powerful kings. The Orthodox Christian Church in Russia never developed an independent hierarchy like the Catholic Church in Europe and so did not contribute toward developing a rule of law in Russia. Fukyama sees parallels in modern Russia with the strong absolutist state that existed before the Communist Revolution. Leaders act with impunity and without respect for a rule of law, and power is distributed secretly among the ruling elite despite the outward appearance of democracy.

Chapter 27 is entitled "Taxation and Representation." Fukuyama turns to England after describing several cases where states failed to develop a rule of law. France, Hungary and Russia all had assemblies that theoretically had power over their monarchs, but for the reasons Fukuyama explained in earlier chapters they did not develop the strength of the English Parliament, which was able to raise an army and defeat the monarch in a civil war as well as force a monarch from the throne and replace him.

Fukuyama traces the political tradition of England, which at the time of the Norman Conquest in the 11th century had already developed a system of participatory government through a hierarchy of local counsels, county sheriffs, and courts with the king at the top of the hierarchy expected to provide fair oversight that protected the rights of the people. The Normans renamed and reorganized some of the offices, but the system remained largely in place.

The Parliament also gained solidarity from religion, Fukuyama explains, because it was mainly Protestant and objected to what it feared was a Catholic plot by the monarch James II in the late 17th century. Parliament forced James to leave the throne and replaced him with William III. This event, Fukuyama argues, was the crucial beginning toward Parliament's eventual claim of sovereignty and an important step in the development of modern democracy. It was in England that the three required elements of modern democracy, a strong state, rule of law and accountable government, first came together at the same time.

In Chapter 28, called "Why Accountability? Why Absolutism?" Fukuyama gives the example of Denmark, which took a different path than England in getting to a modern democratic state but ended up in much the same place. There are many paths, Fukuyama argues, but what tips a state toward accountability is when it has both a strong political and social organization such as England and Denmark had. The other

states he uses for examples, such as France, Hungary and Russia, had imbalanced social and political strengths that inhibited the development of accountability.

Part V, Chapters 29-30

Part V, Chapters 29-30 Summary and Analysis

Part V is called "Toward a Theory of Political Development." In the final two chapters, Fukuyama summarizes some of the central themes of his history of political development. Chapter 29 is called "Political Development and Political Decay." Fukuyama rests his theory on the assumption that humans are naturally social animals who did not invent societies but naturally formed them. He sees an evolutionary mechanism behind political development, with features that work being passed along and those that fail being abandoned. Political decay is also part of the process, however, and states can revert to earlier kinds of organization. The existence of ideas and institutions are also necessary parts of political development.

Chapter 30 is called "Political Development, Then and Now." Fukuyama finishes this first volume of his projected two-volume work just before the French Revolution, which was followed closely by the Industrial Revolution. The sustained economic growth and globalization that have arisen since the Industrial Revolution mean that modern political development looks much different than it did before the Industrial Revolution, Fukuyama argues. He asks two questions about future political development. The first is whether China can sustain its current economic growth without further political development. The second is the fate of liberal democracies like the United States where the constraints on government make it difficult to address large problems that need long-term solutions. Fukuyama closes by stating he intends to address these questions in the forthcoming second volume.

Characters

Karl Marx

Karl Marx was a political theorist who held that economics were the driving force behind all human activity and interaction. Human nature, Marx argues, was to make the most use of the resources available. Marx called for a strong central communist state that held control of the means of production and distributed them and the proceeds from them equally to the members of the state. in Marx's view, religion was not an integral part of human motivation, but was, in Fukuyama's description, "a fairy-tale that was cooked up by elites to justify their domination of the rest of society." (p. 162)

Fukuyama disagrees with Marx on the matter of religion, providing evidence of the closely related development of religious ideas and secular concepts of the rule of law. He also rejects the type of approach taken by Marx and other theorists that seek to find a single human motivation that can account for all other behaviors. Fukyama attempts to build his theory of political development not on this type of assumption, but on biological grounds that explain some of man's most basic behaviors.

Max Weber

Max Weber was a sociologist who argued that religion was not a construct of political rulers intended to subdue the ruled, but was instead a primary motivator of social identity and human action. Weber wrote a work called "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" which, Fukuyama explains, claimed that modern ways of looking at political development as stemming from economic development is a result of the individualistic ideals that arose during the Protestant Reformation. In other words, our view of the past rests on assumptions which are based on our current beliefs, which color our interpretation. Weber argued it was necessary to look at a state's religious views in order to fully understand its economic development.

Georg Hegel

Georg Hegel was a philosopher who wrote about the importance of being recognized in the development of human society. As Fukuyama describes Hegel's thinking, humans have a natural desire to achieve recognition among their fellow humans. This drives them to form a hierarchy which can be carried to a social and political level. Fukuyama looks for a biological basis for this need to be recognized.

Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes was a political theorist and author who wrote "Leviathan," a treatise on the formation of the state. According to Hobbes, Fukuyama claims, man's deepest fear

is of a violent death. The natural state of human interaction is war, Hobbes claims, and so the state arises when men desire to protect themselves from war and death. The Leviathan is a metaphorical creature that represents the state, which secures the individual right to life by securing peace with other peoples.

John Locke

John Locke was an author and political theorist who wrote the Second Treatise on Government which Fukuyama briefly summarizes. According to Locke, Fukuyama claims, humans are naturally free and driven to preserve their freedom as well as to create possessions out of their resources and labor. Complete liberty leads to warfare, Locke argued, and so humans entered into mutual agreements to preserve their liberty and property by creating a state.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was a political theorist and the author of Discourse on Inequality. As Fukuyama summarizes Rousseau's theory of political development, humans are naturally fearful, solitary creatures who want only to care for their own needs but are thrown together into society out of mutual dependence. Although Rousseau claims only to be looking for general truths, Fukuyama notes that he also looks at primitive cultures and animals to try to determine which human behaviors may be natural and which constructed.

Thomas Malthus

Thomas Malthus was a social theorist in the late 18th century who famously noted that world population was growing at a faster rate than the ability to produce food for it. Fukuyama argues that Malthus' theory as stated no longer applied after the Industrial Revolution, after which production capability exploded, but he finds some merit in Malthus' way of approaching social issues.

Aristotle

Aristotle was an ancient Greek philosopher who argued that humans are essentially social animals. Fukuyama agrees with this assessment and looks for biological evidence to support it.

Confucius

Confucius was a Chinese teacher and philosopher who emphasized individual responsibility to one's family over the state. His teachings were banned by the Han emperor who recognized that loyalty to family undermined his authority as emperor.

Confucian ideals were not suppressed, however, and aspects of his teaching were adopted by Chinese leaders, such as the notion that an emperor should rule with the interests of the people at heart.

Wu Zhao

Wu Zhao, also called Empress Wu, was an empress whose rule was characterized by harshness and despotism.

Brahmins

The Brahmins were the highest class of the four main groups in Indian society. The Brahmins were the priests of the Hindu religion and set down the laws of behavior and observance for all followers.

Ayyubids

The Ayyubids were a Muslim group of Kurds who ruled Egypt and Syria before being taken over by the Mamluks, the Turkish slave soldiers they had employed.

Mamluks

The Mamluks were Turkish slave soldiers in the service of the Arab Ayyubid dynasty. They eventually took power themselves and ruled from Egypt, but fell into infighting and were defeated by the Ottomans.

Janissaries

A group of elite fighters who served the sultan of the Ottoman Empire, the Janissaries were non-Muslims taken from their families as boys and raised as military slaves.

Mongols

The Mongols were a warlike group in Asia who conquered much of China, the Middle East, Russia, and parts of Europe.

Augustine

Augustine was a Benedictine monk of the Catholic Church who was sent to England in the sixth century to convert the king of the Angles to Christianity.

Pope Gregory IV

Pope Gregory IV was a reformer who asserted the independence of the Catholic Church from the Holy Roman Emperor. Gregory also ended the practice of priests marrying and handing down offices and property to their heirs by making celibacy a requirement for priests. His reforms had the effect of allowing the secular authorities of Europe to develop independently, Fukuyama claims.

Gratian

Gratian was a Catholic monk of the 12th century who assembled and reconciled a large amount of Christian doctrine and rulings into a single work called the Decretum. This was the basis of canon law for the Catholic Church, which stood as a model for the construction of secular legal systems in European states.

Objects/Places

Ancient China

It was in ancient China that the first state emerged, according to Fukuyama's history of political development. Originally a tribal society, small regional states emerged and entered into a long period of almost continuous warfare with one another. This warfare strengthened the political institutions of many of these smaller states, particularly the Qin, which eventually conquered all of China.

India

Like China, India was a tribal society that grew into a series of small states that were sometimes unified under an emperor. Unlike China, India had a strong Hindu religious tradition in place before the process of unification took place and thus developed a strong rule of law.

The Middle East

The Middle East, like India, was united socially by religion, in this case Islam. Under the Mamluks and later the Ottomans, an Islamic empire emerged that had closely intertwined religious and political authorities.

Europe

Europe was initially a tribal society that developed into states relatively late compared to China, India and the Middle East. It passed from tribalism into feudalism before assembling into separate states. Europe was unique in that a separate religious authority developed alongside the secular political authority, providing both a social structure and the concept of the rule of law.

England

England was unique within Europe since it had already developed a rule of law and had a strong social structure before it developed fully into a state. It was in England that Fukuyama argues the first modern democracy emerged.

France

France developed as a monarchy that was deeply indebted to other countries and reliant on the support of an aristocratic nobility that kept the central authority weak. In

addition, France had a weak social structure that made it difficult for any organized opposition to emerge. Fukuyama calls the political structure of France in the 18th century "weak absolutism."

The State

Fukuyama defines a state as a group of people living under a central authority that claims a defined piece of territory. A state is different than a tribe in that it has a defined territory and a permanent recognized central authority that controls a military that can enforce its authority.

Rule of Law

Rule of Law is the concept that there is a pre-existing law that applies to all people, including leaders. Fukuyama sees an early emergence of the concept in India with the development of the Hindu religion, which sets out rules of behavior and observance for its adherents. Religion is important in creating the concept in other states as well, as with the Catholic Church in Europe.

Accountable Government

Accountable Government is an extension of the rule of law that places the leadership under the constraint of a public assembly. The first emergence of a modern accountable government was the British monarchy of William III who was appointed by and responsible to the British Parliament.

Tribal Society

Tribal societies are characterized as having leaders but no central institution of authority. Tribal leaders are not elected but usually chosen on the basis of their ability to defend the tribe or to distribute resources fairly. Leaders can be temporary and the leadership can change hands. Tribal societies may or may not be confined to a specific territory, but they are defined by their membership and not by the geographical area they claim. Fukuyama shares the belief that most states begin as tribal societies.

Themes

The Role of Religion in Political Development

Fukuyama quotes Karl Marx, who once said that religion was the "opiate of the masses," meaning that it was something created intentionally to distract and subdue people so their political leaders might better take advantage of them. Fukuyama disagrees strongly with this characterization of religion. He argues that religion has played a crucial role in the social and political development of civilizations.

One of the earliest forms of religion addressed by Fukuyama is ancestor worship, a fairly primitive and personal form of religious observance. Ancestor worship, he argues, has the effect of strengthening a feeling of kinship among a group of people who might only be distantly related. These kinship bonds are what allow tribes to organize into larger groups, he claims, and can develop into a patrimonial state such as existed in parts of early China. Ancestor worship also involves the tending of family graves, a practice which may contribute to the notion of private property.

In India, Fukuyama finds the first emergence of a concept of the rule of law, one of the key elements of modern democracy in his theory. This rule of law was explicitly religious at first, handed down by the Hindu priests called Brahmins. In Europe, the Catholic Church played a similar role, but its hierarchical structure and canon law also served as a model for state building. It also became independent of secular authority, allowing for the development of an independent secular state. This was not the case in the Middle East, Fukuyama argues, where religious and secular authority were intertwined and so a strong political tradition did not take hold.

Rather than a deliberate construction of political authority, Fukuyama argues that religion is a natural tendency in human development and has played an early contributing role to political development.

The Three Elements of Modern Democracy

Fukuyama argues that modern democracies all have three essential political institutions, the state, rule of law, and accountable government.

By "state" Fukuyama means a central authority that has power over a defined territory. The state has control of a military and the authority to settle disputes. States, in general, develop from tribal organizations that are based on kinship. Elements of kinship can exist in a state, Fukuyama explains, but they exist in inverse proportion to the strength of the state; the stronger the kinship ties, the weaker the state.

The concept of a "rule of law" holds that there is a law that applies to all people of the state, including the rulers. Social rules become written laws that are used to formally organize the leadership of the state and apply to all individuals. In some states, the rule

of law was explicitly religious in nature, such as in India and the Middle East. In England, which Fukuyama argues was unique among all states, a concept of a rule of law had already grown out of the customary laws and courts of the king even before real state building had begun.

"Accountable government" is when the rule of law is extended to make the ruler accountable directly to the ruled in a formal way, such as the formation of a Parliament or other representative assembly. Here again, England was the forerunner of accountable government when it removed James II from the throne and instated William III.

England was the first place in which these three crucial elements came together at the same time, Fukuyama claims. He also looks at other European states which did not develop these elements at the same time and describes the political weaknesses that were a result.

Fukuyama further argues that the proper way to address the study of the origin of political development is to look at these three elements both in isolation within a certain state as well as comparatively with other states. The individual factors that affect how these elements develop are countless, but by tracing them and comparing them between states, he argues, we can get closer to a true theory of political development.

A Biological Origin for Social Organization

In the introductory chapters to his book, Fukuyama summarizes the political theories of some well known writers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. These theorists differed in their ideas about political development, Fukuyama explains, but they all made the same assumption that humans were essentially solitary creatures before they agreed to enter into social organizations with one another.

Fukuyama disagrees with this assumption, and argues that humans have evolved biologically to be social creatures, and that many of the behaviors that contribute to political organization can be traced to these biological tendencies.

Fukuyama bases his argument on the observed behaviors of chimpanzees, the primates that are most genetically close to humans. Chimps regularly form into bands of several dozen animals, he notices, and stake out a territory which they protect. They have a hierarchical order of males which can be challenged by any males in the group. Sometimes males form alliances with other animals to challenge or defend the hierarchy. Fukuyama cites evidence that chimps can recognize their own relatives and give them preference. They also appear to make judgments on the trustworthiness of other animals based on past experience.

Chimps are also prone to fight with other bands over territory, sometimes killing their rivals, sometimes driving them out of their territory.

Fukuyama sees in these chimp behaviors all the necessary elements for creating a human social organization. Early humans gathered in tribes with a leader who was probably chosen for his ability to fight or defend the group. The tendency to war with other groups strengthened the ties to one's tribe and territory and also forced other groups to organize to avoid being overrun by their better-organized neighbors. The preference for one's own relatives is evident in the kinship-based structure that many large tribes took, Fukuyama argues, and is a tendency that persists even in modern states. The natural tendency to judge the trustworthiness of another individual based on his behavior is the seed for a formal set of rules of behavior such as are set out by religious authorities, Fukuyama claims.

In putting forth a biological basis for all political development, Fukuyama is making a dramatic claim that much of the theory that precedes his is based on an incorrect assumption.

Style

Perspective

Fukuyama is writing about the history of political development and for the main section of the work takes a historical perspective of past events. He recounts the emergence of state institutions in China, India, the Middle East and Europe, using a comparative approach that looks at individual elements of political development in relationship to one another.

Fukuyama does not limit himself to a strictly historical perspective, however. He takes a very broad approach, incorporating the natural sciences, economics, geography and religion as well as political science. He is critical of previous theorists who look for one single cause, such as economics, to explain all political development. He also avoids the narrow view of the anthropologist who might focus only on one group of people. Only through a broad perspective that looks at all the contributing factors can a full understanding of political development be obtained, he believes.

Fukuyama ends the book just prior to the French Revolution, explaining that he intends to complete the work with a second volume that will bring his theory to bear on modern political development since the Industrial Revolution. While he is looking backward to lay an historical foundation, he is also looking forward to how his theory might apply today.

Tone

Fukuyama is a college professor and his writing is scholarly and academic in tone. He presents his arguments in direct prose and provides supporting evidence for them. Much of the book is concerned with recounting historical events, which are described in a straightforward manner.

Fukuyama is presenting what he believes is a new approach to the subject of the origins of political order, and he is often in disagreement with other theorists who have also written on the subject. In several places, Fukuyama summarizes the theory of a previous author then states plainly that the theory is flat wrong. He then goes on to explain why he finds fault in the previous theory. In these passages, Fukuyama's tone sometimes takes on a hint of antagonism not only toward previous theorists, but perhaps also toward his present colleagues who subscribe to those theories.

In the final two chapters, Fukuyama brings his theory briefly into the present day and asks what it might mean for the future of two major modern states, China and the United States. He suggests that China may not be able to sustain its present condition, and points out that the United States seems unable to effectively address long-term problems. He is more optimistic about the political sustainability of the United States, but the tone at the end of the book is somewhat pessimistic.

Structure

The Origins of Political Order is structured in five parts. The first part, called "Before the State," outlines the prehistory of human society and the development of tribal societies. Fukuyama lays out much of the introductory information for the remainder of the book in this first section.

The three central sections of the book each correspond to one of the three elements that Fukuyama argues are necessary for the existence of a modern democracy. These elements are a strong central state, respect for the rule of law and an accountable government.

Part II is called "State Building." In this part, Fukuyama takes an historical look at what he argues is the first real emergence of a state, China under the Han Dynasty. Using China as a benchmark, he then compares the emergence of states in India and the Middle East. These civilizations all had some of the elements of modern states, but none had all of the three crucial elements of democracy, he explains.

Part III is called "The Rule of Law." In this section, Fukuyama examines how the concept developed of a higher rule of law that applies to both rulers and the ruled. He finds its origins within a society are closely tied with religion, such as in India where the Hindu Brahmins instilled a respect and obedience to a set of observances and religious laws. In Europe, the Catholic Church played an important role in establishing a rule of law.

Part IV is called "Accountable Government." In this part, Fukuyama looks at four types of European states up through the 18th century and examines how their varying social and political factors affected the type of government they developed. He uses France and Spain as examples of states that developed a weak absolutism and Russia as an example of successful absolutism. He looks to Hungary as an example of a failed oligarchy, and finally to England as the earliest example of truly accountable government under the Parliament.

Fukuyama closes with a synthesis of his argument about the three elements of modern democracy in Part V, called "Toward a Theory of Political Development." He also uses these last chapters as an introduction to the subject of the second volume in his work.

Within each section are individual chapters, each focusing on a single subject. Fukuyama presents a historical view of political development and in general the book is chronological. Fukuyama makes use of occasional illustrations, tables and maps. The book also contains endnotes and an index.

Quotes

"Hence the current book, which looks at the historical origins of political institutions as well as the process of political decay. This is the first of two volumes, and it deals with political development from prehuman times up to roughly the eve of the French and American revolutions." Preface, p. xiii

"Both society and conflict have existed for as long as there have been human beings, because human beings are by nature both social and competitive animals. The primates from which the human species evolved practiced an attenuated form of politics." Chapter 1, p. 25

"Human societies are so diverse that it is very difficult to make truly universal generalizations from the comparative study of cultures. ... This does not mean, however, that regularities and similarities in evolutionary forms do not exist across different societies." Chapter 3, p. 51

"The chief driver of Chinese state formation was not the need to create grand irrigation projects, nor the rise of a charismatic religious leader, but unrelenting warfare." Chapter 5, p. 94

"The emergence of a modern state is a necessary condition for intensive economic development, but it is not a sufficient one. Other institutions needed to be in place for capitalism to emerge." Chapter 7, p. 126

"If we use the Chinese case as a baseline for political development, Indian society takes a big detour by around 600 B.C. India does not experience prolonged warfare of the sort that would drive it to develop a modern, impersonal centralized state. Instead of concentrating authority in an emperor, it is split between a well-differentiated class of priests and a class of warriors, who need each other to survive." Chapter 10, p. 161

"Indian social development outran both political and economic development early on. The subcontinent acquired a common culture under a set of religious beliefs and social practices that marked it as a distinctive civilization long before anyone tried to unify it politically." Chapter 12, p. 175

"The Ottomans were by far the most successful regime ever to emerge in the Muslim world. They were able to concentrate power on a scale unprecedented for the region on the basis of the institutions they created. They made the shift from a tribal to a state-level society in a remarkably short period of time and then developed state institutions that incorporated several notably modern features." Chapter 15, p. 227

"European political development was exceptional insofar as European societies made an early exit from tribal-level organization, and did so without the benefit of top-down political power." Chapter 17, p. 245

"The rule of law in its deepest sense means that there is a social consensus within a society that its laws are just and that they preexist and should constrain the behavior of whoever happens to be the ruler at a given time." Chapter 18, p. 262

"Accountable government means that the rulers believe that they are responsible to the people they govern and put the people's interests above their own." Chapter 22, p. 321

"England was the first large country in which all these elements came together at once. The three components were highly interdependent. Without a strong early state, there would not have been a rule of law and a broad perception of legitimate property rights. Without a strong rule of law and legitimate property rights, the Commons would never have been motivated to come together to impose accountability on the English monarchy. And without the principle of accountability, the British state would never have emerged as the great power it became by the time of the French Revolution." Chapter 27, p. 420

"We need, then, to disaggregate the political, economic, and social dimensions of development, and understand how they relate to one another as separate phenomena that periodically interact." Chapter 30, p. 460

Topics for Discussion

How does Fukuyama connect biology and society? Is his argument convincing?

How does religion arise in a society, according to Fukuyama, and what is its purpose?

Describe the roles that Hinduism, Islam and Christianity play in the development of India, the Middle East and Europe respectively, according to Fukuyama.

What made England unique among its European neighbors, according to the author?

What role did religion play in ancient China? How does the author think it affected that state's development?

What are the main differences between a tribal-level society and a state-level society, in Fukuyama's view?

What causes a tribe to become a state?